Opinion
B228731
11-17-2011
In re JESSICA G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CESAR G. et al., Defendants and Respondents, JESSICA G., Objector and Appellant.
Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant Jessica G. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent, Cesar G. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent, Jennifer R.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK75206)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Valerie Skeba, Referee. Affirmed.
Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant Jessica G.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent, Cesar G.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent, Jennifer R.
In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), minor Jessica G. appeals from a section 366.26 order, identifying legal guardianship as the appropriate permanent plan for her. Jessica's counsel asserts that the juvenile court should have terminated parental rights and identified adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. Jessica's counsel contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied to the relationship between Cesar G. (Father) and Jessica. We affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the commencement of these dependency proceedings, Father and Jennifer R. (Mother) shared custody of Jessica on an informal basis. In or about July 2008, when Jessica was four years old, Mother took Jessica to Father's home and did not return for her. In or about September 2008, Mother's sister, Erica K., picked up Jessica from the home of Father's parents while Father was working out of town. Erica K. stated that she would care for Jessica. Thereafter, Father did not provide for Jessica. He saw her one time, on October 7, 2008, when Erica K. brought her to his mother's home for a visit.
Mother is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we discuss allegations against her and events involving her only to the extent that they also relate to Father.
In October 2008, Erica K. contacted the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and informed a social worker that she planned to seek legal guardianship of Jessica. Erica K. reported that Mother was using drugs, including methamphetamine, and had a mental illness. She stated that Father wanted "'nothing to do with'" Jessica.
On October 30, 2008, Erica K. informed the social worker that Mother planned to take Jessica back. The social worker advised Erica K. to bring Jessica to the DCFS office. Erica K. agreed to do that. DCFS detained Jessica that day and placed her in foster care.
On November 2, 2008, the social worker contacted Father and informed him that "Jessica was placed in protective custody due to general neglect and caretaker absence by both parents." Father stated that he would appear at the detention hearing. In the detention report, DCFS noted that Father "appears concerned for his child."
On November 4, 2008, DCFS filed a petition under section 300, alleging Mother's substance abuse and mental and emotional problems, and Mother's and Father's failure to provide for Jessica. The petition also alleged: "The child Jessica G[.] has been diagnosed with developmental delays, mental retardation and speech/language impairment. The child's mother . . . and father . . . are unable to provide the child with appropriate parental care and supervision due to the child's medical problems. The parents have failed to follow through with the child's scheduled medical appointments. Such inability on the part of the child's parents endangers the child's physical and emotional health and safety and places the child at risk of physical harm, damage and danger."
Father appeared at the November 4, 2008 detention hearing. His counsel informed the juvenile court that he would submit on detention. Father requested that DCFS investigate whether Jessica could be placed with his mother (Jessica's paternal grandmother). Father was living in his mother's five-bedroom home at the time. Father's counsel told the court that Father "ha[d] been quite forthcoming" in informing counsel that he had a "three-year-old conviction for domestic violence with [M]other" and an October arrest for possession of marijuana. Father represented that he had completed 48 out of 52 domestic violence classes. The juvenile court suggested that Father move out of his mother's home and Father agreed to do so. Father's counsel informed the court that Father had been unaware that he could get "assistance" in caring for Jessica's special needs. Now that Father was aware that assistance was available, his "preference" was "that his daughter reside with him." Jessica's counsel argued that Jessica had thrived in Erica K's care and requested that DCFS "continue to . . . work with [Erica K.] on getting waivers for her criminal conviction" so that Jessica could be placed with her.
The juvenile court ordered Jessica to remain suitably placed in foster care. The court also ordered DCFS to complete a pre-release investigation report regarding placement with Father's mother. The court granted reunification services and monitored visitation for Father. The court ordered Father to appear at the January 8, 2009 jurisdiction hearing.
In a pre-release investigation report, prepared on or about November 6, 2008, DCFS identified several "safety concerns" at the paternal grandmother's home, including broken windows and metal debris in the yard. The grandmother informed the social worker that she would make repairs as soon as she could, and that she "would like to remain as a possible relative to care for [Jessica]." DCFS reported that the social worker could not discuss the matter with Father. He had moved out of his mother's home and the paternal grandmother stated that she did not have contact information for him.
