Opinion
NNHCV116018843S.
12-10-2012
Harwood LOOMIS v. Geraldine A. LUPOLI, Esq., Administratrix of the Estate of Helen M. Clarke Wallace.
Dean R. Associates Singewald, New Haven, CT, for Harwood W. Loomis. Clendenen & Shea LLC, New Haven, CT, for Geraldine A. Lupoli, Esq.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Dean R. Associates Singewald, New Haven, CT, for Harwood W. Loomis.
Clendenen & Shea LLC, New Haven, CT, for Geraldine A. Lupoli, Esq.
WILSON, J.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Harwood Loomis, brings this breach of contract action against attorney Geraldine Lupoli, both in her individual capacity and as the administratrix of the estate of Helen Wallace. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that Lupoli breached an oral agreement to pay compensation for services rendered by the plaintiff on behalf of the estate. Presently before the court is Lupoli's second motion for summary judgment. The dispositive issues presented by the instant motion are: (1) whether this breach of contract action falls within the purview of the relevant Connecticut probate statutes, General Statutes § 45a-390 et seq.; and (2) whether this action is time barred, as a matter of law, by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-576(a).
On November 11, 2011, Lupoli first filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to the first count of the plaintiff's March 21, 2011 complaint. That count, which was a probate appeal under General Statutes § 45a-186(a), was ultimately withdrawn by the plaintiff. See docket entry numbers 114.00 and 114.10. Accordingly, the court never ruled on Lupoli's first motion for summary judgment.
It is undisputed that the decedent passed away prior to October 1, 1987.
General Statutes § 52-576(a) provides, in relevant part: " No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrue ..."
The operative complaint is dated March 18, 2012. The plaintiff alleges that he is an heir and beneficiary of the will and trust of Helen Wallace. The plaintiff further alleges that Lupoli and Thomas Wallace, the life tenant of the estate, orally requested and engaged the plaintiff to perform professional services on behalf of the estate between 1995 and 2001. By letter dated August 30, 2004, the plaintiff requested that Lupoli submit to the Probate Court his claim for compensation for the services he allegedly performed on behalf of the estate. In a letter dated April 5, 2005, Lupoli informed the plaintiff that, based on the input from other beneficiaries of the estate, she would not submit the plaintiff's claim for compensation to the Probate Court.
Thereafter, the plaintiff submitted his request for compensation directly to the Probate Court. At the Probate Court, on October 14, 2010, the plaintiff noticed a deposition of Lupoli. On February 10, 2011, in granting Lupoli's motion to quash the notice of deposition, the Probate Court issued an order stating, in relevant part: " And it is ORDERED AND DECREED THAT ... [t]he Motion to Quash, procedurally entered, is now decided substantively. The merits of the debate are whether a deposition should proceed under C.G.S. 45a-365 on an administrative claim, in this long running decedent's estate, that relates to matters up to 2001, last heard from on August 30, 2004. Simply, the Administratrix has a right to decline to pay; she has done so; and further action should be brought in the Superior Court."
On March 14, 2011, the present case was commenced by service of process. On May 3, 2012, Lupoli filed the instant motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support. On July 31, 2012, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in opposition. Lupoli and the plaintiff each filed supplemental briefs on August 10, 2012 and September 11, 2012, respectively. This matter was argued at short calendar on October 1, 2012.
LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). " In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact ... Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). " Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitation grounds when the " material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute ..." Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 452, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984).
DISCUSSION
I
Lupoli maintains that the Connecticut probate statutes are inapplicable to the present case because the plaintiff is a creditor of the administratrix and not a creditor of the estate. Specifically, Lupoli contends that " [Lupoli's] role as an administratrix ... does not automatically convert the plaintiff's claim to be one made by a ‘ creditor of the decedent’ that would otherwise be subject to the provisions of ... § 45a-390 et seq ... For this reason, [the relevant probate statutes] are inapplicable to the present case." Lupoli's Reply to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 10, 2011, p. 2. In response, the plaintiff argues, inter alia, that this matter was timely commenced pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-399, which sets forth a process by which a creditor can bring suit against a fiduciary of an estate when such fiduciary is unable to settle or adjust a claim filed by the creditor. The plaintiff asserts that § 45a-399 is applicable to the present action because the text of the statute refers to " any claim" brought against the fiduciary.
