Opinion
# 2015-041-005 Claim No. 114830
01-27-2015
ELIOT LOPEZ v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
ELIOT LOPEZ Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim alleging that defendant wrongfully confined inmate/claimant in Involuntary Protective Custody (IPC) is dismissed after trial where proof showed that defendant complied with applicable rules and regulations in conducting IPC hearing and with follow-up reviews. Confinement was therefore privileged.
Case information
UID: | 2015-041-005 |
Claimant(s): | ELIOT LOPEZ |
Claimant short name: | LOPEZ |
Footnote (claimant name) : | The caption is amended to reflect the correct spelling of claimant's name. |
Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
Footnote (defendant name) : | |
Third-party claimant(s): | |
Third-party defendant(s): | |
Claim number(s): | 114830 |
Motion number(s): | |
Cross-motion number(s): | |
Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
Claimant's attorney: | ELIOT LOPEZ Pro Se |
Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
Signature date: | January 27, 2015 |
City: | Albany |
Comments: | |
Official citation: | |
Appellate results: | |
See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Eliot Lopez (claimant) alleges that he was wrongfully confined in Involuntary Protective Custody (IPC) for approximately four months during a period of incarceration at Clinton Correctional Facility (CCF) in 2007.
Clinton Correctional Facility correction officer (CO) Richard Mahuta received what he considered to be reliable information, and concluded that the safety of the claimant and the security of the facility were at risk due to claimant's attempt to displace inmate Scott, a Muslim, as treasurer of a prisoner organization. Inmate Scott had been assaulted, and CO Mahuta concluded that claimant was at risk of attack by other Muslim inmates. These considerations were contemporaneously memorialized on July 19, 2007 by CO Mahuta in Exhibit A, an IPC recommendation form that he authored.
Claimant opposed being housed in IPC. Accordingly, a hearing by which claimant contested the IPC recommendation commenced on August 2, 2007 and concluded on August 8, 2007, during which claimant requested and received the testimony of three witnesses. The hearing officer, on August 8, 2007, determined that the IPC recommendation was "clearly indicat[ed]" and affirmed the recommendation (see Exhibit B).
Claimant began IPC confinement on July 19, 2007 and was released from it in November, 2007 upon his transfer to Great Meadow Correctional Facility. Claimant alleges, through both his claim and trial testimony, that CO Mahuta's IPC recommendation was "fabricated," that the hearing officer improperly and incompletely conducted the IPC hearing, that mandated 30 day "hearing[s]" of his IPC status were held in his absence, and that, accordingly, he was wrongfully confined in IPC for approximately four months.
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of a prison involuntary confinement proceeding, such confinement will be "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
Defendant also relies upon the quasi-judicial governmental immunity defense set forth in its answer.
That defense provides that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary (or involuntary confinement) proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]). This immunity attaches even if the determination is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
If, however, prison officials fail to comply with a rule or regulation governing such hearings, absolute immunity may be lost and liability for money damages may be imposed if it is proven that the regulatory violation caused actual prejudice or injury to the inmate (see Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
Not all disciplinary hearing procedural rules and regulations, if violated, form a basis to abrogate the immunity afforded to employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in commencing and conducting formal inmate proceedings. The rule or regulation must implicate minimal due process protections:
"Notably, there is no right to counsel or to confrontation at prison disciplinary hearings. . . Nevertheless, an inmate is entitled to advance written notice of the charges against him; a hearing affording him a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; a fair and impartial hearing officer; and a written statement of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken" (Sira v Morton, 380 F3d 57, 69 [2d Cir 2004]).
Initially, claimant produced no evidence of fabrication beyond his own allegations that CO Mahuta fabricated the facts which formed the basis of his IPC recommendation. Further, CO Mahuta testified credibly at trial in support of the underlying facts which informed his decision to make that recommendation, and which he contemporaneously set forth in writing in Exhibit A.
Next, absent proof of denial of due process in the conduct of claimant's IPC hearing, and no evidence of such a denial was produced at trial, the hearing officer's decision to affirm CO Mahuta's IPC recommendation is entitled to absolute immunity.
Finally, claimant's assertions that subsequent "hearings" requiring his presence every 30 days were required to continue his IPC status, were proven false by both documentary and testimonial evidence.
Exhibit D, defendant Directive 4948, referring to an inmate placed in IPC, reads in part: "An inmate in this status shall have such status reviewed every 30 days by a three-member committee consisting of a representative of the facility Executive Staff, a Security Supervisor, and a member of the Guidance and Counseling staff. The results of such review shall be forwarded, in writing, to the Superintendent for final determination."
Stephen Brown, Deputy Superintendent of Security at CCF, testified that he oversaw the monthly review by a three-person committee of the status of all inmates held in IPC. He further testified that inmates are not present at such reviews. He testified that Exhibit C memorialized three timely monthly reviews of claimant's IPC status. In each such instance, the committee recommended to CCF Superintendent Artus that claimant's IPC status be continued, recommendations that were in each case adopted by Superintendent Artus. The Court fully credits the testimony of Deputy Superintendent Brown. Parenthetically, contrary to all other evidence in the record, including that of claimant's own testimony, Exhibit C mistakenly identifies claimant's date of initial placement in IPC status as "5/19/07," rather than the accurate date of July 19, 2007.
Far from establishing the claim, the documentary evidence and credited testimony produced at trial established that defendant complied with its own policies in determining and continuing claimant's IPC status at CCF in 2007. The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence any of the allegations of his claim. The claim is dismissed.
All motions not previously decided are hereby denied.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
January 27, 2015
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims