Opinion
CV 21-9645 FMO (AGRx)
12-27-2021
Richard Lopez v. Holiday AL Management Sub LLC
PRESENT: HONORABLE FERNANDO M. OLGUIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
HONORABLE FERNANDO M. OLGUIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REMANDING ACTION
On November 8, 2021, Richard Lopez (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against Holiday Al Management Sub LLC aka Holiday Retirement (“defendant”), asserting state law claims relating to his employment with defendant. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 4); (Dkt. 4, Exh. A (“Complaint”)). On December 13, 2021, defendant removed that action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 1). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861 n. 3 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte 1 before proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33, 123 S.Ct. 366, 370 (2002); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). If there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
An “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
DISCUSSION
The court's review of the NOR and the attached Complaint makes clear that this court does 2 not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff could not have originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”).
Defendant seeks only to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR).
When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, complete diversity must exist between the opposing parties, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 472 (1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant”). Defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 3 meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnote omitted).
In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that a district court has diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.]” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(2).
Here, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction because defendant has failed to show that the parties are diverse. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR). Defendant contends that complete diversity exists because plaintiff is a citizen of California, (see id. at ¶ 11), and defendant is not. (See id. at ¶¶ 13). More specifically, defendant contends that it is a “limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Delaware” and that its “headquarters and principal place of business are located in [] Florida[.]” (Id.); (see Dkt. 5, Declaration of Michele Stone (“Stone Decl.”) at ¶ 3). It further states that its sole member, a “limited partnership” is “organized under the laws of the State of Delaware[.]” (Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 13); (Dkt. 5, Stone Decl. at ¶ 3).
Defendant states that it is currently in transition to Kentucky. (Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 13).
Limited liability companies (“LLCs”) are treated like partnerships rather than corporations for the purpose of determining citizenship, and are deemed “a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006); see Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 569, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (2004) (“[A] partnership . . . is a citizen of each State or foreign country of which any of its partners is a citizen.”). “There is no such thing as ‘a [state name] limited partnership' for purposes of . . . diversity jurisdiction. There are only partners, each of which has one or more citizenships.” Hart v. Terminex Int'l, 336 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Moreover, “[a]n LLC's principal place of business [or] state of organization is irrelevant” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Buschman v. Anesthesia Business Consultants LLC, 42 F.Supp.3d 1244, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Tele Munchen Fernseh GMBH & Co Produktionsgesellschaft v. Alliance Atlantis Int'l Distribution, LLC, 2013 WL 6055328, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“As a limited liability company, [defendant]'s principal place of business is irrelevant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”). If a member of an LLC is a corporation, then the state of that member's incorporation and its principal place of business must be shown. Here, defendant has improperly relied on the standard applicable to corporations despite the fact that neither defendant or its sole member is a corporation. (See id.). In short, defendant has failed to show that complete diversity of the parties exists.
In sum, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding the action, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendant has met its burden of showing that the parties are diverse. See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (“Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1118 (same).
This order is not intended . Nor is it intended to be included in or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
CONCLUSION 5
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.
3. Any pending motion is denied as moot. 6