Opinion
B234285
01-23-2012
In re J.Z. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ADRIAN Z., Defendant and Appellant.
Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Melinda White-Svec, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK 84953)
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Timothy R. Saito, Judge. Affirmed.
Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Melinda White-Svec, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this dependency appeal, Adrian Z., the alleged father of J.Z. (father), contends the trial court erred in sustaining the allegations of the petition that he failed to provide the child with the necessities of life, thereby endangering the child's health and safety. He also contends the court erred in denying him reunification services. We find father's jurisdictional challenge is without merit, both because father acknowledges facts to be true in his appellate brief which establish as a matter of law the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, and because the jurisdictional findings that mother's substance abuse placed J.Z. at risk of harm render nonjusticiable father's challenge to the jurisdictional findings of his own neglect. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of reunification services to father, who, as an alleged father who was incarcerated throughout these proceedings, is not entitled to reunification services. We therefore affirm the trial court's orders.
Father acknowledges in his appellate brief that he was incarcerated during mother's pregnancy with J.Z. and remained incarcerated throughout this case. Father also acknowledges these additional facts in his brief. Mother and J.Z. came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services because mother tested positive for methamphetamines before and at the time of J.Z.'s birth. Mother did not resolve her drug addiction problems, so J.Z. and his siblings were detained. About a month later, father was released from custody in San Bernardino, but his whereabouts remained unknown until his sister reported to the Department that he was again incarcerated, this time in Oklahoma, and he was scheduled to be transferred to federal prison in Georgia. Father has many criminal convictions for weapons and drug crimes, as well as domestic violence. His sister also reported to the Department that father had not provided financially for J.Z. because he was not working. She reported he had been arrested for illegal entry into the United States. The court appointed counsel to represent father. Counsel spoke with father before the hearing to adjudicate the allegations concerning father's failure to provide for J.Z. At the hearing, father's counsel argued the court should not sustain the allegations because mother had provided for J.Z. before his detention, and J.Z. was being well cared for by his maternal aunt.
These facts alone establish the paradigm case for dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) A child may be declared a dependent under subdivision (b) when a parent fails to provide a child with the necessities of life. A child may be declared a dependent under subdivision (g) when a parent has been incarcerated and cannot arrange for the care of the child, or when the parent's whereabouts are unknown and the custodial parent is unable to provide for the child. Father's whereabouts throughout these proceedings were unknown, until the Department discovered he had been released from custody in San Bernardino and was later returned to custody in Oklahoma, to be transferred to federal prison in Georgia. Father has never provided for J.Z. in any way. Father's own summary of the record shows that jurisdiction was proper as a result of his neglect of the child.
Father's argument that the court erred in sustaining jurisdiction based on his failure to provide for J.Z. because mother and maternal aunt have provided for J.Z. is a nonsequitur. Father does not argue there was not substantial evidence to support jurisdictional findings that mother is a drug abuser who used drugs throughout her pregnancy with J.Z., despite completing a criminal court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, and that mother's substance abuse endangers J.Z. To the extent father may be arguing the jurisdictional findings of his own failure to provide are unsupported by substantial evidence because there was no substantial evidence that mother and her sister have failed to provide for J.Z. in his absence, we deem the argument waived. To present issues on appeal for this court's review, an appellant must support his or her claims with argument and discussion. (EnPalm, LCC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 775.) If the argument has any factual or legal basis, father has not elucidated it, and it utterly escapes our comprehension.
In any event, the jurisdictional findings of mother's failure to protect and provide for J.Z. render father's challenge to jurisdiction for his own failure to provide nonjusticiable. (In re I.A. (Dec. 19, 2011, A131432) 2011 Cal.App.LEXIS 1583.) "[I]t is necessary only for the court to find that one parent's conduct has created circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over the child. [Citations.] Once the child is found to be endangered in the manner described by one of the subdivisions of section 300 . . . the child comes within the court's jurisdiction, even if the child was not in the physical custody of one or both parents at the time the jurisdictional events occurred. [Citation.] For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant which parent created those circumstances. A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been established. [Citation.] As a result, it is commonly said that a jurisdictional finding involving one parent is „ "good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent." ' (In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 [].) For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence." (Id. at pp. 10-11.)
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order reunification services for father. The court found father was an alleged father, and as such, he is not entitled to reunification services. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, 451.) He has never sought to legally establish his paternity. He was not named on J.Z.'s birth certificate and did not sign a voluntary declaration of paternity. Father has no relationship with J.Z., he has never provided for the necessities of J.Z.'s life or held the child out as his own, and the Department advised the court that upon his release from federal prison, father would be deported to Mexico. It would have been a meaningless gesture for the court to have ordered reunification services for father, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to issue an idle order. Father's argument on appeal that the court erred by failing to state its reasons for denying reunification has no more merit than his other arguments in this appeal; manifestly, the court did not order reunification services because the law does not contemplate a child's reunification with a man who has no interest in establishing his paternity, and there was no apparent reason why the court would have considered doing so in this case.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
GRIMES, J. WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
FLIER, J.