Opinion
G062309
11-08-2024
JAVIER LOPEZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &Stewart, Jack S. Sholkoff and Carmen M. Aguado for Defendant and Appellant. Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee, Kristen M. Agnew, Nicholas Rosenthal; Polaris Law Group and William L. Marder for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. 30-202201259258 Lon F. Hurwitz, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &Stewart, Jack S. Sholkoff and Carmen M. Aguado for Defendant and Appellant.
Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee, Kristen M. Agnew, Nicholas Rosenthal; Polaris Law Group and William L. Marder for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
Defendant C.H. Robinson Company, Inc. (Robinson) appeals from an order denying in part its motion to compel arbitration. Robinson argues the trial court erred by finding Lopez is a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce and therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; all undesignated statutory references are to this code). It contends, because the FAA applies, Lopez's individual claims are subject to arbitration, the FAA preempts Labor Code section 229, and the trial court should enforce the parties' arbitration agreement according to its terms and dismiss his class claims. Robinson argues, even if the FAA does not apply, the trial court should compel arbitration of Lopez's individual reimbursement claim under Labor Code section 2802 and his putative class claims on an individualized basis.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Lopez is a transportation worker within the ambit of section 1's exemption, following the two-step analysis in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450, 455-459 (Saxon). Because the FAA is inapplicable, we hold the individual reimbursement claim under Labor Code section 2802 is arbitrable, and we deem Robinson's remaining argument forfeited.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robinson provides logistics and transportation services. As a federally registered freight broker, Robinson connects its clients to third-party motor carriers that ship and deliver goods. It manages freight frequently moving across state lines.
In May 2021, Lopez began to work for Robinson in Orange, California. Before he started, he signed a "Mutual Mediation and Arbitration Agreement" (Agreement). The Agreement provides Lopez and Robinson agreed to arbitrate "all legal disputes and claims" under the FAA. The Agreement defines "[c]laims" to "include without limitation all claims pertaining to [the employee's] employment . . . and all claims for . . . wages, overtime, or other compensation . . . or violation of any federal, state, or local law."
The Agreement sets forth under the section, "Individualized Arbitration," the following: "(a) the arbitrator is prohibited from consolidating the claims of others into one proceeding or fashioning a proceeding as a class, collective, joint, or group action (collectively, 'Class Action') or awarding relief to a group of claimants or employees in one proceeding, and (b) the parties waive any right to proceed in a Class Action." (Boldface and italics omitted.) If the FAA were found to be inapplicable, the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) would govern actions to enforce the Agreement or compel arbitration.
Initially, Lopez worked for Robinson as an associate carrier representative. He was later promoted to a carrier representative. Lopez described his duties as follows: contacting truck drivers, "negotiat[ing] a price for their services," "provid[ing] them with information relating to the delivery," "speak[ing] to the shipping party on behalf of the driver," "provid[ing] assistance to the driver regarding any issues" during delivery, "advis[ing] the shipping and receiving parties about any delays or unexpected issues," and notifying "the receiving party on behalf of the driver" when the driver was approaching "the delivery endpoint."
In May 2022, soon after his separation from employment, Lopez filed a putative class action against Robinson alleging three causes of action: (1) violation of Labor Code sections 201-203; (2) violation of Labor Code section 2802; and (3) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. Robinson answered the complaint, denying the allegations.
In October 2022, Robinson moved to compel arbitration of Lopez's individual claims, to strike class claims and allegations from the complaint, and to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay the action pending completion of the arbitration of Lopez's individual claims. Lopez opposed the motion, arguing in relevant part he was a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce under section 1 and exempt from the FAA's coverage. Robinson replied, contending the FAA applies to Lopez because he was not a transportation worker.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel arbitration. It held Lopez was a transportation worker exempt from the FAA's coverage, relying on Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 971 F.3d 904 (Rittman). The trial court found Lopez's "work was essentially that of a trucking dispatcher-contacting the drivers, providing them with information for the delivery, making sure the drivers are able to perform the particular delivery, assisting drivers during the delivery, and communicating between the drivers and the shippers/receivers regarding delays or unexpected issues. Without [Lopez] performing his duties, truckers would not know what loads to pick up or where to take them. The drivers would not have any support during the transportation of products over state lines. While [Lopez] may not physically touch or transport the cargo itself, [Lopez] performs the integral duty of ensuring that the cargo is successfully transported from Point A to Point B. His job is more than tangentially related to the movement of goods. [Lopez]'s work is so closely related to the trucking portion of the business that he is 'practically a part of it.'"
