Troutman v. Webster, 257 P. 262, 264 (Colo. 1927) (quoting 1 Williston on Contracts § 102a (1924)). Thus, an agreement is supported by consideration if “the promisee, in return for a promise, does anything legal which he is not bound to do, or refrains from doing anything which he has a right to do, even though there is no actual loss or detriment to him or actual benefit to the promisor.” Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added); see also Lucht's Concrete Pumping, Inc., 255 P.3d at 1061 (noting that “[c]onsideration may take the form of forbearance by one party to refrain from doing something that it is legally entitled to do”). “Almost any form of consideration will support a valid contract and except in extreme circumstances, [courts] do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.” LoPresti v. Brandenburg, 267 P.3d 1211, 1218 (Colo. 2011). Here, Ms. Schwartz alleges that “[t]he Adams gave no consideration for” the Contract Agreement because they were already “legally and contractually obligated to proceed under the Contract to closing and perform all acts necessary to effectuate that closing.”

"Almost any form of consideration will support a valid contract and except in extreme circumstances, [courts] do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration." LoPresti v. Brandenburg, 267 P.3d 1211, 1218 (Colo. 2011). Plaintiff makes three arguments to support her position that there was no consideration for the separation agreement.

Rather, even changes in stream conditions resulting from the Protocol are not improper so long as they fall within the scope of the parties’ rights under the Blue River Decree. See, e.g., LoPresti v. Brandenburg, 267 P.3d 1211, 1216–17 (Colo. 2011) (holding that a settlement agreement memorialized in a decree did not improperly approve a change of water right in part because the agreement was consistent with the decree). ¶58

. See, e.g., LoPresti v. Brandenburg, 267 P.3d 1211, 1216-17 (Colo. 2011) (holding that a settlement agreement memorialized in a decree did not improperly approve a change of water right in part because the agreement was consistent with the decree).