Opinion
CIVIL NO. 1:01cv288.
March 29, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration denying plaintiffs application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") as provided for in the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i); 42 U.S.C. § 423; 42 U.S.C. § 1382, 1382c(a)(3). Section 205(g) of the Act provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).
Jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is based on 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), all parties consenting.
The law provides that an applicant for disability insurance benefits must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3). It is not enough for plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill. 1979). It is well established that the burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971);Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970).
Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [commissioner's] findings." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). "Substantial evidence is defined as `more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984) quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1427 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed, 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, supra at 607; see also Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).
In the present matter, after consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on May 4, 1999, the date the claimant stated she became unable to work, and has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through at least December 31, 2004.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 4, 1999.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has major depression and an anxiety disorder, impairments which are severe but which do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant's statements concerning her impairments and their impact on her ability to work are not entirely credible. Because the testimony of Angela Dippel was based largely upon the subjective complaints of the claimant, Ms. Dippel's testimony was not entirely reliable either.
5. The claimant has significant non-exertional limitations which interfere with her ability to work. The evidence supports a finding that she is not able to perform work requiring any public contact or a closely regimented pace of production. She does not have any exertional limitations.
6. The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work as an inspector, transport driver, clerk/cashier, sales representative/clerk, and order selector.
7. The claimant's non-exertional limitations significantly narrow the range of work she is now capable of performing.
8. The claimant is 50 years old, an individual "closely approaching advanced age."
9. The claimant has a high school education.
10. The claimant has semi-skilled work experience but has acquired no transferable work skills.
11. Considering the claimant's age, educational background, and residual functional capacity, she is able to make a successful vocational adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Such work includes employment as a maid (400 positions), housekeeper (300 positions), and janitor/cleaner (3,000 to 4,000 positions).
(Tr. at 24-25).
Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to DIB or SSI. The ALJ's decision became the final agency decision when the Appeals Council denied review. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff filed her opening brief on January 18, 2002. On March 4, 2002, the defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner's decision, and on March 14, 2002, the plaintiff filed her reply. Upon full review of the record in this cause, this court is of the view that the ALJ's decision must be affirmed.
A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988);Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290-91 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized that test as follows:
The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? (3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled.Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1988); Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). From the nature of the ALJ's decision to deny benefits, it is clear that step five was the determinative inquiry.
The plaintiff initially applied for benefits on July 22, 1999 and August 4, 1999, alleging that she became disable on May 4, 1999 due to multiple mental impairments, including post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety. The plaintiffs claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. On November 16, 2000, a hearing was held before ALJ Bryan J. Bernstein. The plaintiff represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, as did the plaintiffs case manager, Ms. Angela Dippel. Leonard Fisher, a vocational expert (VE), also testified at the hearing. On December 27, 2000, the ALJ issued his decision wherein he found that the plaintiff was not disabled because she could adjust to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy, despite her impairments. The plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which request was denied on June 8, 2000, leaving the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
The plaintiff was born on May 13, 1950, and was fifty years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. The plaintiff has a high school equivalent education and past relevant work experience as an inspector, transport driver, cashier, sales clerk, and order selector. The plaintiff has a history of depression, which she treated with Prozac and psychotherapy.
The plaintiff was assessed at Park Center on December 10, 1997. The plaintiffs complaints included depression and concentration problems. Grief for her deceased husband was noted as well as social isolation after the death. There was a history of alcohol and drug abuse. The plaintiff reported insomnia, frequent awakening and loss of appetite. She further reported sexual abuse at the age of five, a 1985 rape and stabbing, and another rape when she was seventeen which took place after she ran away from home. Appearance, behavior, insight/judgment, and thought content were all found to be normal or appropriate. Thinking was coherent and mood was normal, but flat. No thoughts of suicide were noted. At Axis I, depression and alcohol dependence in remission were diagnosed. The Axis IV diagnosis was loss/grief issues and financial difficulties. A Global Assessment Functioning ("GAF") score of 53 was the Axis V diagnosis. The plaintiffs psychiatrist, Dr. Lipovitch, noted that she was "able to work and interact with the help of antidepressant medications." (Tr. 186). In April 1998, Dr. Lipovitch observed that the plaintiff was "unable to work" due to concentration problems and alcoholism. (Tr. 187). Nevertheless, the plaintiff continued to work until June 1999 and did not apply for disability benefits until July/August 1999.
