Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

22 Citing cases

  1. Davila v. N. Reg'l Joint Police Bd.

    370 F. Supp. 3d 498 (W.D. Pa. 2019)   Cited 11 times
    In Davila, the officer received information from an independent reliable source that the driver's identification was accurate.

    The new information that Officer Bienemann learned went to the validity of the immigration detainer, but an immigration detainer is not an arrest warrant. See generallyGalarza v. Szalczyk , 745 F.3d 634, 641–42 (3d Cir. 2014) ; see alsoLopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't , 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 973–74 (S.D. Ind. 2017). Thus, the circumstances as between Duckett and this case are not sufficiently similar.

  2. Creedle v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

    349 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2018)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that a similar Florida statute did not provide an independent source of authority for local law enforcement to arrest individuals for civil immigration violations

    The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally, under the Fourth Amendment, "the predicate for an arrest is probable cause to believe the arrestee is committing or has committed a crime." Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't , 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 975-76 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford , 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) ; Brown v. Texas , 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) ; Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200, 212-13, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) ). In the context of federal immigration enforcement, however, federal immigration officials may conduct reasonable arrests to face administrative proceedings based on probable cause that certain civil immigration violations have been committed.

  3. City of S. Miami v. DeSantis

    408 F. Supp. 3d 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    City of El Cenizo, Tex. v. Tex. , 890 F.3d 164, 174 (5th Cir. 2018) ; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 ; United States v. Ovando-Garzo , 752 F.3d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that identifying an alien, communicating with federal immigration officers, and detaining an alien until federal officers could take custody was not unilateral conduct outside the scope of a local law enforcement officer's authority); seeCorley v. United States , 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) ("one of the most basic interpretive canons, that " ‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ " (quoting Hibbs v. Winn , 542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004) )); see alsoLopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't , 296 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (‘ "An immigration detainer is a piece of paper issued by immigration officials that purports to command other law enforcement officials to hold a prisoner, who otherwise would be released, in custody and deliver that person to federal immigration officials.’ It is ‘the principle mechanism for [ICE]...to obtain custody over suspected immigration violators in the custody of state or local law enforcement officials.

  4. United States v. Valdez-Hurtado

    638 F. Supp. 3d 879 (N.D. Ill. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Even as the INA contemplates or encourages law enforcement agencies to cooperate with ICE's immigration enforcement activities, such cooperation "does not embrace detention of a person based solely on either a removal order or an ICE detainer" because that form of detention "exceeds the 'limited circumstances' in which state officers may enforce federal immigration law and thus violates 'the system Congress created.' " Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion County Sheriff's Dept., 296 F. Supp. 3d 959, 973-74 (S.D. Ind. 2017), quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408, 132 S.Ct. 2492.

  5. C.F.C. v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

    349 F. Supp. 3d 1236 (S.D. Fla. 2018)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim arising from their continued detention at the request of ICE must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment

    ons violations under Massachusetts common law and thus had no authority to "to arrest and hold an individual solely on the basis of a Federal civil immigration detainer" because "it is not reasonable to interpret § 1357(g)(10) as affirmatively granting authority to all State and local officers to make arrests that are not otherwise authorized by State law"); Ochoa v. Campbell , 266 F.Supp.3d 1237, 1259 (E.D. Wash. 2017) ("Courts around the country have held that local law enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment when they temporarily detain individuals for immigration violations without probable cause."); Morales v Chadbourne , 793 F.3d 208, 216 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding "clear law" establishing that the constitution requires probable cause for the immigration detention that a detainer requests); Abriq , 295 F.Supp.3d at 880-81 (finding that the defendant, a local law enforcement agency, lacked probable cause to detain the plaintiff pursuant to an immigration detainer); Lopez–Aguilar v. Marion County Sheriff's Department , 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 969-70 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (approving the parties' stipulated judgment declaring that "seizures by [Marion County] based solely on detention requests from ICE (in whatever form) or removal orders from an immigration court violate the Fourth Amendment unless ICE supplies, or [Marion County] otherwise possess[es], probable cause that the individual to be detained has committed a criminal offense"). In Lopez–Aguilar , the county argued that it held the plaintiff based on a detainer because it was required to "cooperate" with federal immigration officials.

  6. Abriq v. Hall

    295 F. Supp. 3d 874 (M.D. Tenn. 2018)   Cited 120 times
    Finding that plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim must be dismissed because "[i]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendments, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process"

    Metro argues that it was acting in "cooperation" with ICE officials, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). In Lopez–Aguilar v. Marion County Sheriff's Department , 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 969-70, 2017 WL 5634965, at * 6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2017), the county had argued that it held the plaintiff based simply on the ICE detainer because it was required to "cooperate" with federal immigration officials. The court held that the circumstances under which state enforcement officers may be authorized to assist or cooperate with the federal government in immigration matters are limited and clearly defined under federal law.

  7. R2X, LLC v. Windsor

    1:23-cv-01568-SEB-MKK (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2024)

    Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 96768 (S.D. Ind. 2017).

  8. Alberto-Toledo v. Wash. Cnty.

    Case No. 3:20-cv-01557-MC (D. Or. Jul. 15, 2021)

    While probable cause of a civil immigration violation may permit the seizure of individuals by federal immigration officials, courts have held that, "absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law." Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 296 F. Supp. 3d 959, 977-78 (S.D. Ind. 2017) ("Only when acting under color of federal authority, that is, as directed, supervised, trained, certified, and authorized by the federal government, may state officers effect constitutionally reasonable seizures for civil immigration violations."). Federal law does not expressly authorize the execution of Warrants of Removal/Deportation by state or local officials.

  9. Batesville Casket Co. v. Ackerman

    1:23-cv-01679-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Despite the title of "Agreed Injunction," the parties are essentially requesting the entry of a consent decree that embodies the terms of their settlement agreement.See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Settlement agreements that contain equitable terms, an injunction for example, will usually be embodied in a consent decree so that the judge will have continuing jurisdiction to enforce their terms."); D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A] settlement agreement is nothing more than a contract; the imprimatur of an injunction is required to render it a consent decree enforceable through contempt); Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 968 (S.D. Ind. 2017) ("There is no apparent distinction between a 'stipulated judgment,' on the one hand, and what is called a 'consent decree' or a 'consent judgment,' on the other."). Because a "federal court is more than a recorder of contracts from whom private parties may purchase injunctions," Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338, "litigants wishing the Court to issue a consent [decree] must argue why the [decree] should issue, and cannot expect the Court unreflexively to endorse their agreement with the full authority of the federal judiciary," Hanni, 2017 WL 6805318, at *

  10. Jones v. Radey

    1:21-cv-00163-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2023)

    "There is no apparent distinction between a 'stipulated judgment,' on the one hand, and what is called a 'consent decree' or a 'consent judgment,' on the other." Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 296 F.Supp.3d 959, 968 n.4 (S.D. Ind. 2017). But a "federal court is more than a recorder of contracts," and a district court should not enter a consent decree whenever it "strikes two parties' fancy."