On November 7, 2008, the juvenile court ruled that DCFS had discretion to place Jessica with the paternal grandmother once her home was approved. The court also ordered the social worker "to seek a criminal waiver" allowing Jessica to be placed with the maternal aunt, Erica K.
On January 6, 2009, DCFS filed a first amended petition against Mother, Father and the father of Mother's infant son. In addition to the allegations about Father set forth above, DCFS also alleged: The child, Jessica G[.]'s parents . . . have engaged in numerous violent altercations in which the father choked and punched the mother causing the mother to sustain bleeding lacerations. Such violent altercations on the part of the child's parents endangers the child's physical and emotional health and safety and places the child at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage and danger."
In the jurisdiction/disposition report, prepared on or about January 5, 2009, DCFS reported that the social worker had been unable to contact Father. The paternal grandmother declined to provide contact information for Father, but stated that she would tell Father to contact the social worker at the telephone number provided. DCFS also reported that the paternal grandmother had had a visit with Jessica, but Father had not contacted the foster mother to arrange visitation.
DCFS listed the following reasons why it could not return Jessica to the care of Father: "The father has failed to make himself available to the Department and has not shown any effort at addressing the issues that brought the family to the attention of the Department. The father made an inappropriate plan for the care of the child by allowing her to reside with the maternal aunt, [Erica K.] The father stated that he knew that the maternal aunt had a substance abuse history yet allowed the child, who suffers from multiple developmental delays, to be cared by her [sic]. Further, it is unknown if the father has a substance abuse problem as he has failed to make himself available to the Department for a complete assessment, however, his criminal history shows at least one drug related arrest which raises concern that the father may also have substance abuse issues that must be addressed before the child can be safely returned to his care."
Father appeared for the hearing on January 8, 2009, but was excused by his counsel before the hearing commenced. The juvenile court set the matter for mediation. According to Father's counsel, Father fixed the broken windows at the paternal grandmother's home. The court ordered DCFS to reevaluate the home for possible placement of Jessica.
On February 5, 2009, Father appeared for mediation and stated that he would "agree to a case plan following adjudication of the petition that includes suitable placement for Jessica." The mediation agreement provided that DCFS would "continue to assess Jessica's paternal grandmother's home for placement."
In an interim review report, prepared on or about February 2, 2009, DCFS reported that Father still had not contacted DCFS. Erica K. told the social worker that she believed Father was still living with the paternal grandmother and that Father had "never provided for the child, paid child support, or cared for the child physically."
On March 4, 2009, the juvenile court adjudicated the first amended petition. Father was not present at the hearing, but he was represented by counsel. The court dismissed the allegations against Father regarding his failure to provide for Jessica. The court sustained the allegation about Father's "violent altercations" with Mother, as quoted above. The court also sustained the following allegation, as amended: "The child, Jessica G[.] has been diagnosed with developmental delays, mental retardation and speech/language impairment. The child's mother . . . and father . . . have a limited ability to deal with the child's special needs. Such inability on the part of the child's parents endangers the child's physical and emotional health and safety and places the child . . . at risk of physical harm, damage and danger."
The juvenile court entered a disposition case plan requiring Father to attend domestic violence counseling, parent education and individual counseling to address family dysfunction and case issues. The court ordered monitored visitation for Father.
Father appeared for a review hearing on April 8, 2009, and submitted on an order limiting his right to make educational decisions for Jessica. DCFS continued to work with the maternal aunt, Erica K., regarding potential placement of Jessica.
In an interim review report, prepared on or about July 9, 2009, DCFS reported that the foster home where Jessica had lived for nine months was being assessed as a possible "adoptive home." A couple of weeks later, DCFS reported that five-and-a-half-year-old Jessica was "saying more single words than she did prior to detainment," and had "gone to the bathroom on the toilet one time however remain[ed] in diapers."
In a status review report, prepared on or about August 25, 2009, DCFS reported that Father had not contacted the social worker "since this case initially opened with DCFS." Accordingly, DCFS provided no assessment of Father's compliance with the case plan. DCFS recommended that Father's reunification services be terminated. DCFS also reported that Jessica was having weekly monitored visits with the paternal grandmother.