Because the FAA did not apply, the trial court, citing Labor Code section 229 and the parties' Agreement, compelled Lopez's "individual claim for waiting time penalties under Labor Code [section] 203 to arbitration." It stayed the remaining claims, including the class action claim for waiting time penalties and the business expense reimbursement claim under Labor Code section 2802, pending completion of the arbitration.
Robinson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Robinson and Lopez both argue we should employ the de novo standard of review when considering a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration. But "'"[t]here is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration."'" (Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 221, 227.) If the order rests solely on a decision of law, the de novo standard of review applies. (Ibid.; Muro v. Cornerstone Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 784, 789 (Muro).) "'Decisions on issues of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.'" (Muro, at p. 790.)
"Under the substantial evidence standard of review, 'we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings]. [Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn....[Citations.]' [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citations.] However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] 'The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.'" (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1266.)
II.
LOPEZ IS EXEMPT FROM THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT'S COVERAGE
We address the threshold question on appeal: whether Lopez is a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce under section 1 and exempt from the FAA's coverage. Robinson argues Lopez does not fall within section 1's exemption. Despite asserting the facts are undisputed, Robinson challenges some of the trial court's factual findings. It also contends a worker must be physically involved in moving goods to qualify for section 1's exemption. In support of its arguments, Robinson draws from several federal district court and appellate cases. We find nearly all of Robinson's arguments unconvincing. In applying Saxon's two-step analysis, we conclude there was substantial evidence that Lopez falls within section 1's exemption.
A. The FAA and Section 1's Exemption for Transportation Workers
The FAA was enacted in 1925 in "response to hostility of American courts to the enforcement of arbitration agreements ...." (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 111 (Circuit City).) To effectuate this purpose, the FAA requires judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Ibid.) Section 2, its coverage provision, applies the FAA to contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce ...."
Section 1 exempts from the FAA's coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." (Italics added.) The exemption is narrow in scope, applied to "only contracts of employment of transportation workers." (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 118-119.)
In determining whether a worker falls within the catchall category of section 1's exemption-"any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"-we use a two-step analysis. First, we define "the relevant 'class of workers' to which" the worker belongs. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 455.) Second, "we determine whether that class of workers is 'engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.'" (Ibid.) Workers "need not work in the transportation industry to fall within" section 1's exemption. (Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024) 601 U.S. 246, 256 (Bissonnette).)
B. Saxon
Saxon is the leading case on section 1's exemption. In Saxon, a ramp supervisor worked for Southwest Airlines. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 453.) Her work often required loading and unloading "baggage, airmail, and commercial cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country." (Ibid.) The ramp supervisor brought a putative class action against Southwest Airlines for failure to pay overtime wages, despite having agreed to arbitrate wage disputes individually in her employment contract. (Id. at p. 454.) Southwest Airlines sought to enforce the arbitration agreement and, in response, the ramp supervisor argued section 1 exempted her from the FAA's coverage. (Ibid.)
