Opinion
G059354
07-01-2022
ARTHUR LOPEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IRVINE COMPANY LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Arthur Lopez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Ruzika, Wallace & Coughlin, Frank J. Coughlin and Steven E. Bolanos for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 30-2018-01000086, Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Lopez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ruzika, Wallace & Coughlin, Frank J. Coughlin and Steven E. Bolanos for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
GOETHALS, ACTING P.J.
Arthur Lopez appeals from the trial court's postjudgment costs order. That order followed the court's entry of judgment against Lopez in January 2020 on his housing discrimination claims after the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims in December 2019. Lopez's contentions in opposing the costs order appear to be the same or similar to those he raised when he filed-before entry of the judgment-a motion to suppress his deposition testimony and for sanctions against Defendants. Those contentions center around, as he describes it in his appellate brief, the fact that one of the Defendants "owns the building in which Veritext Legal Solutions- the entity providing [deposition] services," which included "deposition offices ([and] staff of Veritext)," leased space. "[H]ence," this deposition services entity was a "tenant of these defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This resulted in, according to Lopez's declaration in opposing Defendants' motion for costs, "a Hostile Environment from the onset" of his deposition.
The defendants and respondents are Irvine Company LLC, The Irvine Company Apartment Communities, Inc., Newport Bluffs LLC, and The Newport Bordeaux Apartments (Defendants).
It appears the trial court denied Lopez's suppression request and motion for sanctions based on these circumstances in November 2019, before it entered judgment. Lopez did not raise any claim of error regarding the November 2019 order in his appeal of that judgment. Therefore, he is precluded from now re-raising those same issues as a basis to challenge the costs order because that "'"would have the effect of allowing two appeals from the same ruling."'" (Hersey v. Vopava (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 792, 797 (Hersey).) We therefore affirm the costs order.
Our opinion in Lopez v. Irvine Company LLC (Jul. 1, 2022, G058725) [nonpub. opn.] addresses the arguments Lopez raised there, affirming the judgment and the trial court's underlying summary judgment ruling.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The trial court's costs order explains that it taxed certain costs, resulting in a costs award of $3,451.11. Specifically, the costs allowed by the court consisted of, first, $1,956.95 in "costs associated with Plaintiff's deposition," which the court found "recoverable as reasonably necessary deposition costs" based on the invoice Defendants submitted. The court taxed $564.51 in requested deposition costs that were beyond the invoice amount, including for items such as interest charges, but which are otherwise unexplained in the order. The court noted Defendants withdrew their request for $129.29 as the cost for service of process. Finally, the court found that, while per diem costs for a court reporter are recoverable, transcript fees are precluded where the court does not order them. Thus, the court reduced Defendants' request for $669 in court reporter costs to the $350 per diem amount. "In sum, Defendants are awarded $3,451.11 in costs ($ 4,463.01 - $564.51 - $129.29 - $319 = $3,451.11)."
The court reporter costs apparently arose from the hearing on the summary judgment motion.
DISCUSSION
Lopez's central argument on appeal is that "the defendants and their attorneys are caught red handed having failed to disclose affiliations/[lease] contracts with [the] deposing service/entity . . . who is also a tenant of these defendants @ [their] wholly owned commercial building . . . ." Lopez makes this argument in three sections of his opening brief.
In the first, which he advances under a blank heading ("I"), Lopez alludes to the fact that the trial court earlier considered and rejected his claim of bias in the manner in which the deposition services company performed its duties. He argues the trial court "grossly erred by ignoring Plaintiff's objections to the defendants' violations of these herein stated rules," with those alleged violations arising from the fact that "[one of the defendants] owns the building" in which the deposition was held. Lopez further argues he "originally prayed for $10,000.00" in sanctions against Defendants on this basis; he fails to provide a page citation to the record in this appeal or the record in Lopez v. Irvine Company LLC, supra, G058725, for the trial court's earlier ruling.
The second heading in Lopez's opening brief ("II") returns to the theme of sanctions "being sufficient to justify the award to Plaintiff of the $10,000 in sanctions" he earlier requested. He again provides no record citations, and we are unable to locate Lopez's sanctions motion or the court's ruling in either record. Lopez argues the per diem fee for the court reporter's presence at the summary judgment motion should be taxed because "without a valid transcript from the unlawful deposition no such motion [for summary judgment] should have been filed and just the same is said about the court reporter['s ensuing] needless presence." Lopez similarly attacks the deposition costs "since the deposition was improperly and unlawfully arranged," apparently for the same reasons of implicit bias on which he earlier sought sanctions. Lopez concludes this portion by arguing his "request for $10,000.00 in Sanctions is authorized by statute given the defendant's chronic, systematic misuse of discovery processes . . . ."
Appellate courts have no independent knowledge of the cases brought before them for review and may not be tasked with scouring the record on the appellant's behalf. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) Bedrock or "fundamental principles of appellate review" include the following: "(1) a judgment is presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error." (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)
Lopez's third argument repeats his earlier argument, now "petition[ing] this court to invalidate said deposition and its corresponding transcript from the record as evidence including its part in the matters pertaining to the Summary Judgment since Plaintiff timely objected to its validity from the onset including having been deprived of his right to proofread and offer corrections through errata filings . . . ."
Lopez's challenges fail for two reasons. First, in failing to provide a record of his earlier suppression motion and request for sanctions, including any opposition filed, and the trial court's ruling, it is impossible for us to meaningfully review the merits of his claim to determine whether there was any prejudicial error. Lopez does not suggest he requested or obtained a copy of his deposition transcript and identified anything that was mistranscribed, or that it was prejudicial in any manner. Second, and more fundamentally, we may not review on appeal any alleged error in a postjudgment order that was issued before the judgment which the appellant did not challenge in appealing from that judgment. (Hersey, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797-798.) Lopez may not circumvent this rule by recasting his arguments as a cost challenge when, in substance, he now attacks a prejudgment order that he did not appeal.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's postjudgment cost order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their appellate costs in defending the order.
WE CONCUR: SANCHEZ, J., MARKS, J. [*]
[*]Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.