Father appeared at a September 28, 2009 status review hearing. Father's counsel informed the juvenile court that Father "has visited with the child." The court declined to terminate Father's reunification services, finding "Father's compliance [with the case plan] has been partial -- been minimal, but he is visiting."
In a status review report, prepared on or about March 10, 2010, DCFS reported that Jessica was placed in the home of a new "prospective adoptive parent" on January 22, 2010. DCFS explained: "The family was close to the previous foster mother . . . and they were also Jessica's respite caretakers. Jessica is very familiar with her current caretakers and appears to be adjusting well in the new home. Jessica has been enjoying living with her four foster sisters and appears to be [quite] comfortable in the home. Jessica calls the foster mother 'mommy.' At Jessica's visit in February, Jessica was very excited to show [the social worker] her new bedroom."
DCFS also reported on Father's visitation with Jessica. He and the foster mother agreed that he would have monitored visits on Saturdays. The foster mother informed the social worker that Father had been "consistent in visiting Jessica [between October and December 2009] and they had good visits." At the end of December, Father stopped visiting. DCFS learned that Father was arrested on December 23, 2009 for an unidentified reason. Prior to that date, he had not enrolled in classes or counseling.
Father appeared at a status review hearing on March 29, 2010. His counsel informed the juvenile court that he had been recently released from custody. The court ordered DCFS to set up a visitation schedule for Father. The court set the matter for a contest regarding termination of Father's reunification services, and ordered DCFS to assess relatives, including the paternal grandmother, for potential placement of Jessica.
In late April 2010, DCFS reported that it still did not have contact information for Father. The paternal grandmother told the social worker that Father had moved in with his girlfriend, but she did not have contact information for him. The foster mother reported that Father contacted Jessica once in March, but did not provide a telephone number where he could be reached.
Father appeared at the contested review hearing on May 4, 2010. His counsel informed the juvenile court that he had participated in a domestic violence program and intended to participate in parenting classes and counseling. The juvenile court terminated his reunification services and ordered DCFS to set up a visitation schedule for him and his relatives.
On or about August 27, 2010, DCFS prepared a report for the section 366.26 hearing. DCFS recommended that the juvenile court terminate Father's parental rights and select adoption as the appropriate permanent plan for Jessica. The foster mother still expressed interest in adopting her. DCFS reported visits with Jessica by the paternal grandparents, but did not report any visits by Father. In July 2010, Father informed the social worker that he was temporarily living at his mother's home.
After the section 366.26 hearing was continued, DCFS prepared another report on or about October 19, 2010. DCFS informed the juvenile court that Father had "maintained accessional contact with caregiver and Jessica." The foster mother arranged for Father and the paternal grandparents to have visits with Jessica on Sundays. DCFS reported that Father had visits with Jessica on July 18, August 29 and September 12, 2010, and spoke with her on the phone on July 15, September 6 and September 11, 2010. The foster mother stated that "the visits went well and Jessica enjoy[ed] seeing her family." The paternal grandfather told the social worker that, although he did not have contact information for Father, the social worker could mail letters to Father at the paternal grandmother's home and the letters would be delivered to Father. The paternal grandparents did not live together.
On October 26, 2010, the social worker met with the paternal grandmother "and completed a walk through" of the paternal grandmother's home. The social worker recommended minor corrections to the home and referred the matter for a kinship home assessment.
The juvenile court conducted the section 366.26 hearing on October 28, 2010. The parties stipulated that if the paternal grandmother were called to testify she would state: (1) that she had completed a foster and kinship care training program at a community college; (2) that she was willing to care for Jessica; (3) that she felt she was capable of taking care of Jessica's needs; (4) that she was willing to adopt Jessica; and (5) that she was "willing to do whatever the court ask[ed] to have Jessica G[.] in her care."
Father testified at the hearing. He stated that he and his family members would travel about 63 miles on Sundays to visit Jessica at her foster home. He would set out for his Sunday visits at about 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. He would spend the day with Jessica, and leave for home at about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. The visits took place at Jessica's foster home and at a park and restaurant near the foster home. Father's parents attended these visits, and occasionally one of his brothers made the trip with them.
Father also had the opportunity to visit with Jessica closer to his own home. When Jessica's foster mother was visiting the mall near Father's home, she would call Father and allow him to visit Jessica at the mall.