The United States Supreme Court held the ramp supervisor belonged "to a 'class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' that is exempted [under section 1] from the [FAA's] coverage." (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 453.) The court proceeded in its analysis in two steps. It first defined "the relevant 'class of workers' to which" the ramp supervisor belonged. (Id. at p. 455.) Citing dictionaries contemporary with the FAA, the court explained the focus of this inquiry is on the actual work performed by the class of workers: "[T]he FAA speaks of '"workers,"' not '"employees" or "servants."' [Citation.] The word 'workers' directs the interpreter's attention to 'the performance of work.' [Citations.] Further, the word 'engaged'- meaning '[o]ccupied,' 'employed,' or '[i]nvolved,' [citations]-similarly emphasizes the actual work that the members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out. [The ramp supervisor] is therefore a member of a 'class of workers' based on what she does at Southwest, not what Southwest does generally." (Id. at p. 456.) The court found the ramp supervisor belonged "to a class of workers who physically load and unload cargo on and off airplanes on a frequent basis." (Ibid.)
Saxon next examined whether the "class of airplane cargo loaders is 'engaged in foreign or interstate commerce'" pursuant to section 1. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 456.) The court, drawing again on dictionaries contemporary with the FAA, interpreted section 1's text: "to be 'engaged' in something means to be 'occupied,' 'employed,' or 'involved' in it. 'Commerce,' meanwhile, includes, among other things, 'the transportation of . . . goods, both by land and by sea.' [Citations.] Thus, any class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders falls within [section] 1's exemption." (Saxon, at p. 457.) The court concluded airplane cargo loaders formed "'a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.'" (Id. at p. 457.)
Saxon acknowledged the Circuit City court held section 1 "exempted only contracts with transportation workers, rather than all employees, from the FAA," without providing "a complete definition of 'transportation worker.'" (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 458, citing Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 119.) Nonetheless, Circuit City "indicated that any such worker must at least play a direct and 'necessary role in the free flow of goods' across borders. [(Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 121.)] Put another way, transportation workers must be actively 'engaged in transportation' of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce." (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 458.) The Supreme Court concluded: "Cargo loaders exhibit this central feature of a transportation worker.... [O]ne who loads cargo on a plane bound for interstate transit is intimately involved with the commerce (e.g., transportation) of that cargo." (Ibid.) C. Lopez Falls Within Section 1's Exemption for Transportation Workers
Applying Saxon's two-step test here, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding Lopez is a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce under section 1 and is exempt from the FAA's coverage.
1. Lopez Belonged to a Class of Workers Who Organized and Facilitated the Delivery of Customer Shipments
"We begin by defining the relevant 'class of workers' to which [Lopez] belongs." (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 455.) Our focus is on "'the performance of work'" and "the actual work that the members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out." (Id. at p. 456.) Here, the trial court, citing Lopez's declaration, found Lopez's job duties as a carrier representative included: "contacting the drivers, providing them with information for the delivery, making sure the drivers are able to perform the particular delivery, assisting drivers during the delivery, and communicating between the drivers and the shippers/receivers regarding delays or unexpected issues."
Throughout its briefs, Robinson asserts the facts are undisputed. But Robinson contests the trial court's factual finding that Lopez "assist[ed] drivers during the delivery." It argues this finding draws from a "conclusory statement" in Lopez's declaration that he "would provide assistance to the driver regarding any issues that came up." We disagree. Although drawn from Lopez's declaration, the statement is not necessarily conclusory. It is a finding made by the trial court based on the general duties Lopez performed. There is substantial evidence in the record to support this finding by the trial court.
Robinson also argues no evidence supports the trial court's finding that Lopez's duties were akin to those of a trucking dispatcher. It contends the trial court assumed trucking dispatchers are transportation workers under section 1. These arguments are misguided. The trial court made no such assumption. Rather, its statement-"[Lopez]'s work was essentially that of a trucking dispatcher"-referred to a trucking dispatcher in a colloquial sense to illustrate the duties performed by Lopez.
The remaining job duties are undisputed. Therefore, Lopez belonged to a class of workers who "contact[ed] the drivers, provid[ed] them with information for the delivery, ma[de] sure the drivers are able to perform the particular delivery, assist[ed] drivers during the delivery, and communicat[ed] between the drivers and the shippers/receivers regarding delays or unexpected issues." In short, to paraphrase Robinson's human resources director Lindsay Vigeant, Lopez belonged to a class of workers who organized and facilitated the delivery of freight shipments for Robinson's customers.
