Opinion
98 Civ. 3419 (TPG)
August 23, 2000.
OPINION
Plaintiff, a former New York City school principal, claims that she was reassigned from her position as principal because of her age and in retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC. She sues under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), New York State Executive Law § 296, and New York City Administrative Code, Title 8-107. The action is brought against Rudolph Crew, Chancellor of the New York City Public Schools; the Board of Education of New York City; and Maria Santory Guasp, Superintendent of District 9.
Defendants move for summary judgment. The motion is granted.
Facts
Defendants' motion is supported by the affidavit of defendant Guasp, as well as portions of the deposition of plaintiff Lorans. In response to the motion, plaintiff has submitted an affidavit.
The following factual description relates largely to incidents occurring at plaintiff's former school. There is no substantial controversy about the fact that these incidents occurred. A controversy is raised, however, by defendants' contention that plaintiff was at fault with respect to these occurrences, and plaintiff's vigorous denials of any such fault. This controversy existed at the time of the events and persists to this day. But, as will be shown by the summary of the facts, the points at issue in this controversy have never had anything to do with plaintiff's age or retaliation against her for filing a charge with the EEOC. Plaintiff Aurea Rubi Lorans was born on August 4, 1934 and has worked for the New York City Board of Education in various capacities for more than 30 years. In March 1983 plaintiff became the Principal of CES 58X, a public elementary school within New York City Community School District 9 ("CSD 9") which is in the Bronx.
Defendant Guasp became the superintendent of CSD 9 in August 1996.
In October 1996 Guasp received complaints from CES 58X parents that children had been dismissed from school early on five different days. On October 24, 1996 Guasp requested a written explanation from plaintiff, which plaintiff failed provide. Plaintiff was absent from school from Monday, October 28, 1996, through Wednesday, October 30, 1996. Guasp met with plaintiff and her union representative the following Monday, November 4, 1996. During that meeting plaintiff refused to discuss her absences or the reasons for the early dismissals.
The 1997-1998 school year began on September 4, 1997. Guasp received complaints from parents concerning the registration process at CES 58X. The complaints were that registration was proceeding too slowly, that parents and children were being made to wait outside for long periods of time, and that kindergarten and special education students were being turned away.
On or about September 8, 1997 Guasp, with a team of CSD 9 staff, visited CES 58X to investigate these complaints. Guasp concluded that registration was proceeding slowly and inefficiently and that children and parents had been forced to wait outside. Several parents informed Guasp that they had attempted to register on previous days but had been turned away.
Guasp directed several members of the CES 58X staff to assist with the registration and instructed her staff to escort the waiting parents and children into the school.
Guasp confirmed that there was a problem about kindergarten students, and that in fact the parents of kindergarten students had been advised to keep their children at home until further notice. Guasp directed the kindergarten teachers to contact their students' families and advise them to bring their children to school. Guasp also confirmed that special education students had been turned away and was informed that plaintiff had told the parents that the school did not have the furniture or teachers for special education students. However, Guasp found that two of the special education classrooms had not been set up as classrooms, even though suitable furniture was stockpiled elsewhere in the school. Additionally, the district office had sent six qualified special education teachers for interviews and plaintiff had failed to hire any of them. Guasp directed the custodians to set up classrooms and placed two licensed special education teachers in the school so that the students could start attending school.
Plaintiff denies any fault with respect to the incidents of September 1997. Plaintiff maintains that the reason kindergarten classes were not held was in line with school board policy regarding immunizations. Additionally, she alleges that the special education classes were not held because the teachers provided by CSD 9 district office were unqualified and the furniture for the special education students was "junk."
On September 9 and 10, 1997 CSD 9 Deputy Superintendent Helen Santiago visited CES 58X and found other problems at the school, including a return to the slow registration process. By memorandum dated September 10, 1997 Santiago informed Guasp of her findings.
On September 11, 1997 Guasp removed plaintiff from her position as principal at CES 58X and reassigned her to work at the District Office.
Thereafter plaintiff met with Guasp and her union representative, Michael Schwartz. Plaintiff's affidavit refers to meetings on September 24, September 29, October 8 and October 17, 1997. Guasp's affidavit refers to a meeting on October 17. Plaintiff asserts that in the course of these meetings Guasp asked plaintiff when she was going to retire and told her she would never go back to being principal of a school. Plaintiff's affidavit states that "Guasp insisted that I ready myself for retirement, offering me a `golden parachute' if I consented to go quietly into the night." Guasp's affidavit has a different version. Guasp states that on October 17, 1997 she met with plaintiff and Schwartz and that during this meeting plaintiff told Guasp that plaintiff was considering retiring but that, since she would have worked for the Board of Education for 30 years as of November 1998, she would like to remain employed until that time. Guasp states in her affidavit that it is her recollection that either plaintiff or Schwartz proposed that plaintiff be transferred to the Professional Development Center, to which Guasp responded that it might be possible for plaintiff to stay in the District Office for the remainder of 1997, attend the Professional Development Center in the spring and fall of 1998 and then retire. Guasp states that plaintiff indicated that this plan would be acceptable to her. Attached to plaintiff's affidavit is a letter from plaintiff to Guasp dated October 18, 1997. The letter thanked Guasp for the meeting of the 17th and went on to say that, after meeting with her family, she had determined that she must not waive or cancel any of her rights.
