Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-cv-02160-WDM-CBS.
August 16, 2006
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before me on three motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), filed by Defendants on December 29, 2005. Upon review of the parties' filings, I conclude oral argument is not required. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss will be denied.
Background
As alleged by plaintiff George Lopez (Lopez), the facts of this case are as follows.
Lopez is incarcerated at Fremont Correctional Facility in Canon City, Colorado. In March 2004, through the prison's maintenance work detail, Lopez was assigned the task of cutting up old inmate boots. To accomplish this task, Lopez was instructed to use a circular saw with the blade guard tied back, while another inmate held the boots by hand. While Lopez was cutting one of the boots, the saw kicked back and ran down his leg, causing severe injury. As a result, Lopez brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, prison employees who either assigned him the boot-cutting task or set the boot-cutting procedures, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss is appropriate when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts entitling it to relief. The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and construe all reasonable allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1996).
Discussion
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In their first motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Lopez has failed to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies because his Complaint contains neither records of administrative proceedings nor a detailed description of Lopez's efforts to obtain administrative relief. See Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that exhaustion is a pleading requirement and describing the information that must be provided). In response, Lopez argues that he has exhausted his administrative remedies and that issue preclusion prevents Defendants from arguing otherwise.
From Lopez's response, it appears likely that he has indeed exhausted his administrative remedies, but has simply failed to provide details in his complaint. Therefore, I will construe Lopez's response as a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and will grant such relief. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies will be denied without prejudice.
2. Allegations of an Eighth Amendment Violation
In their second motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Lopez's allegations do not state an Eighth Amendment violation for three reasons: (1) work is not punishment; (2) there are no allegations of willful and wanton infliction of pain; and (3) Lopez has failed to allege that Defendants intended to cause him harm.
Defendants' first argument cannot be reconciled with Farmer v. Brennan. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In Farmer, the Supreme Court held that when a prison guard places a prisoner in a situation where the guard actually knows there is a substantial risk he will be violently raped, the guard has violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 825. Similarly, Lopez has alleged that Defendants forced him to cut up boots with a circular saw, knowing that there was a substantial risk that he would be seriously injured by the saw. It is true that in Farmer, the risk was caused by forcing a prisoner to live in unsafe conditions; while in this case, the risk was caused by forcing a prisoner to work in unsafe conditions. However, Defendants offer no authority or convincing reason to suggest this would be a material distinction. Therefore, it seems that there may be situations, where the work conditions are dangerous enough, where forcing an inmate to work could be cruel and unusual punishment.
As for Defendants' second and third arguments, I conclude that these also lack merit. In cases such as this one, a plaintiff need not allege that the defendants acted with the purpose of causing harm or that they willfully and wantonly inflicted pain. Allegations that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and that they were deliberately indifferent to that risk are sufficient. Id. at 834.
3. Personal Participation
In the final motion to dismiss, two of the defendants, Beverley Nichols (Nichols) and Duane Conners (Conners), argue that Lopez's claims against them should be dismissed because he does not allege their personal participation in any of the events leading up to his injury. See e.g., Worrell v. Henry, 239 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]o establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that `an affirmative link exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor's personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.'") (quoting Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original)). Specifically, Nichols and Conners argue that Lopez's claims are deficient because there are no allegations that (1) they were present at the time of the injury, or (2) knew of the use of the circular saw.
I disagree. First, none of the cases cited by Nichols and Conners stand for the proposition that, to be liable, a supervisor must be physically present when a subordinate engages in unconstitutional behavior. Indeed, such a standard would not be reasonable; it would allow supervisors to escape liability even when they issue direct orders that, when strictly followed, result in a flagrant violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights.
As for the defendants' second argument, their assertion is refuted on the face of the Complaint. Lopez alleges that Nichols and Conners were both personally responsible for setting the policy and procedures regarding the destruction of inmate work boots. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) And, Lopez alleges that both Nichols and Conners personally had a policy of directing the inmates to cut the boots with a circular saw while another inmate held the boots by hand. Id. at ¶ 14. Therefore, dismissal is not appropriate on these grounds.
Accordingly, it is ordered:
1. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint for the limited purpose of demonstrating exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. Defendants' motion to dismiss, filed December 29, 2005 (Docket No. 6), is denied without prejudice.
3. Defendants' motions to dismiss, filed December 29, 2005 (Dockets No. 5 7), are denied.
4. This case remains pending for trial.