But that is a distinction without a difference under our case law; we have characterized as "antagonistic" a defendant’s position that a crime was committed not by him but by a co-defendant. See, e.g., Metz v. State, 284 Ga. 614, 616 (2) (a), 669 S.E.2d 121 (2008) (appellant argued that co-defendants stabbed victim, while they accused appellant), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011) ; Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792, 795 (2), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997) (co-defendants "each presented vigorous defenses attempting to show that the other caused the fatal injuries"). In order to obtain a new trial based on the trial court’s denial of severance, Walter must show a "clear prejudice and denial of due process" as a result of his co-defendants' antagonistic defenses that might have been avoided by separate trials.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Loren v State, 268 Ga. 792, 795 (2) ( 493 SE2d 175) (1997). With regard to Holland's first claim, there is nothing in the record to show that the defense attorneys disagreed about evidence concerning the van's registration.
1. The evidence is sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; see Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792(1), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997). 2.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also McClellan v. State, 274 Ga. 819, 819–820(1)(a), 561 S.E.2d 82 (2002); Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792, 794(1), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997). 2.
Although Coe asserts that defendants had antagonistic defenses, each asserting that he was defending himself from the other, antagonistic defenses alone are not sufficient to mandate severance; Coe must also demonstrate harm from the failure to sever. Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792, 795(2), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997). And, Coe does not point to any evidence produced against him in this joint trial that would not have been admitted in a separate trial, Butler, supra, and thus fails to show specific prejudice from the presentation of his and Mingledolph's defenses at the joint trial.
Neither co-defendant testified or made any statement admitted at trial placing Boyd at the scene of the crime. The fact that counsel for Smith elicited responses from some witnesses confirming their testimony that Boyd was the primary participant in the kicking of Clark after Griffin knocked him to the ground was merely cumulative of the State's evidence against Boyd. See Rhodes v. State, 279 Ga. 587, 590, 619 S.E.2d 659 (2005); Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792(2), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997). Accordingly, Boyd failed to show any harm from the joint trial and the trial court acted within its discretion by denying the motion to sever.
In any event, antagonistic defenses alone are not sufficient to mandate severance; McLean must also demonstrate harm from the failure to sever. Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792, 795(2), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997). McLean does not point to any evidence produced against him in this joint trial that would not have been admitted in a separate trial, Butler, supra, and he fails to show specific prejudice from the presentation of his and Herbert's defenses at the joint trial.
[Cit.] Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 382(10)(c), 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001). See also Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 53(30), 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002); Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792, 796(3), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997); Edwards v. State, supra at 133, 442 S.E.2d 444. Therefore, the trial court's erroneous failure to charge involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense was harmless.
White makes no such showing. Walker's only witness had previously testified for the State, and that evidence, as well as evidence flowing from Walker's cross-examinations of witnesses that arguably could be construed as implicating White, was merely cumulative of the State's evidence against her. See Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792 (2) ( 493 SE2d 175) (1997). White nonetheless asserts that she was harmed by her inability to call Walker to testify, that evidence against Walker might have "spilled over" to her and been considered against her, and that she was forced, by virtue of the chance of a coin toss, to give her closing argument before Walker.
To the extent that Rhodes' defense may have been antagonistic to that of her co-defendant, that factor in itself is insufficient to warrant the grant of a separate trial absent a showing of harm. Holmes v. State, 272 Ga. 517 (2) ( 529 SE2d 879) (2000). Rhodes has failed to make any showing that antagonism between Collum and herself was harmful to her. Evidence offered by Collum that arguably could be construed as implicating Rhodes was merely cumulative of the State's evidence against her. See Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792 (2) ( 493 SE2d 175) (1997). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever.