Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-11458.
May 4, 2005.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau, Larry R. Weeks, Judge, Superior Court No. 1JU-00-0005/6/7/8 CP.
Margi A. Mock, Assistant Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Dan N. Branch, Assistant Attorney General, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Janine J. Reep, Assistant Public Advocate, and Joshua Fink, Public Advocate, Juneau, for the Guardian Ad Litem.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
1. Lorna F. appeals from the termination of her parental rights. She does not challenge the superior court's findings that (1) the children have been subjected to conditions exposing them to a substantial risk of harm; (2) active but unsuccessful efforts had been made to provide her with rehabilitative services; and (3) serious emotional or physical harm was likely to result from her continued custody of the children. Her sole argument here is that the superior court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests.
We have used pseudonyms for family members throughout to protect their privacy.
2. We review the superior court's factual findings for clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
G.C. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648, 650 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 650-51.
3. Lorna and her companion Donald M., who voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, had four children between 1992 and 1998. Lorna has been incarcerated several times for alcohol-related assaults. The evidence reflects a pattern of alcohol abuse, while habitual bingo-playing diverted necessary funds from the children's basic needs. The testimony of social worker Jeannie Hale established that the family consistently needed help in purchasing necessities such as diapers, food, and clothing. In all, the children were removed from Lorna's and Donald's care at least seven times before the Office of Children's Services (OCS) petitioned to terminate Lorna's and Donald's parental rights.
4. At the termination hearing, psychologist Dr. John Kesselring testified that the children love their parents. The superior court found that "the parents love their children very much, but the children need more than love." Dr. Kesselring also testified that termination of Lorna's parental rights would be painful for the children, and that ideally there would be a way to maintain a relationship. Lorna argues that because of this loving bond, the superior court should have placed the children in long-term foster care with visitation that would guarantee a continued relationship rather than terminating her parental rights.
5. But substantial evidence supports the superior court's finding that the termination of Lorna's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Hale testified that termination of Lorna's parental rights and adoption was preferable to long-term foster care because adoptions are disrupted less frequently and create a greater sense of belonging and emotional stability. Hale also testified that Lorna was actively undermining any sense of stability and permanence that long-term foster care could have provided by "not letting the kids be settled" or emotionally attached to their foster family.
6. Dr. Kesselring also testified that long-term foster care would not provide the children with the stability that they need in order to flourish. He testified that children experience difficulties when they "don't have a sense of what the future holds, where [they're] going to be living," that "fantasies of reunification" may cause them to undermine other placements, and that they may blame themselves when things do not work out with the parent, experiencing "problems with anxiety, self[-]esteem, guilt[,] depression" and the aggravation of other problems. Dr. Kesselring ultimately testified that "it follows from my analysis that I think that would be a logical conclusion that [Lorna's parental rights] would be terminated." He came to this conclusion after comparing the emotional impact to the children from termination with a lack of stability and the continued emotional damage upon repeated removal from Lorna's care due to alcohol abuse relapses.
7. We also note that the Alaska Legislature has emphasized the importance of permanence to children's development. In light of this legislative judgment and the testimony, the superior court did not err in finding that termination of Lorna's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
See AS 47.05.065(5)(C) ("[I]t is important to provide for an expedited placement procedure to ensure that all children, especially those under the age of six years, who have been removed from their homes are placed in permanent homes expeditiously."). See also S.H. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Alaska 2002) (noting that "[t]he timeliness of a permanent stable placement for the children is paramount"). Other jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Victor A., 852 A.2d 976, 986 (Md.App. 2004) ("The overriding theme of both the federal and state legislation is that a child should have permanency in his or her life."), aff'd, 2005 WL 831593 (Md. Apr. 12, 2005); Matter of Guardianship of J.C., 608 A.2d 1312, 1315 (N.J. 1992) ("[W]hen efforts to reunite families repeatedly fail, permanent plans must be made for children, justifying the termination of parental rights.").
8. The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.