In his July 31, 2012 memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the present action was timely commenced under General Statutes §§ 45a-401(c) and 45a-402 (formerly § 45a-210). The plaintiff appears to have conceded these arguments, however, in his September 11, 2012 memorandum. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that " [i]t is clear that the present claim is not one brought within the time limited to present [a] claim [under] §§ 45a-395, 45a-400, 45a-401, 45a-402 [and] 45a-413." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed September 11, 2012, p. 1. The plaintiff later reiterated his position: " The facts clearly show [that] the plaintiff's actions in commencing the instant suit were within all applicable statutes ... §§ 52-576[and] 45a-399." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 5, 499 A.2d 1162. Whether the plaintiff actually conceded these arguments, however, is irrelevant to the outcome of the instant motion. As explained below, the time limitations set forth in the relevant probate statutes; General Statutes § 45a-390 et seq.; are irrelevant to the present action because the plaintiff is simply not a creditor of the decedent.
General Statutes § 45a-399 provides, in relevant part: " When any fiduciary of a decedent's estate required to account in a court of probate is unable to settle or adjust any claim against him as such, or when any such fiduciary and a claimant against him are unable to agree concerning the amount or validity of such claim, such fiduciary may give written notice to such claimant of the disallowance of his claim, wholly or in part, and unless such claimant commences a suit against such fiduciary within four months after such notice has been given, such claimant shall be barred of his claim against such fiduciary, except such part as has been allowed, and of any such claim against the estate."
Although research has revealed no Connecticut cases directly addressing the precise issue of whether a post-mortem creditor who orally agrees to provide consulting services on behalf of an estate at the request of an administratrix is a " creditor" within the meaning of the relevant probate statutes, the court's analysis is informed by prior decisions. For instance, in Burke v. Terry, 28 Conn. 414 (1859), our Supreme Court held that an attorney who had provided legal services during the settlement of an estate was not a creditor of the estate and, as a result, had no right to appeal from the settlement of the administrator's account by the Probate Court. Far more recently, in DiFrancesca v. Rousseau, 36 Conn.Supp. 33, 34, 409 A.2d 1252 (1979), the court held that, pursuant to Burke, " a claim against an administrator for legal services rendered in the settlement of an estate does not make the provider of those services a creditor of the estate." Id., at 35. Subsequently, in Constas v. Tucci, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket Nos. CV 010182864, CV 01 0182865 (January 27, 2010, Jennings, J.), the court similarly held that under Burke an attorney who provided legal services during the settlement of an estate was restricted to his civil action remedies. Consequently, in light of the Burke line of cases, the plaintiff's oral agreement with Lupoli to perform professional services on behalf of the estate does not transform the plaintiff into a creditor of the decedent. Thus, Connecticut's probate statutes are irrelevant to the instant motion for summary judgment.
Although the plaintiff is not a creditor of the decedent, persons similarly situated to the plaintiff are not without a remedy. Specifically, such persons may seek to recover from the fiduciary of the estate personally and, under certain circumstances, seek to be reimbursed from the assets of the estate pursuant to General Statutes § 52-570a. R. Folsom, Connecticut Estates Practice: Probate Litigation in Connecticut (2d Ed.2009), § 4:10, pp. 4-29, 4-30.
General Statutes § 52-570a provides, in relevant part: " (a) If any person has a legal claim against any executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, on account of moneys paid or services rendered for the estate administered by the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, and which should justly be paid out of the estate, the claimant may bring a civil action against the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, while in office, or against the successor of any of them, if such fiduciary has ceased to hold office."
