Opinion
B326731
09-21-2023
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18CCJP01537 Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Cesar V. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his two children, L.V. and S.V.H., at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. We affirm.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2021, L.V. and S.V.H.'s mother, Monica H.R. (Mother), tested positive for methamphetamine on the day she gave birth to L.V. She told a social worker she had used the substance three days earlier. Father told the social worker he had a history of using methamphetamine, but had been clean and sober since June 2020. Father said he is on probation and was about to start an inpatient rehabilitation program at a Salvation Army facility. Father agreed to submit to an on-demand drug test, but failed to show up for the test one week later.
In March 2021, DCFS took L.V. and S.V.H. into protective custody and placed them with a maternal aunt, F.R. L.V. was three weeks old at the time and S.V.H. was three years old.
DCFS filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), and (j), based upon Mother's methamphetamine use during pregnancy, and Mother's and Father's failure to protect the children from the other's substance abuse.
In April 2021, Father informed a dependency investigator that he had used drugs during his rehabilitation program at the Salvation Army, had an argument with a program manager, left the program, and is not allowed to return. Father then moved to Texas, where he has family.
In May 2021, the court sustained the dependency petition, declared the children dependents of the court, removed the children from each parent's custody, and directed DCFS to provide reunification services. The children continued to be placed with their maternal aunt, F.R.
In a status report prepared for the six-month review hearing, DCFS reported that F.R. "has been supportive and provided the children with a stable and loving home." A social worker observed that L.H. has bonded with F.R., and S.V.H. told the social worker that "she loves her 'Tia' very much."
The social worker reported that Mother was in partial compliance with her case plan.
Father was not in compliance with his case plan and not in communication with DCFS. F.R. informed the social worker that she believes Father has been incarcerated for the preceding two months. DCFS recommended that the court terminate reunification services for Father. The court, however, ordered services be continued for Father "over [DCFS's] objection."
In its 12-month status report prepared in April 2022, DCFS reported that Mother and Father were not in compliance with their case plans. Although Father had been "released from jail" in January 2022, his whereabouts were unknown. He had not been in communication with DCFS, had not drug tested as required, and had not seen the children since March 2021. Meanwhile, F.R. continued to provide "the children with a stable and loving home." DCFS recommended the court terminate reunification services for both parents. In a last minute information filed on April 29, 2022, DCFS stated that adoption by F.R. and her husband "is the recommended plan."
Neither Mother nor Father personally participated in the 12-month review hearing in May 2022. F.R. was present by telephone. The court indicated its tentative ruling to terminate family reunification services. Father's counsel and Mother's counsel each stated their "object[ion] for the record." The court then terminated services and set a hearing to be held pursuant to section 366.26. The court further ordered DCFS to prepare an assessment plan pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (i), and initiate an adoption home study.
DCFS prepared a concurrent planning assessment in April 2022. According to the assessment, a social worker "discussed permanency planning as to [L.V. and S.V.H.]" The social worker informed F.R. "of the legal and financial benefits between adoption and legal guardianship," and F.R. "stated that she and [her husband] are willing to adopt the siblings." F.R. further stated that she became a foster parent "with the hopes of adopting a child" and that "she loves her nieces and she wants to provide them with a permanent home."
In a report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, DCFS notes that F.R. and her husband (the prospective adoptive parents) "became foster parents with the intention of adopting the children ....[They] have become attached to the children since caring for them for over a year and four months. They would like to continue providing a loving home for [L.V. and S.V.H.]," and for the children "to become their children permanently through adoption." Under the hearing, "understanding of responsibilities of adoption/legal guardianship" (boldface &capitalization omitted), DCFS states that the prospective adoptive parents "are aware of the responsibilities of adopting [L.V. and S.V.H.], and that they will have all [the] legal . . . rights, as if they were their biological children. [They] continue[ ] to be committed and eager to become [L.V. and S.V.H.'s] adoptive parents and provide them with a permanent, loving and stable home." Under the heading, "commitment to permanent plan" (boldface &capitalization omitted), DCFS states that the prospective adoptive parents "continue to express their desire to provide [L.V. and S.V.H.] with a permanent home through adoption." Their commitment to adoption was further expressed in a reports prepared in October 2022 and January 2023.
At the section 366.26 hearing held on February 1, 2023, Mother's counsel "object[ed] to termination of parental rights," without stating a ground for the objection. Father's counsel stated that "Father does object to termination of parental rights today" because he will be released from jail in July 2023 "and his hope was to be able to do services to reunify with his children." The court then terminated Father's and Mother's parental rights and identified adoption as the children's permanent plan.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Under section 361.5, subdivision (g)(2)(B), "[a] relative caregiver shall be given information regarding the permanency options of guardianship and adoption, including the long-term benefits and consequences of each option, prior to establishing legal guardianship or pursuing adoption." Father contends that social workers failed to provide this information to the prospective adoptive parents and that this failure deprived the juvenile court of a meaningful opportunity to ascertain the children's best interests and determine whether the relative guardian exception to adoption applied. He requests that we reverse the court's order terminating parental rights and instruct DCFS to advise the prospective adoptive parents of the relative guardian exception to adoption and report to the court on their desired permanent plan at a new section 366.26 hearing. We agree with DCFS that Father has forfeited this issue on appeal by failing to raise it below.
The relative guardian exception to adoption is codified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), which provides an exception to adoption when "[t]he child is living with a relative who is unable or unwilling to adopt the child because of circumstances that do not include an unwillingness to accept legal or financial responsibility for the child, but who is willing and capable of providing the child with a stable and permanent environment through legal guardianship, and the removal of the child from the custody of their relative would be detrimental to the emotional well-being of the child."
" '[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672; see In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790 ["[i]f the order was in fact erroneous, and the court is persuaded by the reason advanced by the objecting party, the court has the opportunity to correct the error"].) Moreover, when a party asserts an objection, the objection must be on the same ground asserted on appeal. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756.)
At no point in the dependency proceeding did Father contend that DCFS had failed to comply with the informational requirement under section 361.5, subdivision (g)(2)(B), or argue that the relative guardian exception to adoption applies. Although Father asserted an objection to termination of his parental rights based on his anticipated release from jail several months hence and "his hope" that he could receive "services to reunify with his children," this is insufficient to preserve the issues he raises on appeal concerning the relative guardian placement.
DISPOSITION
The orders from which Father has appealed are affirmed.
We concur: BENDIX, J., WEINGART, J.