Viann Ellsworth, CNS (Clinical Nurse Specialist) saw the plaintiff at Park Center on July 9, 1999. Ellsworth found the plaintiffs speech to be a bit pressured, judgment poor, and insight minimal. Ellsworth observed prominent themes of helplessness, hopelessness, and worthlessness. The plaintiffs memory was intact, she was oriented, and coherent. The plaintiff did admit to some suicidal thoughts, but had no intent to act. The plaintiff reported that she had been sober for two years. Ellsworth found the plaintiff to be very anxious and feelings of being overwhelmed and of being sorry for herself were noted. Ellsworth described the plaintiffs condition as "marked deterioration related to a significant situational stressor with accompanying prominent depressive symptoms."
The plaintiff was seen again by Ellsworth on July 20, 1999. At this time both appearance and speech were deemed to be normal. Judgment was found to be good and insight fair. The plaintiff exhibited feelings of hopelessness, helplessness and worthlessness. Ellsworth observed the claimant to be coherent, oriented, and found her memory to be intact. The plaintiff denied she had any ideas relating to suicide. The plaintiffs affect was determined to be blunted and her mood somewhat dysphoric. The plaintiff reported difficulty remembering when she took medications. Ellsworth found that there were many unresolved issues that would hinder the plaintiffs ability to focus on a job.
On August 17, 1999, Roger Holly, M.S., a Park Center employee, wrote a statement concerning the plaintiffs condition. Holly had seen the claimant several times for outpatient therapy at Park Center. A diagnosis of recurrent major depression was noted as well as the fact that the plaintiff was taking medication. Holly reported that the plaintiff was unable to work due to problems with inability to concentrate, fatigue, tearful spells, and the need to deal with some loss issues.
The plaintiff was seen again by Ellsworth on September 20, 1999. Appearance was deemed appropriate, judgment and insight fair, content of thought process normal and the form was coherent. There was no disorientation, thoughts of suicide or memory problems detected. The plaintiffs mood was depressed and blunted. The plaintiff was angry after recently learning that her two sons, then adults, had been molested when they were children by a babysitter. Ellsworth viewed the plaintiffs condition as fairly stable and recommended the continuation of medication.
On October 12, 1999, the plaintiff with the assistance of her case manager, Ms. Dippel, completed a Daily Activities Questionnaire. The plaintiff indicated that she experienced difficulty in completing simple tasks such as laundry and cooking. The plaintiff reported that she was not motivated to get things done and that at times she would rather not eat than cook. The plaintiff further reported that it had been necessary for her to obtain help with filling out Medicaid and Food Stamp forms.
Dr. Larry Lambertson, a psychiatrist, completed an assessment of the plaintiffs mental status in November 1999. Dr. Lambertson diagnosed the plaintiff with major depression, and assigned her a GAF score of 40, which correlates to an individual with an impairment in reality testing or major impairment in several areas. Dr. Lambertson opined that the plaintiff was "psychiatrically unstable to work." (Tr. 189). Nevertheless, Dr. Lambertson noted that the plaintiffs grooming and dress were appropriate, that she was independent and motivated, that her mood was labile, that her speech was relevant and coherent, that her thought processes were logical, and that she was often distracted. The plaintiffs primary complaints were depression, low energy, and poor concentration. The plaintiff attended her appointment alone after traveling by automobile approximately twelve miles. Dr. Lambertson opined that the plaintiff could attend to simple tasks on a sustained basis over a two-hour period of time. The plaintiff further noted that the plaintiffs symptoms had improved, and that she had less depression since the addition of Effexor to her medication regimen.
