Opinion
C.A. No. 07A-05-001 JRS.
Submitted: January 31, 2008.
Decided: April 11, 2008.
Upon consideration of the Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.
ORDER
This 11th day of April, 2008, Jourdean Lorah ("Ms. Lorah"), having filed a "motion concerning present financial status and the administrative remedy," it appears to the Court that:
The Court is treating this motion as a motion for reconsideration of the Court's previous order dismissing Ms. Lorah's appeal.
1. On February 28, 2007, Ms. Lorah filed a discrimination charge with the Discrimination Unit of the Department of Labor ("the Department") against Tatnall School ("Tatnall"). The Department investigated Ms. Lorah's claim, pursuant to 19 Del. C. §§ 712(a)(1) and 712(c)(2), but determined that no reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred.
2. On May 4, 2007, Ms. Lorah filed a notice of appeal in this Court in which she sought review of the Department's determination. On January 31, 2008, this Court issued an order dismissing Ms. Lorah's appeal on the ground that the Department's finding was not appealable. The Court based its determination upon 29 Del. C. § 10161(b), which states that decisions of administrative agencies not listed in Section 10161(a) may not be appealed. The Department is not listed in Section 10161(a).
3. On January 31, 2008, Ms. Lorah filed a "motion concerning present financial status and the administrative remedy," in essence a motion for reconsideration, asking the Court to order the Department to sue Tatnall on her behalf. In support, Ms. Lorah argues that because she is financially unable to afford an attorney to pursue an employment discrimination action against Tatnall, the Department must sue for her.
4. The Court has no statutory or legal authority to order the Department to pursue an action against Tatnall School on Ms. Lorah's behalf. The statutes governing the Department's handling of discrimination charges and this Court's appellate review of administrative agencies are both clear on their face and Ms. Lorah has not challenged the validity of either statute (nor would she have any basis to do so). When applying such unambiguous statutes, "the Court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words." The statute governing the Department's response to charges of employment discrimination neither authorizes nor directs the Department to sue employers on behalf of employees who make allegations of discrimination after the Department determines that "no reasonable cause" exists to believe that discrimination occurred. The statute governing administrative appeals does not authorize appeals from Department determinations of "no cause."
See O'Niell v. Town of Middletown, 2006 WL 205071, *11 (Del.Ch. Jan. 18, 2006)
Coast Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Industrial Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985).
19 Del. C. § 712.
See 29 Del. C. § 10167(b).
5. Based on the foregoing, Ms. Lorah's motion for reconsideration must be
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.