As for the first theory of recovery, namely, suing the administrator personally, " [w]henever an executor or administrator enters into a contract binding the estate, he or she incurs a personal liability since the estate is not a legal entity and cannot be the obligor. The administrator or executor is personally liable for breach of express contracts ... for all debts incurred in the continuation by the fiduciary of the business of the deceased, for debts arising out of a will contest settlement and for expenses of administration generally." Id., at p. 4-29; see also, Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 495, 515, 1823 WL57 (Conn.). " Previous to the enactment of [§ 52-570a] ... the right of recovery of one to whom an executor or administrator had incurred an obligation in the performance of his duties was against the executor or administrator personally, and the only way in which the estate could be charged with such an obligation was through its allowance to the executor or administrator in his account of the sums paid by him. Such obligations as were properly incurred by an executor or administrator would be allowed in that account as a matter of course. On the other hand, obligations incurred by reason of positive misconduct or violation of duty on his part would not be allowed to him; although, if he acted reasonably and in good faith, the mere fact that, as later appeared, he had misjudged the situation or incurred expenses unnecessarily, would not prevent their allowance to him. On obligations incurred under such circumstances that they might not be allowed to him out of the estate, he might be held personally liable. Moreover, it followed from these principles that obligations incurred by an executor were not chargeable against an administrator ... who succeeded him." (Citations omitted.) Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 612-13, 138 A. 795 (1927); see also, DiFrancesca v. Rousseau, supra, 36 Conn.Supp. at 36, 409 A.2d 1252.
Section 52-570a provides an additional remedy to persons similarly situated to the plaintiff by permitting recovery from the assets of the estate, provided that such debt ought to be equitably paid from the estate. More particularly, " [i]n any case in which any person has a legal claim against any ... administrator ... growing out of moneys paid or services rendered which should justly be paid out of the estate, a civil action in the Superior Court may be brought [under § 52-570a] against the fiduciary ... If the claim is found just and one which ought to equitably be paid from the estate, judgment may be rendered for the claimant ‘ to be paid out of the estate so held.’ Nothing in this statutory remedy prevents the claimant from electing to hold the fiduciary to personal responsibility for debts of the estate ... It is clear, therefore, that this remedy is cumulative and does not reduce the common law personal liability of the fiduciary." R. Folsom, supra, § 4-10, at p. 4-30, 409 A.2d 1252. " Moreover, the statute does not change the nature of the obligation but merely affords the creditor a remedy by which, without injustice to the estate, the obligation may be discharged immediately from the fund which in any event would bear the ultimate burden." Id.
Accordingly, whether the plaintiff complied with provisions of § 45a-399 is not relevant because the plaintiff is not a creditor of the decedent. The plaintiff is limited to his civil law remedies, which include both an action against the fiduciary personally and an action under § 52-570a.
In
II
Having determined that § 45a-399 is irrelevant to the present case, the court will now examine whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by § 52-576(a). Whether § 52-576(a) bars the plaintiff's claims depends on the nature of Lupoli's purported liability. As previously discussed, parties similarly situated to the plaintiff may seek to recover both from an administrator personally or, pursuant to § 52-570a, seek to be reimbursed from the assets of the estate, provided that such debt ought to be equitably paid from the estate. R. Folsom, supra, § 4:10, at pp. 4-29, 4-30, 409 A.2d 1252. " To the extent of their personal liability ... [administrators] may plead with the same statute of limitations and with the same effect, as many other individuals." R. Folsom, Connecticut Estates Practice: Settlement of Estates in Connecticut (2d Ed.2009), § 8:136, p. 8-66. In contrast, " [t]o the extent of this ‘ estate liability, ’ it is held that obligations may be equitably chargeble to the estate despite the running of the statute of limitations, and hence that the only real bar, so far as the estate liability is concerned, would be laches." Id., § 8:137, at pp. 8-66, 8-67, 409 A.2d 1252.
It is well settled that " § 52-576 governs the statute of limitations under simple or implied contract actions ..."
Research revealed only one Connecticut case that directly addresses the issue of whether such " estate liability" claims are subject to general statutes of limitations. In
Thus, to the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to recover from Lupoli personally, the plaintiff's claims are subject to the time limitations set forth in § 52-576(a). On the other hand, to the extent that the plaintiff's claims may be reimbursed from the estate pursuant to § 52-570a, the only applicable time limitation is laches. Thus, it necessarily follows that the plaintiff's claim against Lupoli pursuant to General Statutes § 52-570a is, at least in part, not subject to the timing provisions of § 52-576(a). Nevertheless, the court will not consider whether the plaintiff is precluded under the doctrine of laches from recovering against Lupoli in this capacity because this argument was not raised by Lupoli.
