"[T]he overarching policy of [the Act is to provide] benefits to injured workers as soon as is practical." Lopez v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 495 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied). Indeed, assurance of the prompt payment of benefits under the Act is the primary consideration, or quid pro quo, for employee participation in the workers' compensation system.
We may not reverse for abuse of discretion merely because we disagree with the decision of the court.Lopez v. Tex. Worker's Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).Id. (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)).
See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001. There is currently a binding appeals panel decision that Reynaldo's death occurred in the course and scope of his employment, and the Gaonas are entitled to death benefits. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.205 (providing that appeals panel decision is binding during judicial review); Lopez v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 495 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (stating that administrative ruling whether granting or denying benefits — remains in effect until overturned by final, enforceable judicial decision, and benefits are payable, or not, in accordance with appeals panel decision until final judicial decision rules otherwise). The trial court would controvert that binding decision and, consequently, the exclusive remedy provision by trying the negligence claims while judicial review is pending.
When a suit is brought challenging the decision of a TWCC appeals panel, the appeals panel's decision remains binding until there is a final non-appealable judgment in the case. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.205(b); Lopez v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 492-95 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). Thus, if the appeals panel awards certain benefits to a claimant and the claimant's provider brings suit seeking judicial review of the award, the claimant is entitled to receive the benefits at issue during the pendency of the provider's appeal. See Lopez, 11 S.W.3d at 492-95.
Statutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Lopez v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (citing Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. 1989); Republic W. Ins. Co. v. State, 985 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.)). In construing these statutes, we are mindful of the rules of statutory construction.
"It is well established that a party seeking abatement must prove the allegations in its plea by a preponderance of the evidence." In re HPGM, LLC, No. 06-20-00019-CV, 2020 WL 5737529, at *4, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. App.-Texarkana Sept. 25, 2020, orig. proceeding) (citing Flowers v. Steelcraft Corp., 406 S.W.2d 199, 199 (Tex. 1966)); see S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 469 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi - Edinburg 2000, no pet.); Lopez v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied); Bernal v. Garrison, 818 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1991, writ denied); Brazos Elec. Power Co-Op., Inc. v. Weatherford Indep. Sch. Dist., 453 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Even the verification of a plea does not do away with the requirement that the one urging the plea prove the grounds by a preponderance of the evidence at the time the plea is presented to the court.
As stated by our sister court, "[A] party who urges a plea in abatement has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing on such plea the facts that are alleged in the plea as grounds for abating and dismissing the plaintiff's case." Brazos Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Weatherford Indep. Sch. Dist. , 453 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ; seeS. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa , 19 S.W.3d 452, 469 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (proponent of plea has burden of proof to establish allegations in motion); Lopez v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund , 11 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) ("The proponent of a motion to abate has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing on the motion the facts that are alleged in the motion as grounds for abating the case.")
Tex. Gov't Code § 74.162.Curtis v. Gibbs , 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added); seeWarren v. Weiner , 462 S.W.3d 140, 144–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting Curtis for same proposition); Lopez v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund , 11 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (same); see alsoJ.B. Hunt , 492 S.W.3d at 295 n.21 (referencing Curtis ’s"same parties and same controversy" language in context of explaining that inherently interrelated cases are subject to abatement).Perry v. Del Rio , 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (quoting Cleveland v. Ward , 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1071 (1926) ).
Tex. Gov't Code § 74.162. Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added); see Warren v. Weiner, 462 S.W.3d 140, 144-45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting Curtis for same proposition); Lopez v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (same); see also J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 295 n.21 (referencing Curtis's "same parties and same controversy" language in context of explaining that inherently interrelated cases are subject to abatement). Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (quoting Cleveland, 285 S.W. at 1071).
It is true that questions of statutory construction are pure questions of law. See Lopez v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex.App.-2000, pet.denied). This is not such a case, however.