Father tried to have telephone contact with Jessica at least once a week. He was mindful of her schedule and her early bedtime at her foster home. When he worked late, he was unable to speak with Jessica on the phone.
Father characterized his relationship with Jessica as "different" from the relationship she had with anyone else. He described Jessica as "a child trapped in a box, that - her brain doesn't connect with her mouth that well." He explained that he had "always been able to understand everything she says." He believed that when Jessica was with him she felt "like a normal kid" because she did not need to "try[] as hard to pronounce these words." According to Father, Jessica was "a little more in tune, a little more attentive to the situation" during their visits. Father would bring "learning toys and different books" to share with her.
Father believed that Jessica was "very attached to [him]." When they would see each other, she appeared to feel excited and that she was special. Father explained: "[T]hat excitement that she has when she sees me is very -- is very tremendous, to the point where you can notice that, in that brief moment, she's particular in that house, not just another member of where she's at." During visits and phone calls, Jessica would refer to Father as "Papa Alex" because her foster sisters knew Father as "Alex." Jessica would carry pictures of Father in her bag when she went to school.
Father stated that, before Jessica's removal, he had been the one who had taken care of Jessica, changing her diaper, playing with her and taking on most of the parental responsibilities.
Although Father appreciated everything the foster mother had done for Jessica, and believed her to be "a really good person," Father did not want the foster mother to adopt Jessica. He wanted the juvenile court to place Jessica in his mother's home. The family had spent about $10,000 to remodel the home so that it would be ready for Jessica to live there.
During oral argument, DCFS's and Jessica's counsel urged the juvenile court to terminate Father's parental rights. Both asserted that Father's visitation had not been as frequent as he had testified. Jessica's counsel also argued: "[Father] has just recently entered into her life. And at this point in time, Jessica looks to the current caretaker as her parent. And she's there with her every day and looks to her for her everyday needs. She has been with this caretaker for almost a year now. And she is stable with the current caretaker, and they do have a bond, parent-child-relationship-type bond. [¶] And Jessica does have very special needs. The caretaker is taking care of these special needs. And she has been very willing to allow the father and the paternal relatives to visit. . . ."
The juvenile court concluded that Father satisfied the parent-child exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B). The court identified legal guardianship as the permanent plan for Jessica. In making its ruling, the juvenile court stated, in pertinent part:
"I was very impressed with father's testimony. And I will tell you why. It's very clear that he has a deep love for his child. And that's impressive to me because that -there are a lot of fathers in this system and out of the system who do not step up to the plate for their child, particularly one who has these special needs.
"But what came through to me, in a way that doesn't come through in the reports, from father's testimony is the love his child has for him. And I've observed it when they were here in court.
"But his testimony about the time he spends with his daughter, you know, the efforts that he's made to preserve this relationship -- and, frankly, I think she looks to him as being her father. I think that's pretty clear to me. It's also clear to me that the -- the caretaker would want to continue the familial relationship with father and his family.
"But here's my concern is that maybe that will work out, and maybe everything will be fine. But once I terminate parental rights, those parental rights are terminated, and you can't undo that. And you can't undo that if, for some reason, this person can't care for Jessica.
[¶]. . . [¶]
"And, usually, when I'm considering all those factors, the child's need for stability outweighs the relationship that they have with their parent. But in this case, I have to say I don't think that's -- that's true. I think this father is very, very important to Jessica.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"I think Jessica does look to that -- the caretaker as being her parent. But I also think she looks to her father as being her dad. And he's gone out of -- both the caretaker and the father have gone to extraordinary circumstances to maintain this relationship. And it is a relationship that is worth maintaining.
"And I can't take the chance that something is going to happen to that relationship. We can always reconsider adoption at a later point. We can never reconsider termination of parental rights.
"So I just think, in this particular case -- and this is not something I very often find -- but I think this relationship is too important to Jessica to risk it being terminated. And I think she benefits from having father in her life."
Jessica's counsel appealed. DCFS has not submitted a brief on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Jessica's counsel contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights applied to the relationship between Father and Jessica. Jessica's counsel asserts that the juvenile court should have terminated parental rights and identified adoption as the appropriate permanent plan for Jessica instead of legal guardianship.