Moreover, with respect to laches, there is simply insufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. " Laches is an equitable defense that consists of two elements. First, there must have been a delay that was inexcusable, and, second, that delay must have prejudiced the defendant ... The mere lapse of time does not constitute laches ... unless it results in prejudice to the defendant ... as where, for example, the defendant is led to change his position with respect to the matter in question." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Accordingly, the remaining issue is whether the plaintiff timely commenced his breach of contract claim against Lupoli in her individual capacity. " While the statute of limitations normally begins to run immediately upon the accrual of the cause of action, some difficulty may arise in determining when the cause or right of action is considered as having accrued. The true test is to establish the time when the plaintiff first could have successfully maintained an action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Amoco Oil Co. v. Liberty Auto & Electric Co., 262 Conn. 142, 153, 810 A.2d 259 (2002). " Where services are continuously rendered over an extended period of time under an express or implied contract which does not fix the term of employment nor the time when compensation shall be payable, many courts have regarded the contract as an entire one, raising an implied condition that the compensation shall not be due and payable until the termination of the service, so that the statute of limitations will not begin to run against the claim for compensation until the employment is ended ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaylord Hospital v. Massaro, 5 Conn.App. 465, 467-68, 499 A.2d 1162 (1985) (holding that, in an action to recover expenses arising from medical care, § 52-576(a) began to run when a patient's medical treatment was complete and he was released from the hospital); see also Bailey, Moore, Glazer, Schaefer & Proto, LLP v. Hippeau, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4007301 (February 22, 2006, Thompson, J.) (holding that " in the context of a claim by an accounting firm seeking payment for services rendered, a plaintiff's cause of action generally would accrue at the time the accounting services to the defendant are completed").
In the present case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff performed services pursuant to an oral contract, which was silent as to when the alleged services would be payable. Thus, the six year limitation period set forth in § 52-576(a) began to run in 2001, when the plaintiff last performed services on behalf of the estate. See, e.g., Gaylord Hospital v. Massaro, supra, 5 Conn.App. at 467-68, 499 A.2d 1162. Since the plaintiff did not commence this action until March 14, 2011, the plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Lupoli in her individual capacity is time-barred by § 52-576(a). The plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Lupoli in her role as administratrix, however, is not subject to § 52-576(a) to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to recover from the assets of the estate pursuant to § 52-570a. To be clear, the only applicable time limitation to such claims is laches. Nonetheless, as the court previously noted, whether the plaintiff is precluded from recovering under this doctrine was not raised by Lupoli.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Lupoli's second motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the plaintiff's claim against Lupoli in her individual capacity, and denied with respect to the plaintiff's claim against Lupoli in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Helen Wallace pursuant to General Statutes § 52-570a.
Loomis v. Lupoli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 11 6018843 (September 28, 2011, Wilson, J.) [ 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 671], this court previously considered Lupoli's motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, motion to strike the plaintiff's March 21, 2011 complaint. At issue in that case was, inter alia, whether the plaintiff properly complied with the statutory procedure set forth by §§ 45a-399 and 45a-401. Id. The court held, viewing the allegations in that complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had timely complied with those statutes. Id. The court did not consider whether the plaintiff was a creditor of the decedent within the meaning of the relevant probate statutes because this argument was raised by Lupoli, for the first time, in this motion for summary judgment.
Garofalo v. Squillante, 60 Conn.App. 687, 692, 760 A.2d 1271 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 929, 767 A.2d 101 (2001). Moreover, § 52-576(a) applies to executed oral contracts. Bagoly v. Riccio, 102 Conn.App. 792, 799, 927 A.2d 950, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 931, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).
Hewitt v. Beattie, supra, 106 Conn. at 617-18, 138 A. 795, which is cited by Professor Folsom, our Supreme Court held, inter alia, that General Statutes " § 5771 [a predecessor to § 52-570a], provides for the satisfaction from assets of the estate of claims which ought equitably to be paid from them. In determining whether the obligations incurred by the executors should now be paid from the assets of the estate, the mere fact that the period of the applicable statute of limitations had run would not be conclusive, but the matter should be determined by equitable principles ... These claims are subject, as regards delay in taking steps to enforce them, only to the defense of laches, of which prejudice is the essence."
Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, 118 Conn.App. 325, 334-35, 983 A.2d 293 (2009). With the evidence presented, the court cannot determine, as a matter of law, whether the plaintiff's delay in bringing this action was both " inexcusable" and detrimental to Lupoli.