Summary
In Lopez v. Scott County Unified School Dist. No. 466, 2000 WL 1546822 (D. Kan.), the United States District Court for the District of Kansas considered and denied a plaintiff's request for attorney's fees incurred in the administrative process.
Summary of this case from Chavez v. Board of Educ. of Tularosa Municipal SchoolsOpinion
Case No. 99-1495-JTM
October, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment in this suit seeking attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and is prepared to rule. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion is denied and defendant's motion is granted.
I. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1998). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1993). The moving party need not disprove the nonmoving party's claim or defense; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).
Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). The opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the opposing party must come forward with significant admissible probative evidence supporting that party's allegations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
II. Facts
On January 21, 1997, James Sanchez physically attacked a fellow student during a class at his middle school. As the teacher intervened, James attacked the teacher and threatened to kill both the teacher and the student. The school board gave James a five-day out-of-school suspension extending from January 29, 1997 to February 4, 1997. On February 4, a staffing committee meeting was held to discuss a course of action for dealing with James Sanchez. According to the Staffing Committee Report, the violent incident was a direct manifestation of James's "disabling condition." Staffing Committee Report, February 4, 1997, at 1. It was the decision of James's family to keep him from school until "further decisions were made." Id. at 4.
James Sanchez is plaintiff's son.
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq., such a meeting is designated an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") meeting. An IEP is a written statement that sets forth the child's present performance level, goals and objectives, specific services that will enable the child to meet those goals, and evaluation criteria and procedures to determine whether the child has met the goals. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(11).
On February 10, 1997, the parties conducted a second IEP meeting. The staffing committee recognized that "James's family would prefer that he be back in school as it was before." Staffing Committee Report, February 10, 1997, at 2. However, the committee found, due to the seriousness of the incident, it would be necessary to deliver "special education services." Notice of Staffing, February 10, 1997, at 3. The committee further concluded that "[a]t this time [James] is not returning to the regular school setting so special education services will be provided at a neutral site." Id. Finally, the committee indicated that "[t]his is an interim plan." Id.
On February 11, 1997, plaintiff notified the school board of her intent to appeal the committee's decision denying immediate reintegration. The appeal was, in the language of the IDEA, a request for a due process hearing. In response, the staffing committee met on February 13, 1997. At that meeting, plaintiff reiterated that she wanted James returned to a normal classroom setting immediately and that she did not consent to the board's reintegration plan. Nonetheless, the committee decided to delay his reentry into school until it could develop a behavioral plan incorporating specific criteria for James to meet before a full reentry. The committee agreed to provide James a full day individual class at the school board administration building. The committee stated, "[a] specific behavior plan needs to be developed for reentry to the middle school." Staffing Committee Report, February 13, 1997, at 1. The parties agreed to hold the due process hearing in abeyance until it was determined whether they could reach a compromise plan.
Where the requirements of an IEP or any of the IDEA's other strictures are not met, the parent or guardian of a disabled child may request "an impartial due process hearing" and may appeal an adverse decision administratively or to the federal courts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f-g).
The committee next met on March 10, 1997 and decided to continue out-of-school services despite plaintiff's objections. Plaintiff then demanded an administrative hearing seeking James's immediate reentry into the regular classroom. The school board provided a hearing and, on June 30, 1997, the hearing officer denied the request for reentry. Plaintiff appealed, and on July 30, 1997, the reviewing officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1997, plaintiff filed a claim in the District Court of Scott County, Kansas, requesting a restraining order requiring that James Sanchez be placed in a regular classroom setting. On March 31, 1997, the district court denied plaintiff's request. The parties have taken no further action in that matter.
The IEP committee had continued to meet despite the due process hearing and Scott County proceeding. On March 14, 1997, the staffing committee developed a draft proposal for a behavior plan that would include steps for James's reentry into middle school. The plan contained eight conditions that James needed to meet on a continuing basis. It further provided that "James will continue in the current setting at the administration building while demonstrating the above conditions. After these are met, the following steps [for reentry] will be followed." Proposal for Behavior Plan, March 14, 1997.
On July 28, 1997, the committee held the final staffing/IEP meeting in which they decided James was ready to reenter the middle school beginning the first day of the following school year. Incidents occurring after this time are not relevant to the matters before this court.
Plaintiff comes before the court seeking an award of attorneys' fees. However, plaintiff's response to defendant's motion for summary judgment presents argument relating to improper notice of proceedings and due process violations. The court will not consider these arguments. The motion before the court involves only plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
III. Analysis
As set out above, plaintiff did exercise her procedural rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") by requesting a full due process hearing. The IDEA establishes a clear and mandatory system of procedural protections, including impartial due process hearings and judicial review, to facilitate a cooperative approach to securing appropriate educational plans for disabled children by parents and local education agencies. See Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Congress clearly intended for these safeguards to ensure that the most appropriate parties, i.e., parents and school officials, make the decisions. Id.
The IDEA's provision for attorneys' fees provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B). In applying § 1415(i)(3)(B) to these facts, the only issue is whether plaintiff was a "prevailing party" in any of the proceedings outlined above. "The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties." Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 950 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The plaintiff must point to a resolution of the dispute that changes the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant. "If the plaintiff has succeeded on `any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,' the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989) (citations omitted).
The "benefit [plaintiff] sought" was James's immediate reentry to the middle school classroom setting. The plaintiff was not a "prevailing party" in this endeavor. The IEP meetings resulted in an IEP that restricted James's reentry until the following school year. Plaintiff was also unsuccessful in the administrative due process proceeding. The hearing officer denied plaintiff's request for immediate reintegration. Upon appeal of that decision, the reviewing officer affirmed the hearing officer. Finally, in the Scott County case, the court denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction compelling James's immediate reentry. Plaintiff did not prevail in any proceeding.
Plaintiff pursued this goal in the IEP meetings, the Scott County proceeding, and the administrative due process hearing.
Plaintiff sought immediate reentry from the beginning of the IDEA proceedings. Yet, the committee did not grant James reentry until the subsequent school year after the IEP conditions were satisfied. In short, plaintiff's activities never altered the committee's relationship to her or James in any significant way. The court finds that plaintiff is not a "prevailing party" under § 1415(i)(3)(B) and is, therefore, not entitled to attorneys' fees. Summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that defendant's motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 21) is granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 28) is denied.