"At a hearing under section 366.26, the court is required to select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child. Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan." (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164.) When the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted, the court must terminate parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can show that one of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applies. (Ibid.) "Because a parent's claim to such an exception is evaluated in light of the Legislature's preference for adoption, it is only in exceptional circumstances that a court will choose a permanent plan other than adoption." (In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469.)
"'The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.'" (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 122.) To satisfy the burden of proving the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B), a parent must demonstrate that he or she has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The second prong of this exception requires the parent to demonstrate that his or her relationship with the child "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Even frequent and loving contact between a child and a parent is not sufficient, by itself, to establish the significant parent-child relationship required under subdivision (c)(1)(B). (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.) A "parental relationship is necessary for the exception to apply, not merely a friendly or familiar one" because "[i]t would make no sense to forgo adoption in order to preserve parental rights in the absence of a real parental relationship." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The juvenile "'court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' [Citation.]" (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) "The factors to be considered include: '(1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of the interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs.' [Citation.]" (In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 81.)
"Reviewing courts have applied various standards of review when considering trial court determinations of the applicability of these statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights. In In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 . . . , the court observed that both the substantial evidence test and the abuse of discretion test have been applied, and the court stated that '[t]he practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant. "[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only '"if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he [or she] did." . . .'" [Citations.] However, the abuse of discretion standard is not only traditional for custody determinations, but it also seems a better fit in cases like this one, especially since the statute now requires the juvenile court to find a "compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)[ (B) ].) That is a quintessentially discretionary determination. The juvenile court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and generally get "the feel of the case" warrants a high degree of appellate court deference. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.)
Citing In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527-1528, Jessica's counsel "urges this court to apply the de novo standard of review." In In re I.W., the Court of Appeal articulated a third standard of review applicable in cases in which a parent fails to meet his or her burden of proof on the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. (Ibid.) The appellate court explained: "In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact's unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case [citations]. [¶] Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1528.) This standard is inapplicable here where the party with the burden of proof, Father, prevailed at trial.
We apply a deferential standard of review. Regardless of whether the substantial evidence test or an abuse of discretion standard is applied, we will not disturb the juvenile court's decision to preserve Father's parental rights and identify legal guardianship as the permanent plan, for the reasons discussed below.
The juvenile court's finding that Father maintained regular visitation and contact with Jessica is supported by substantial evidence. As set forth above, at the September 28, 2009 status review hearing the juvenile court made a finding that Father was visiting Jessica. DCFS subsequently reported that Father consistently visited Jessica between October 2009 and his December 23, 2009 arrest and incarceration. Father was released from custody in or about March 2010. Sometime thereafter, he and the foster mother arranged for Sunday visits. At the October 28, 2010 section 366.26 hearing, Father testified that he was visiting Jessica regularly on Sundays and was maintaining weekly telephone contact with her.
At the section 366.26 hearing, counsel for Jessica and DCFS both argued that Father's visitation was not as frequent as he testified. The juvenile court found Father's testimony to be credible. The credibility of a witness is a question for the trier of fact, not this court. (In re Precious D. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1258-1259.)
We afford the juvenile court's finding that Jessica would benefit from continuing the relationship with Father a "high degree of . . . deference," given the "'juvenile court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and generally get "the feel of the case."'" (In re Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.) The court commented that it had observed the love that Father had for Jessica and the love that Jessica had for Father and the nature of their parent-child relationship.
Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates: Jessica called Father "Papa Alex." She carried pictures of him in her bag when she went to school. She appeared to relax when she was around Father because he understood everything she said despite her severe speech delay. During visits with Father, Jessica was focused and "in tune" with her surroundings, and "attentive" to activities. According to Father, during the time that Father and Mother shared custody of Jessica, Father cared for Jessica, changing her diaper, playing with her and taking on most of the parental responsibilities.
We are mindful of the legislative preference for adoption but, on this record, we will not disturb the juvenile court decision declining to terminate parental rights. Substantial evidence demonstrates that Father occupied a parental role in Jessica's life and that "'severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.'" (In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827.) The evidence shows that, with Father, Jessica seemed to feel confident and understood despite her developmental delays. He provided a place in the world where she felt special and "complete." The juvenile court did not err in preserving this relationship.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
MALLANO, P. J.
JOHNSON, J.