Lopata v. State

12 Citing cases

  1. Hepple v. State

    31 Md. App. 525 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)   Cited 28 times
    Defining "manifestly wrong" and "substantially injurious"

    I further find that there is no evidence of the ownership of the property and no evidence really of Mr. Jones' interest in the property. I further find that the time of the entry on September 14, 1974, when State's Exhibit Number 2 was removed therefrom, that Mr. Jones was not on the premises and consequently under the doctrine, [ Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451 (1973) cert. denied, 269 Md. 762 (1973)] although he had been on the premises on prior occasions, he has not met his burden of proof to establish his standing to raise a Fourth Amendment infringement of his rights."

  2. Lopata v. State

    269 Md. 762 (Md. 1973)

    Denied October 1, 1973Petition denied October 1, 1973. Opinion of Court of Special Appeals reported: 18 Md. App. 451.

  3. Colin v. State

    101 Md. App. 395 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle in which contraband was hidden in the compartment in a door, reacted nervously when the vehicle was stopped, and gave the officers a false name "add[ed] up to a revealing picture" that "could reasonably be interpreted as showing that he had something to hide and knew where it was to be found"

    Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34, 99 S.Ct. at 425 ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.") (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966-67, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). See also Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 452-53, 307 A.2d 721 (1973) ("It is not enough for a defendant to show that someone's constitutional rights have been violated; he must show that his constitutional rights have been violated." (Emphasis in the original)), cert. denied, 269 Md. 762 (1973).

  4. Cobey v. State

    80 Md. App. 31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)   Cited 41 times
    Affirming trial court's conclusion that DNA "fingerprinting" is generally accepted

    That issue, as interesting as it may be, is not preserved for review because Cobey, through his trial attorney, consented to submit to the blood test. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 307 A.2d 721 (1973). Since the question was not preserved, we do not consider it. Md. Rule 8-131(a).

  5. Logue v. State

    37 Md. App. 41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)   Cited 3 times

    "Chaotic," however, is not to be equated with "coercive" in the absence of some showing that the police officers used the "chaotic" situation as a means of coercing their intrusion into the appellant's home. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Anderson v. State, 237 Md. 45, 205 A.2d 281 (1965); Whitman v. State, supra; Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 307 A.2d 721 (1973). We find no such evidence in our independent review of the record.

  6. Jarrell v. State

    373 A.2d 975 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)   Cited 10 times
    Upholding the warrantless search of a vehicle for marijuana upon receiving information that a sale was to occur within two hours.

    . . . whether a consent to a search was in fact "voluntary" or was the product of duress or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.Accord Johnson v. State, 30 Md. App. 280 (1976); Wilson v. State, 30 Md. App. 242 (1976); Whitman v. State, 25 Md. App. 428 (1975); Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451 (1973). The same test, i.e., the "totality of the circumstances" has also been used over the years in determining the voluntariness of a confession.

  7. Venner v. State

    30 Md. App. 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)   Cited 7 times

    Another threshold question, with which we are not concerned here, is standing to object, as in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725 (1960); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967 (1968); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 36 L.Ed.2d 208, 93 S.Ct. 1565 (1973). See also Duncan v. State, 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976); Garrison v. State, 28 Md. App. 257, 345 A.2d 86 (1975); Shope v. State, 18 Md. App. 472, 307 A.2d 730 (1973); Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 307 A.2d 721, cert. denied, 269 Md. 762 (1973); Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 286 A.2d 572 (1972); D. Trager and E. Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 421. Yet another threshold question could be consent. See United States v. Watson. 423 U.S. 411, 46 L.Ed.2d 598, 96 S.Ct. 820 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973); Johnson v. State, 30 Md. App. 280, 352 A.2d 349 (1976); Wilson v. State, 30 Md. App. 242, 357 A.2d 437 (1976); Whitman v. State, 25 Md. App. 428, 336 A.2d 515 (1975).

  8. Johnson v. State

    30 Md. App. 280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)   Cited 6 times

    The State and appellants agree that the convictions of both appellants stand or fall on the validity of the consent. "In any event, considering all the facts presented at the suppression hearing, and following the guidelines set down in the Schneckloth and Lopata [ 18 Md. App. 451] cases, the Court finds that the consent of defendant Oscie Johnson to search the premises at 7406 Hancock Avenue was freely and voluntarily given and the subsequent search and seizure of evidence was valid." In Whitman v. State, 25 Md. App. 428, we adopted the procedure prescribed by United States v. Hearn and Taylor, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.), of isolating the factors of coercion and non-coercion and placing them in juxtaposition in order to determine the voluntariness of a consent search.

  9. Hager v. State

    341 A.2d 886 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975)   Cited 3 times

    As previously stated, appellant and the other two escapees abandoned the '67 Ford in front of the Continental Motel some time after 9 p.m. on March 4th. The Crime Investigation Unit of the City of Cumberland vacuumed the vehicle in the early morning of March 5th, many hours before the arrest of appellant in Pennsylvania. There is no issue presented under Pennsylvania Rule 118; and appellant has no other grounds for objection, nor indeed any standing to object, since the car had been abandoned by him and had been impounded by Corporal McGowan on the evening of March 4th. See, Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451 (1973). 4. Appellant's Oral Statement

  10. Duncan and Smith v. State

    27 Md. App. 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975)   Cited 21 times
    Stating generally that the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence at a suppression hearing, and "`[t]he burden of persuasion remains throughout upon the one who at the outset has asserted the affirmative of the issue'"

    One must establish that it is his own direct or derivative enjoyment of property or expectation of privacy that has been invaded before he may challenge the invasion. Walters v. State, 8 Md. App. 583, 261 A.2d 189; Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 286 A.2d 572; Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 307 A.2d 721; Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). We are not here concerned with the question of what is the appropriate burden of proof at a suppression hearing once a justiciable issue is properly before the hearing judge.