Opinion
No. 05-03-00076-CV.
Opinion issued February 19, 2004.
On Appeal from the 199th District Court Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 199-50243-01.
Affirmed.
Before Justices JAMES, WRIGHT, and BRIDGES.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael Alan Lorant appeals the trial court's entry of a final decree of divorce between appellant and Melissa Marie Lorant. In three issues, appellant argues the trial court erred in limiting the time appellant had for trial, admitting certain evidence, and ruling that appellee should have the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the parties' children. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In January 2001, appellee filed an original petition for divorce. Trial of this matter began on March 8, 2002. At trial, appellant's counsel stated he had been retained the evening before, and he requested additional time to prepare for trial. Counsel also complained that the time allocated for trial was insufficient. At the end of the day's proceedings, the trial court recessed the matter, and nearly four months elapsed before trial resumed. On December 20, 2002, the trial judge signed a final decree of divorce which, among other things, gave appellee the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the parties' children. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, appellant complains the trial court erred in limiting the time allotted for trial, recessing the trial for four months, and for requiring appellant to argue his "Motion to Revoke Suspension of Commitment" during the time allocated for trial. In arguing his first issue, appellant cites to the cover pages of volumes six and seven of the reporter's record to indicate the four-month recess in the case. Appellant also cites to the trial judge's comment that, "with this much time lapse," he had "to kind of get back into the flow of the case." The reason for the delay is unclear from the record and the parties' briefs. In addition, appellant cites his original objections to the amount of time that had been allowed for trial and the requirement that he put on evidence related to his "Motion to Revoke Suspension of Commitment" during the time allocated for trial. However, after restating his issue, he cites no authority to support his argument that the trial court's actions constituted error. Appellants' arguments must be supported by appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). Failure to cite any authority constitutes a waiver of the alleged error. Kang v. Hyundai Corp. (U.S.A.), 992 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). Accordingly, any error based on appellant's arguments in his first issue is waived.
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing appellee's evidence regarding issues not identified in appellee's discovery responses, allowing other evidence of appellee over objection, and excluding appellant's evidence. Once again, appellant restates his argument that the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay testimony offered by appellant and admitting evidence offered by appellee over hearsay and relevance objections, but he cites no authority to support his contention that the trial court erred. Appellant's entire argument consisted of a claim that an excluded statement was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted followed by a list of "TRE 801, 802, and 803." Therefore, any error based on the arguments in his second issue is waived. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h); Kang, 992 S.W.2d at 503.
In his third issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in ruling that appellee should have the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the children. Again, appellant cites no authority to support his claim. Therefore, any error based on the arguments in his third issue is waived. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h); Kang, 992 S.W.2d at 503.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.