Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 07CECG023855, Jeffrey Y. Hamilton, Judge.
Barry J. Bennett, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Robert J. Rosati, for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
Ardaiz, P.J.
In August of 2006 appellant Juan Lopez entered into a written employment contract with respondent Parlier Unified School District ("the District"). Under the contract, the District employed appellant as a "Director of Curriculum & Instruction/Project" for a three-year term commencing on August 1, 2006, and terminating on June 30, 2009. Near the end of his first year on the job, on or about May 21, 2007, appellant was served by the District with a letter advising him "you will be reassigned from your current administrative position for the ensuing 2007/08 school year." The District assigned appellant to another administrative position at the same salary. Appellant filed in superior court a petition seeking a writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate him to his Director's position for the 2007/08 school year. Appellant contended that under Education Code section 44951 he was entitled to remain in his Director's position because the District did not notify him by March 15, 2007 that he would be reassigned to a different position for the 2007/08 school year. The superior court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the District. The court relied on a clause of section 44951 stating "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year .…" (§ 44951.)
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise dated.
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION
Appellant contends that the District's failure to notify him by March 15, 2007 that he would be reassigned to a new position for the following (2007/08) school year was a violation of section 44951, and that this violation entitled him to reinstatement to his Director's position. As we shall explain, we agree with the superior court that the District did not violate section 44951 because that statute, by its express terms, did not apply to appellant.
THE DISTRICT DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 44951
A party may seek a writ of mandate "to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled ...." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) "In order to obtain writ relief, a party must establish '"(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent ...; and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty ...."' [Citation.]'" (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 868.) Section 44951 provides:
"Unless a certificated employee holding a position requiring an administrative or supervisory credential is sent written notice deposited in the United States registered mail with postage prepaid and addressed to his or her last known address by March 15 that he or she may be released from his or her position for the following school year, or unless the signature of the employee is obtained by March 15 on the written notice that he or she may be released from his or her position for the following year, he or she shall be continued in the position. The provisions of this section do not apply to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year, or to a certificated employee holding a position that is funded for less than a school year, or to a certificated employee assigned to an acting position whose continuing right to hold this position depends on being selected from an eligible list established for the position, or to the termination of employment pursuant to Section 44955."
As the superior court pointed out in its ruling, the second sentence of section 44951 expressly states that "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year ...." (§ 44951.) It was not disputed that appellant was a certificated employee or that he held a written contract. Nor was it disputed that the expiration date of his written contract was June 30, 2009. This was two school years "beyond" the 2006-2007 school year in which he received his notice of reassignment. Thus section 44951, by its express terms, did "not apply" to appellant. (§ 44951.) Even if we assume, without deciding the issue, that a violation of section 44951 would entitle appellant to reinstatement to the Director's position, he is not entitled to reinstatement because there has been no violation of section 44951.
"In construing any statute, we first look to its language. [Citation.] 'Words used in a statute ... should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature ....' [Citation.] 'If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court looks "to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379; in accord, see also Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) __ Cal.4th ___ (S143087, filed 12/15/08).)
In the case before us, the words of the statute stating "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year" (§ 44951) are clear and unambiguous. There is thus "no need for construction." (S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 379.)
Appellant cites In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 771, for the proposition that we should give section 44951 a construction which "will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity." (Ibid.) Appellant argues that it is "absurd" to read section 44951 as not applying to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year. We see nothing absurd about the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Without the protections afforded by section 44951, a certificated employee with a one-year contract, or a certificated employee who is in the last year of a multi-year contract, would not know by March 15 whether he or she would have a job, and thus also an income from that job, in the ensuing school year. A certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year has a protection the others do not have - the remedy of damages for the employer's breach of the multi-year contract.
None of the other authorities cited by appellant support his argument that we should construe the language "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year" (§ 44951) as if it said "[t]he provisions of this section apply to a certificated employee who holds a written contract with an expiration date beyond the current school year." In Hoyme v. Board of Education (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 449, for example, the court stated "'[i]t is axiomatic that in the interpretation of a statute where the language is clear, its plain meaning should be followed.'" (Id. at p. 452, quoting from Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155.) In Hoyme the statute required that the employee be "sent written notice deposited in the United States registered mail with postage prepaid and addressed to his last known address by March 15 that he may be released from his position for the following school year" or that "the signature of such an employee is obtained by March 15 on such written notice ...." (Hoyme, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.) In Hoyme the employer personally delivered the notice but obtained no signature of the employee on the notice. The court concluded that "[t]he language here is clear and unequivocal" (id. at p. 452) and that the employee "did not receive proper notice of her possible release ...." (Id. at p. 455.)
Appellant also calls our attention to Ellerbroek v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 348, where the court stated: "There is no question but that the prime purpose behind the enactment of this particular statute is to afford affected administrative type employees adequate notice of a possible reassignment in sufficient time to permit such employee to seek out other satisfactory employment prior to the beginning of the next school year." (Id. at p. 369.) We fully agree with Ellerbroek, but the "affected administrative type employees" are those employees the statute affects, not those employees to whom "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply." (§ 44951.) Nor does anything in Barton v. Governing Board (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 476, or Jefferson v. Compton Unified School Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 32, state or imply that section 44951 should be construed to afford its protections to employees to whom "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply ...." (§ 44951.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
WE CONCUR: Vartabedian, J., Dawson, J.