2. Lopez Belonged to a Class of Workers Engaged in Interstate Commerce
Next, we consider whether that class of workers "engaged in . . . interstate commerce" under section 1. Again, despite asserting the facts are undisputed, Robinson argues no evidence demonstrates Lopez was engaged in interstate commerce. We disagree.
Here, Lopez "play[ed] a direct and 'necessary role in the free flow of goods' across borders." (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 458.) He ensured interstate shipments were started and completed, by contacting truck drivers, negotiating prices for their services, providing them delivery information, notifying the shipping and receiving parties regarding "any delays or unexpected issues" during delivery, and "communicat[ing] with the receiving party on behalf of the driver" when the driver was approaching the destination. As the trial court properly found, "[w]ithout [Lopez] performing his duties, truckers would not know what loads to pick up or where to take them," and Lopez "perform[ed] the integral duty of ensuring that the cargo [was] successfully transported from Point A to Point B."
Lopez was also "actively 'engaged in'" and "intimately involved with the" transportation of goods in interstate transit. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 458.) A Robinson general manager described Lopez's duties as "relaying and gaining information concerning the location of the delivery, the time of the delivery, and the rate for the delivery" with the carriers or drivers, typically by telephone. These interactions put him in a position to work closely with carriers and customers in moving goods across state lines during the transportation process.
Robinson contends, because freight brokers like Robinson do not physically handle freight, workers like Lopez cannot be transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce under section 1. Not so. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected such a "hands-on contact" requirement to qualify for section 1's exemption in Lopez v. Aircraft Service International, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 107 F.4th 1096, 1101-1102 (Lopez). Lopez involved an airline fuel technician who fueled airplanes transporting goods in foreign and interstate commerce. (Id. at p. 1101.) The Ninth Circuit explained Saxon did not require workers to "have hands-on contact with goods and cargo" to qualify for section 1's exemption. (Ibid.) Rather, Saxon acknowledged workers could fall within section 1's exemption "even 'when the class of workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of interstate commerce or the actual crossing of borders.'" (Id. at p. 1102, quoting Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at 457, fn. 2.) We find Lopez persuasive and reject a "hands-on contact" requirement.
Robinson challenges the trial court's finding that Lopez's "work [was] so closely related to the trucking portion of the business that he is 'practically a part of it.'" It contends no evidence supports this finding because Robinson lacked a trucking business. We do not read the trial court's finding as Robinson does. In Rittman, the Ninth Circuit cited a test used in cases involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.): whether an employee "'engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it[.]'" (Rittman, supra, 971 F.3d at p. 912.) The trial court's finding paraphrased and quoted this test. In this context, the phrase, "the trucking portion of the business," appears to mean interstate transportation.
Robinson asserts nothing in the record supports the trial court's finding that, without carrier representatives like Lopez, "drivers would not have any support during the transportation of products over state lines." We agree. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, "[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in support of the judgment." (Picerne Construction Corp. v. Castellino Villas (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208-1209.) While carrier representatives like Lopez provided support to the drivers, that does not necessarily mean the drivers would not receive any support in the carrier representatives' absence. Such an inference goes too far based on the evidence in the record.
Nonetheless, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that carrier representatives like Lopez, who organized and facilitated the delivery of freight shipments for Robinson's customers, belonged to a "class of workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce." (§ 1.) He is exempt from the FAA's coverage.
D. Robinson's Federal Cases Are Unpersuasive
Robinson relies on several federal cases in support of its argument Lopez is not a transportation worker under section 1. These federal cases are unpersuasive.