On November 19, 1999, J. Gange, Ph.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form. Based upon affective disorders, Dr. Gange found that the plaintiff had impairments which were not severe. Dr. Gange found slight limitations in restriction of daily living activities, difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. Dr. Gange determined that the claimant suffered from depression, but that she could complete two hour periods of work.
On December 15, 1999, a Park Center annual assessment form was completed by Mr. Bradley J. Rupp and Ms. Majorie Burns. The daily living assessment was independent in all categories. Appearance, behavior, and insight/judgment were all appropriate. Mood was depressed and the plaintiff was teary-eyed. The plaintiff was continuing to experience difficulty in dealing with the death of her husband. No memory problems were noted and thinking and speech were normal. Thought content was hopeless and helpless. The plaintiff was oriented and not suicidal. The two diagnoses noted were depressive disorder, recurrent and post traumatic stress disorder.
The plaintiff continued to attend therapy sessions at Park Center and on March 15, 2000, Dr. Lambertson completed a second psychiatric assessment. Dr. Lambertson reported conclusions substantially similar to those in his November 1999 report.
Dr. Unversaw, a state agency psychological consultant, evaluated the plaintiffs condition on March 31, 2000, and concluded that she had slight restrictions in her daily activities and moderate social and concentration deficits. Dr. Unversaw noted that the plaintiff appeared to function more effectively than she had reported to her mental healthcare providers. A second reviewing psychologist noted in June 2000 that the plaintiffs GAF rating, as reported by Dr. Lambertson, was inconsistent with the objective findings and the plaintiffs activities of daily living.
In a report dated June 10, 2000, the plaintiffs therapist reported that she had three primary problems: grief issues over the death of her husband in 1996; issues related to past sexual abuse; and a history of alcohol abuse. The therapist noted that the plaintiff had recently "no showed" for appointments three times. John Musgrave, B.S., a psychology intern, examined the plaintiff in October 2000 and concluded that: "Given the nature of her difficulties and the fact that they have been present since 1996, it appears that Ms. Lorden is not able to work at this time." (Tr. 266). Dr. Lambertson wrote a letter on November 7, 2000, and reiterated his intern's opinion: "Altogether, I see this patient as having a severe disability and being unable to work in any kind of work environment at this point in time." (Tr. 256-57). On November 14, 2000, Dr. Lambertson further reported that the plaintiff had several "marked" mental functional limitations.
With respect to her daily living activities, the plaintiff reported that she was able to cook, clean the house, do laundry, drive, read, sew, and do lawn work. At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that her hobbies included caring for her cats and reading books. A VE testified at the hearing and indicted that an individual like the plaintiff who was restricted to jobs with no public contact that did not involve a regimented pace of production could perform a significant number of light and medium jobs in the economy, including several thousand housekeeping, cleaning, and janitorial jobs in the Fort Wayne region.
The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The agency has promulgated regulations that set forth a five-step sequential process for analyzing disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920. A claimant has the joint burdens of production and persuasion through at least step four, where the individual's residual functional capacity (RFC) is determined. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, 416.945. At step five the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that there are jobs in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform.Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 18 (7th Cir. 1994). In the present case, the ALJ found that the plaintiff retained the ability to perform his past relevant work.
The agency's final decision is subject to review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), which provides that the agency findings "as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." "Substantial evidence is . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Furthermore, "[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or on the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)." Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). This court must accept the ALJ's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986).
In his decision, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between her alleged onset date and her date last insured. At step two, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had severe impairments, but found, at step three, that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled any impairment in the Listing of Impairments. At step four, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff did not retain the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work. The ALJ also determined that the plaintiffs testimony was not entirely credible. At step five, the ALJ found that the plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, and thus was not disabled.
