Lora v. Maule Industries, Inc.

5 Citing cases

  1. Parker v. Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist

    432 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    Defendant/hospital was aware of that testimony because the witness had been deposed in an earlier medical mediation proceeding. Without attributing underhanded motives to the moving party, we hold merely that, on this record, defendant has failed to establish conclusively that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Lora v. Maule Industries, Inc., 235 So.2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Defendant chose not to depose any of the plaintiff's expert witnesses.

  2. Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies

    327 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 8 times
    Urging rejection of patent danger doctrine

    Resourcefully, Brandies' counsel argues that the boy merely knew of the source of the danger, not of the danger itself, and that his admitted consciousness of the danger of the whirling auger was not a particular, discriminating awareness that the auger blade would draw his hand into the pinch point where the hopper and sleeve joined. The extent of Brandies' appreciation of the danger was therefore a jury question, he argues, as are similarly close questions involving a landowner's liability or assumption of risk. 1661 Corp. v. Snyder, 267 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.App.1st, 1972) (new trial for a plaintiff against a landowner when there was conflicting evidence of whether the water pipe over which she stumbled was "patent, obvious, visible, and open to ordinary observation by anyone"); Lora v. Maule Industries, Inc., 235 So.2d 743 (Fla.App.3rd, 1970) (assumption of risk requires appreciation of the nature, character and extent of the danger); Watson v. Drew, 197 So.2d 53 (Fla.App.4th, 1967) (assumption of risk defense requires showing that plaintiff knew of the "very hazard" and appreciated its danger); Atlantic Coastline Ry. v. Gary, 57 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1952) (knowledge that a rack would descend in forty seconds was not equivalent to knowledge and appreciation that it would plummet); Landry v. Sterling Apts., Inc., 231 So.2d 225 (Fla. App.4th 1970), cert. den. 238 So.2d 107 (1970) (plaintiff's knowledge of trash and ice in the vicinity was not specific knowledge of the slippery substance on which he was about to fall); Williston v. Cribbs, 82 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1955) (a jury question whether the decedent appreciated the danger of electrocution when he knew and took steps to avoid wires lying across the roof). Notwithstanding some similarities with the cases cited, we cannot slice the evidence here finely enough to sustain Brandies' j

  3. Rea v. Leadership Housing, Inc.

    312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 12 times

    As a general proposition whether a plaintiff has assumed the risk, is guilty of contributory negligence or whether the plaintiff's sole negligence was the proximate cause of the injury ordinarily presents jury questions precluding summary judgment. 30 Fla.Jur., Summary Judgment, sec. 6; Jones v. Crews, Fla.App. 1967, 204 So.2d 24; Lora v. Maule Industries, Inc., Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 743; see also McRae v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., Fla.App. 1969, 227 So.2d 214; Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Garland, Fla.App. 1972, 269 So.2d 708; Veiga v. South Carolina Insurance Company, Fla.App. 1973, 274 So.2d 10. Specifically, the factual matters contained in the pleadings and depositions reflect the existence of a triable issue with respect to plaintiff's assumption of the risk precluding summary disposition.

  4. Acosta v. Daughtry

    268 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 9 times

    Appreciation of the danger is an essential to the defense of assumption of risk . . .' Bartholf v. Baker, Fla., 1954, 71 So.2d 480, 483. A member of a golfing foursome assumes certain obvious and ordinary risks of the sport by participating therein with knowledge of its normal dangers, but a player does not assume a risk which cannot reasonably be anticipated, and which may be the result of improper and unauthorized negligent action of another player." Again this Court, speaking in Lora v. Maule Industries, Inc., Fla.App. 3, 1970, 235 So.2d 743, and in reversing a defendant's summary judgment, followed plaintiff's argument "that there was no evidence presented to show that he appreciated the nature, character and extent of the danger involved . . ." It is consequently the law that "actual knowledge is essential to a voluntary assumption of risk of a peril.

  5. Balboa Insurance Company v. Floyd

    262 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)

    It is an issue to be determined by the trier of the fact as to whether or not the killing of the minor was an intentional or unintentional act. This is a material issue which should be submitted to a jury and not determined at a summary judgment hearing. Holl v. Talcott, Fla. 1966, 191 So.2d 40; Shollenberger v. Baskin, Fla.App. 1969, 227 So.2d 79; Lora v. Maule Industries, Inc., Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 743; see George v. Stone, Fla.App. 1972, 260 So.2d 259 (opinion filed April 7, 1972). Obviously, the question of coverage is dependent on a resolution of this issue and, under the circumstances, it would appear that it would be appropriate for the trial judge to sever this issue prior to the main trial proceedings.