Robinson contends three federal cases are primarily pertinent here: (1) Lenz v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. (8th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3d 348 (Lenz); (2) Bell v. Ryan Transportation Service, Inc. (D.Kan. 2016) 176 F.Supp.3d 1251 (Bell); and (3) Morning Star Associates, Inc. v. Unishippers Global Logistics, LLC (S.D.Ga., May 20, 2015, No. CV 115-033) 2015 WL 2408477 (Morning Star). In these cases, Robinson argues, the courts held the plaintiffs were not transportation workers when they had job duties similar to those of Lopez. But, even if we were to agree these cases were factually analogous, we find the reasoning in them unpersuasive.
"'Although we may not rely on unpublished California cases, the California Rules of Court do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority.'" (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA, Inc. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1022, fn. 9.)
In short, Lenz held a customer service representative for a transportation company was not a transportation worker under section 1. (Lenz, supra, 431 F.3d at pp. 352-353.) Bell found a carrier sales representative for a logistics company was not a transportation worker. (Bell, supra, 176 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1256-1257.) Morning Star concluded an administrative worker involved with shipping was not a transportation worker. (Morning Star, supra, 2015 WL 2408477 at p. *8.)
In Lenz, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a "nonexclusive list of [eight] factors in determining whether an employee" fits within section 1's exemption: "first, whether the employee works in the transportation industry; second, whether the employee is directly responsible for transporting the goods in interstate commerce; third, whether the employee handles goods that travel interstate; fourth, whether the employee supervises employees who are themselves transportation workers, such as truck drivers; fifth, whether, like seamen or railroad employees, the employee is within a class of employees for which special arbitration already existed when Congress enacted the FAA; sixth, whether the vehicle itself is vital to the commercial enterprise of the employer; seventh, whether a strike by the employee would disrupt interstate commerce; and eighth, the nexus that exists between the employee's job duties and the vehicle the employee uses in carrying out his duties (i.e., a truck driver whose only job is to deliver goods cannot perform his job without a truck)." (Lenz, supra, 431 F.3d at p. 352.)
Although some of the factors in Lenz may still guide courts in determining the application of section 1's exemption, at least two Lenz factors are irrelevant to the section 1 exemption analysis post Saxon. The first factor-"whether the employee works in the transportation industry" (Lenz, supra, 431 F.3d at p. 352)-is inconsistent with Bissonnette, a recent United States Supreme Court case. Bissonnette held, "A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to fall within [section 1's] exemption ...." (Bissonnette, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 256.) We also consider the third factor- "whether the employee handles goods that travel interstate" (Lenz, supra, 431 F.3d at p. 352)-immaterial. As explained above, an employee need not have "hands-on contact" with the goods to qualify for section 1's exemption. (Lopez, supra, 107 F.4th at pp. 1101-1102.)
Therefore, since we determine certain Lenz factors are immaterial to the analysis, we find Lenz unpersuasive. And, because Bell and Morning Star rely on Lenz and predate Saxon, we are not convinced they are applicable here.
Additionally, Robinson contends a worker must physically transport goods across borders or work closely with someone who does to qualify for section 1's exemption. It relies mainly on three federal cases: (1) Sheppard v. Staffmark Investment, LLC (N.D.Cal., Feb. 23, 2021, No. 20-CV-05443-BLF) 2021 WL 690260 (Sheppard); (2) Furlough v. Capstone Logistics, LLC (N.D.Cal., May 10, 2019, No. 18-CV-02990-SVK) 2019 WL 2076723 (Furlough); and (3) Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc. (3d. Cir. 2004) 372 F.3d 588 (Palcko).
These cases are unpersuasive. Sheppard and Furlough both held a worker must physically transport goods to qualify for section's 1 exemption. (Sheppard, supra, 2021 WL 690260 at p. *5; Furlough, supra, 2019 WL 2076723 at p. *24.) But, as discussed above, we reject a "hands-on contact" requirement to qualify for section 1's exemption. (Lopez, supra, 107 F.4th at p. 1101 [2024 WL 3464425 at p. *12].)