The plaintiff first argues that her non-exertional limitations eliminated even a limited range of work. The plaintiff claims that in analyzing the medical evidence and testimony in the record, the ALJ improperly selected phrases and remnants from various exhibits to support his conclusion. The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to discuss information supplied by Ms. Dippel, Nurse Ellsworth, Mr. Holly, Mr. Rupp and Ms. Burns. However, the record is clear that the ALJ did discuss the information supplied by these people, although the ALJ did not always recite the name of the person. For example, the ALJ extensively discussed Ellsworth's July 9, 1999 report, when she saw the plaintiff on an emergency basis at Park Center. (Tr. 16). Additionally, the ALJ noted that the plaintiff "has individual therapy with Bradford Rupp, MS" (Tr. 17) and specifically referenced the annual assessment prepared by Rupp and Burns. (Exhibit 5F). The ALJ further made specific reference to Dippel's testimony at the hearing. (Tr. 20). Thus, the plaintiff's argument that the ALJ failed to consider this record evidence is without merit.
The ALJ did not specifically reference Mr. Holly's August 17, 1999 letter. The one-paragraph letter, which is addressed to "Whom It May Concern", indicates that he had seen the plaintiff several times in outpatient therapy at Park Center, and that she was unable to work at that time. (Tr. 166). Holly does not explain how he arrived at this conclusion. As Holly is not a doctor, and does not support his opinion with specific medical findings, it was not an error for the ALJ to not mention Holly's letter in his decision.
The ALJ did carefully consider the most important evidence of record, the reports and opinions of her treating psychiatrists, Dr. Lipovitch and Dr. Lambertson. Nevertheless, the plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not correctly apply the "treating physician's rule." The plaintiff argues that both Dr. Lipovitch and Dr. Lambertson opined that the plaintiff could not work, and that these opinions should have been given controlling weight.
The Social Security Administration requires a two-prong evaluation of the medical opinions of treating physicians. First, under what is known as the "Treating Physician Rule," the medical opinion of a treating physician must be given controlling weight if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record. McGraw v. Apfel, 87 F. Supp.2d 845, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1999). Second, even if the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the physician's opinion is still entitled to deference and must be weighed using the factors set out in the regulations. Id. The regulations also provide that "[w]e will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion. Id. Notwithstanding, "the final decision on whether a claimant is disabled or not is a legal one rather than a medical one, and it is for the ALJ to make that decision." Kapusta v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1989).
Codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2); Social Security Ruling 96-2p.
The factors cited include: the length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination; nature and extent of the treatment relationship; supportability (e.g., medical signs and laboratory findings); specialization; and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2)(d)(6)
With respect to Dr. Lipovitch's opinion, the record shows that on December 10, 1997, he opined that the plaintiff was "able to work and interact with the help of antidepressant medications." (Tr. 186). Then in April 1998, Dr. Lipovitch opined that the plaintiff was unable to work due to concentration deficits and alcoholism (Tr. 187), yet the plaintiff continued to work until June 1999 (at which time she was fired for testing positive for marijuana). Clearly, it was not an error for the ALJ to decline to give controlling weight to Dr. Lipovitch's opinion. After all, Dr. Lipovitch's opinion is itself inconsistent with evidence of the plaintiffs own course of conduct in continuing to work for an additional year.
Moreover, because the plaintiffs alcoholism constituted a substantial part of Dr. Lipovitch's opinion that the plaintiff was unable to work, the ALJ was correct in discounting that opinion. Indeed, the 1996 amendments to the Social Security Act, prohibit the payment of disability benefits based on a claimant's alcoholism. See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847. Indeed, the Act now provides, "[a]n individual will not be considered to be disabled for the purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subchapter) be a factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(C). See cf. O'Kane v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 686, 687 (7th Cir. 2000); Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Lipovitch's opinion.