A memorandum of one Martin Wolpoff dated January 23, 1998 indicates that on November 14, 1997 Guasp made a request to Judith Chin, Executive Director of the Division of Instructional Support for the Board of Education, that plaintiff be transferred to the Professional Development Center ("PDC"). This is a program to provide training for principals who are not performing effectively.
Following the November 14 1997 request by Guasp, Chin chose a team of three persons to investigate whether plaintiff should be assigned to the PDC. On or about March 2, 1998 plaintiff was officially reassigned from the District Office to the PDC, where plaintiff remains as far as the record before the court shows. At all times since her reassignment away from her school, plaintiff has received her full school principal's salary.
Plaintiff filed a grievance contesting her placement in the PDC. By decision dated May 13, 1998 Chancellor Crew upheld plaintiff's assignment to the PDC as proper.
In the course of the events described above, on November 29, 1997 plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. In this charge plaintiff alleged that she was relieved of her duties and assigned, without justification, to the District Office. Plaintiff also alleged that she was the oldest principal in the district, that on February 24, 1997 she had been asked by Guasp to retire, and that she had been assigned no duties in the expectation that she would leave. Plaintiff alleged that the discrimination against her started in September 1997 and was continuing to the time of the charge. She checked the boxes entitled "Age" and "Retaliation" when describing the cause of the alleged discrimination. On March 31, 1998 plaintiff filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, complaining of her assignment to the PDC and alleging that this was in retaliation for her earlier complaint to the EEOC.
The record before the court does not show anything about the EEOC's response to these charges.
Plaintiff commenced the present action in May 1998.
Discussion In this action plaintiff contends that she was subjected to age discrimination when she was reassigned from her position as principal of CES 58X to the District Office. Plaintiff contends that her further reassignment to the PDC was the result both of age discrimination and retaliation against her for filing the first charge with the EEOC. Plaintiff was 63 years old at the time of these events.
The ADEA provides it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988). The ADEA protects persons of plaintiff's age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. IV 1993). The New York Human Rights affords similar protection. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 2961(1)(a) (McKinney 1993). The same is true for the New York City Administrative Code. See Carlton v. Mystic Transp. Inc., 202 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2000). The law also provides redress if an employer retaliates for the assertion of legally protected rights. See Pub. Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 180 (1989).
There are numerous decisions in employment discrimination cases about what is required for a plaintiff's prima facie case and about burden shifting on certain issues if the prima facie case is made. However, the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion is whether there is a triable issue of fact as to discrimination. In the case at bar there is the added issue of retaliation.
In the present case it is clear beyond any doubt that plaintiff was reassigned to the District Office and then reassigned to the PDC because of incidents that arose at her school giving rise to complaints about plaintiff's performance. In view of the completeness of the record before the court, including extensive documentation, there can be no question about the genuineness of defendants' motive in removing plaintiff from her school to rectify a series of problems in the administration of the school and to relieve the school of conflicts perceived to have been created by plaintiff. None of this had anything whatever to do with the question of plaintiff's age or retaliation against her for complaining to the EEOC.
It is true that at the time of the events and continuing until the present, plaintiff has vigorously denied any fault on her part and has further asserted that the procedures used against her were contrary to applicable administrative rules. But the evidence about these disputes serves to confirm that the nature of the problem which existed between plaintiff and defendants had nothing to do with her age or a complaint to the EEOC but related solely to other matters.
Plaintiff points to a discussion of her possible retirement with Guasp, which occurred in the fall of 1997, after she had been reassigned to the District Office but before her further reassignment to the PDC. Her version of what was said is different from that of Guasp. But accepting plaintiff's version as true, it does not provide any evidence that the decisions to reassign her to the District Office and then to the PDC were motivated even in part by her age or an EEOC charge. As already described, the problems at plaintiff's school furnished ample reason for her reassignments, and there is no evidence of any other reason. If Guasp initiated a discussion of plaintiff's possible retirement, as claimed by plaintiff, this does not contradict the overwhelming evidence about problems and conflicts at plaintiff's school. A discussion of possible retirement is in fact consistent with the idea that there had been difficulties with plaintiff and that the administration was seeking a way to resolve the situation. It was perfectly legal to discuss retirement with plaintiff, and such discussion, given the evidence as a whole, does not furnish any proof of age discrimination or retaliation against plaintiff for her EEOC charge. See Raskin v. The Wyatt Company, 125 F.2d 55, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1997). As to the retaliation issue, the evidence indicates that Guasp requested the transfer to te PDC on November 14, which was prior to the time the charge to the EEOC was made.
The court rules that there is no triable issue of fact regarding plaintiff's claim of age discrimination or her claim of retaliation.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and the case is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.