In Palcko, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held a field services supervisor for a package delivery business was a transportation worker under section 1. (Palcko, supra, 372 F.3d at pp. 590, 593.) The supervisor "monitored and improved the performance of the drivers under her supervision to ensure timely and efficient delivery of packages." (Id. at p. 590.) The Third Circuit concluded, "Such direct supervision of package shipments makes [the supervisor's] work 'so closely related [to interstate and foreign commerce] as to be in practical effect part of it.'" (Id. at p. 593.)
Robinson argues Palcko is distinguishable from the present case. It asserts Robinson did not employ drivers, unlike the delivery business in Palcko. It also asserts Lopez did not supervise drivers but only called drivers to provide them information pertaining to deliveries. These are distinctions without a difference. We recognize Lopez performed different work. But, as discussed above, Lopez actively engaged in transporting goods across borders, qualifying for section 1's exemption.
E. Robinson's Additional Arguments Fail
Robinson presents several additional arguments that disagree with our analysis. None is convincing.
First, Robinson argues the trial court, at the hearing, erroneously relied on Vigeant's declaration. Specifically, it contends the trial court cited Vigeant's description of Robinson's general operations and involvement in interstate commerce, even though Robinson's general operations were irrelevant to the section 1 exemption analysis. It asserts Vigeant failed to provide any facts relating to the section 1 exemption and failed to explain how Lopez was directly engaged in interstate commerce. It argues Vigeant's declaration supports a section 2 rather than a section 1 analysis and the trial court conflated or confused the two in finding Lopez was exempt from the FAA's coverage.
These arguments lack merit. An oral ruling is not "'necessarily the unequivocal decision of the court. A court may change its ruling until such time as the ruling is reduced to writing and becomes the [final] order of the court.'" (Silverado Modjeska Recreation &Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 300.) Nothing in the trial court's final written order suggests it relied on Robinson's general operations in determining whether Lopez fell within section 1's exemption. Its analysis focused solely on Lopez's job duties and how he was actively engaged in the movement of goods.
Furthermore, Vigeant does explain how Lopez was "directly involved in transporting goods across state . . . borders." (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 451.) Vigeant said Lopez "directly supported [Robinson]'s interstate transactions by facilitating and coordinating freight shipments. For example, he coordinated with [Robinson]'s clients that required the shipment of materials across state lines and the transportation agencies that would thereafter complete the delivery."
Second, Robinson argues the trial court mistakenly relied on Rittman. It asserts Rittman does not apply here as that case addressed an issue different from the present case: whether "'last mile'" delivery drivers, who mostly made intrastate deliveries for Amazon, had to physically cross state borders to fall within section 1's exemption. (Rittman, supra, 971 F.3d at pp. 907, 909.) In Rittman, the Ninth Circuit, after considering the plain meaning of "'engaged in foreign or interstate commerce'" under section 1 and surveying the case law, concluded these delivery drivers were transportation workers "engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce, even if they [did] not cross state lines," and were exempt from the FAA's coverage.(Id. at pp. 910-915.)
In its survey of the case law, Rittman discussed Lenz. (Rittman, supra, 971 F.3d at p. 911.) But, contrary to Robinson's suggestion, Rittman did not invoke Lenz's eight-factor test in its section 1 analysis. (Rittman, at pp. 915-916.)
While the facts of Rittman may be distinguishable from the instant case, Rittman discusses relevant principles involving section 1's exemption. The holding itself is applicable here. A worker, like Lopez, need not actually cross state lines to qualify for section 1's exemption. And nothing prohibits a state trial court from drawing on persuasive authorities, like federal appellate cases, in making its ruling. (See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 90 [state courts may consider federal appellate decisions "for their persuasive weight"].)
Third, Robinson contends the trial court refused to follow Bell, Morning Star, and Lenz because they originate outside the Ninth Circuit. It argues the trial court's reference to the absence of Ninth Circuit cases shows a misapprehension of what decisions are binding or persuasive authority. We do not read the trial court's order in the same manner. The trial court explained it declined to follow Bell, Morning Star, and Lenz because they were not binding authority. And it made no such reference to the lack of Ninth Circuit cases.