With respect to the plaintiff's contention that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to Dr. Lambertson's opinion, and failed to properly explain why the opinion was not worthy of much weight, this court finds that the ALJ's decision speaks for itself:
Larry Lambertson, M.D., became the claimant's treating psychiatrist after Dr. Lipowitcz [sic]. Dr. Lambertson completed a Report of Psychiatric Status on September 24, 1999 (Exhibit 3F). Dr. Lambertson diagnosed major depression, recurrent, and rated the claimant's GAF as 40. Dr. Lambertson noted that the claimant had good grooming, coherent speech, logical thoughts, fair ability to abstract ideas and to perform calculations, and maintained the ability to perform activities of daily living. The claimant complained of confusion and inability to concentrate although she was able to drive herself to appointments. She complained of insomnia, decreased energy, decreased motivation, and decreased interest in activities. She felt nervous around other people. She was taking Prozac, Serax, Trazadone, and Effexor. The claimant's depression had decreased since she started taking the Effexor along with her other medications. Dr. Lambertson opined that the claimant could attend to simple repetitive tasks for two hours at a time unless she were distracted. In spite of the evidence of fairly good functioning at the examination, Dr. Lambertson rated the claimant's GAF as 40 (Exhibit 3F).
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition, page 32, a GAF of 40 reflects impairment in reality testing or communication, or major impairment in several areas, such as avoiding friends, neglecting family, or failing at school for children. Dr. Lambertson's assessment ignores observed strengths and reflects uncritical acceptance of what the claimant said versus how the claimant actually presented herself (Exhibit 3F). Apparently Dr. Lambertson's idea of what "marked" deficiencies are is different from the language of the Social Security regulations; several examinations revealed strengths in areas he found deficient (see, e.g., Exhibit 11F, pages 4-13).
* * *
Dr. Lambertson rated the claimant's GM as 40 and opined that the claimant could not perform simple repetitive tasks for two hours at a time, which was a reversal of his opinion of September 24, 1999. This reversal is also surprising in that Dr. Lambertson stated in the March 15, 2000, report that the claimant was slowly improving (Exhibit 6F).
* * *
To the extent that Dr. Lambertson's opinion was based upon the claimant's self serving subjective complaints, including his belief that the claimant had more than minimal physical problems, his opinion is not reliable either, and is not given much weight.
(Tr. 17, 18, 22).
Clearly, the ALJ provided a reasonable basis for rejecting Dr. Lambertson's opinion. It is well-settled that a medical opinion by a treating source is entitled to significant weight only if it is "well-supported" by clinical and laboratory findings and is "not inconsistent with other substantial evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2); Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, "a claimant is not entitled to disability benefits simply because her physicians states that she is "disabled' or unable to work."Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. The record supports the Commissioner's argument that the ALJ rejected Dr. Lambertson's opinion largely because it appeared to be based on the plaintiffs self serving subjective complaints rather than objective clinical findings. Additionally, the record shows that Dr. Lambertson's conclusions were substantially at odds with many of his reported examination findings. Finally, statements from other medical sources further support the ALJ's findings. Most recently, Dr. Unversaw, a state agency psychological consultant, evaluated the plaintiffs condition, and concluded that she had slight restrictions on her daily activities and moderate social and concentration deficits. (Tr. 231). Dr. Unversaw noted that the plaintiff appeared to function more effectively than she had reported to her mental healthcare providers (Tr. 235-36). A second reviewing psychologist noted in June 2000 that the plaintiffs GAF rating as reported by Dr. Lambertson, was inconsistent with the objective findings and the plaintiffs activities of daily living. (Tr. 239). Clearly, the ALJ's decision to not give Dr. Lambertson's opinion controlling weight is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the ALJ fully explained his reasoning.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the VE's testimony is not adequate to support an unfavorable decision. Citing to Bankston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F. Supp.2d (E.D. Mich. 2000), the plaintiff suggests that the ALJ should have included additional concentration limitations in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert. This court agrees with the Commissioner, however, that the ALJ was not required to include limitations that he did not find credible. The ALJ fully accommodated the plaintiffs supportable concentration deficits by limiting her to work that did not require a regimented pace of production. Thus, the plaintiffs argument on this point is meritless.
Accordingly, as substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that the plaintiff is not disabled, the decision will be affirmed.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is hereby AFFIRMED.