Opinion
No. 06-75836.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed May 5, 2008.
Michael K. Mehr, for Petitioner.
Paul Fiorino, Christina Bechak Parascandola, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency No. A77-833-656.
Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Moises Lopez-Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing de novo, Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005), we grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings.
Our recent decisions in United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), held respectively that accessories after the fact are covered by Cal. Vehicle Code § 10851(a), and that accessory-after-the-fact liability is not necessarily morally turpitudinous. Because "[w]e have before us a record of conviction that is inconclusive" as to the factual predicate for Lopez-Gutierrez's conviction, see Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007), he has established prejudice from prior counsel's failure to contend that his conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 794 (a petitioner "must demonstrate only that she has plausible grounds for relief to establish prejudice from ineffective assistance). We therefore remand with directions that the BIA reopen Lopez-Gutierrez's proceedings. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004).
We deny the Attorney General's request to strike part of the opening brief.