Fourth, Robinson asserts the trial court did not cite legal authority with similar facts to the present case. But that is due to the absence of binding legal authority on point here. Accordingly, the trial court properly relied on persuasive authorities, like Rittman, in its order.
Fifth, Robinson argues for the first time in its reply brief the trial court wrongly assumed the section 1 exemption analysis requires examining whether a worker "performs a task that is 'integral' to interstate commerce." "[W]e will not consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief." (Sachs v. Sachs (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 59, 66.) Thus, we decline to address this argument. Even if we were to address it, we would conclude step two of the Saxon inquiry necessitates considering whether the worker's performance of tasks is "direct and 'necessary'"-or, in other words, integral-to "'the free flow of goods' across borders." (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 458.)
Finally, Robinson asserts if we were to affirm the trial court, our affirmance would erode the narrow construction of section 1's exemption. To the contrary, as we concluded above, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Lopez satisfies the requirements outlined in Saxon. And "[t]hese requirements 'undermine[ ] any attempt to give the provision a sweeping, open-ended construction,' instead limiting [section 1] to its appropriately 'narrow' scope." (Bissonnette, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 256.)
We note if this "line-drawing proves to be unmanageable, it is up to Congress, not jurists, to revise the statute." (Rittman, supra, 971 F.3d at p. 918.)
We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Lopez is a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce under section 1. Lopez is exempt from the FAA's coverage, and the Agreement cannot be enforced under the FAA.
III.
LOPEZ'S REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION
Because Lopez is an exempt transportation worker under section 1 and the FAA does not apply, we next address Robinson's argument that Lopez's individual reimbursement claim under Labor Code section 2802 should be compelled to arbitration. Labor Code section 229 provides: "Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate." When the FAA applies, it preempts Labor Code section 229. (Performance Team Freight Systems, Inc. v. Aleman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240.) But, as the FAA is inapplicable here, Labor Code section 229 is not preempted.
Labor Code "[s]ection 229 is found in article 1 of division 2, part 1, chapter 1 of the Labor Code, encompassing sections 200 through 244. Thus, if a cause of action seeks to collect due and unpaid wages pursuant to [Labor Code] sections 200 through 244, that action can be maintained in court, despite an agreement to arbitrate." (Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 684.)
Lopez brought his second cause of action under Labor Code section 2802 for failure to reimburse a business expense-the cost of using his personal cellular phone for work. Because he did not seek to collect due and unpaid wages pursuant to Labor Code sections 200 through 244, Labor Code section 229 does not apply.
The Agreement covers "all claims pertaining to [the employee's] employment . . . and all claims for . . . wages, overtime, or other compensation . . . or violation of any federal, state, or local law." Lopez's individual reimbursement claim falls within the scope of this provision. It is therefore arbitrable, and the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration of this claim.
IV. ROBINSON'S FINAL ARGUMENT IS FORFEITED
"'When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.' [Citation.] Alternatively stated, '[w]here a point is merely asserted by [appellant] without any [substantive] argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.' [Citation.] 'Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by [substantive] argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived.'" (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418.)
"Although we exercise our discretion to consider arguments for which we can discern a legal or factual basis in the briefs, there are many instances when no such basis is apparent. 'We are not obliged to make other arguments for [appellant] [citation], nor are we obliged to speculate about which issues counsel intend to raise.'" (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
In the final argument section of its opening brief, Robinson argues we should compel Lopez's putative class claims to arbitration on an individualized basis. In support, it cites the legal principle of "interpret[ing] the scope of arbitrable claims broadly" and the Agreement covering "'all legal disputes and claims.'" But Robinson offers no substantive arguments or authorities explaining why these claims should be compelled to arbitration (with the exception of the Labor Code section 2802 claim discussed above). We therefore decline to address this argument and deem it forfeited.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court's order denying Robinson's motion to compel arbitration as to Lopez's individual reimbursement claim under Labor Code section 2802 is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to enter an order compelling Lopez to arbitrate this claim. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: DELANEY, J. GOODING, J.