Even accrued amounts of alimony are subject to modification. Nixon v Wright, 146 Mich. 231; 109 N.W. 274 (1906), Loomis v Loomis, 273 Mich. 7; 262 N.W. 331 (1935). Alimony and maintenance decrees do not resemble judgments at law in the pecuniary obligations they impose at the time of their pronouncement.
In interpreting this statutory provision the Michigan courts have held that the trial court reserves jurisdiction to modify an award for support money and that the right of modification extends to accrued payments. ( Nixon v. Wright, 146 Mich. 231 [109 N.W. 274, 10 Ann.Cas. 547]; Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7 [ 262 N.W. 331]; Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23 [ 217 N.W. 913, 56 A.L.R. 839]; Wellman v. Wellman, 305 Mich. 265 [ 9 N.W.2d 579].
Courts may modify a divorce decree upon a showing of a change of conditions of the parties. See Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7. In the case at bar defendant's financial condition was bettered by reason of his increased earning of $2 per week, and the reduction in payments of $6 per week by reason of 1 child becoming 17 years of age. Under these conditions there was an improvement in his financial condition to warrant his paying $6 per week upon accrued and unpaid alimony. The fact that defendant is now supporting 2 of his second wife's grandchildren does not alter his obligation to pay accrued alimony.
(Italics supplied.) Nixon v. Wright, 146 Mich. 231, 109 N.W. 274, 10 Ann. Cas. 574; Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7, 262 N.W. 331; Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23, 217 N.W. 913, 56 A.L.R. 839; Wellman v. Wellman, 305 Mich. 365, 9 N.W.2d 579. In Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264, our Supreme Court followed the rule of Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 682; 54 L.Ed. 905, 28 L.R.A.N.S. 1068, 20 Ann. Cas. 1061, and, while holding that a divorce decree providing for support money rendered in the state of Missouri was a final judgment that could be enforced in California, expressly stated that `only if such accrued payments are still subject to modification may recovery be denied.
" The decree of alimony vests in the wife no absolute right to the allowance, as it may be changed from time to time, and reduced or enlarged in the discretion of the court." See Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7; Camp v. Camp, 158 Mich. 221. In the Loomis Case a decree of divorce obtained by plaintiff Marie Loomis in September, 1928, ordered defendant to pay alimony of $20 a week for the support of their minor children.
Claimant urges that under the circumstances of the case at bar the probate court has jurisdiction to pass upon the claim for alimony presented to it. We recognize the jurisdiction of the probate court to pass upon claims properly allowable by that court, but in Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7, we held that the chancery court has the power to modify and revise provisions for alimony, whether accrued or for future obligations. The death of a husband may create a situation where the decree for alimony should be modified.
Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23 (56 A.L.R. 839); Kutchai v. Kutchai, 233 Mich. 569; Brown v. Brown, 135 Mich. 141. The law has long been established in this State that in the exercise of its discretion a chancery court may modify and revise the provisions of a decree as to alimony and also the amount of accrued and unpaid alimony. Our decision in Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7, is determinative of the question before us. In that case plaintiff Marie Loomis obtained a decree of divorce in September, 1928. The decree ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $20 per week for the support of their two minor children until the younger child attained the age of 16 years.
In addition to the Schweim and Van Nest Cases, supra, we have been guided by the provisions of 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 12748 (Stat. Ann. § 25.106), and the cases of Perkins v. Perkins, 10 Mich. 425, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 259 Mich. 543, Soller v. Soller, 266 Mich. 248, and Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7. Defendant strongly urges that if he is required to pay the arrearage immediately he will have to liquidate assets and suffer large capital losses thereby.
Thus, in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682, 54 L.Ed. 905, 20 Ann. Cas. 1061, 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1068, the court, recognizing though not applying the exception said: "Second, that this general rule, however, does not obtain where, by the law of the state in which a judgment for future alimony is rendered, the right to demand and receive such future alimony is discretionary with the court which rendered the decree, to such an extent that no absolute or vested right attaches to receive the installments ordered by the decree to be paid, even although no application to annul or modify the decree in respect to alimony had been made prior to the installments becoming due." Cases supporting the right to modify a decree as to past due alimony are the following: Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7, 262 N.W. 331, Thompson v. Mentzer, 216 Ill. App. 470, Williamson v. Williamson, 246 Mass. 270, 140 N.E. 799, Bentley v. Calabrese, 155 Misc. 843, 280 N.Y. Supp. 454, Hartigan v. Hartigan, 142 Minn. 274, 171 N.W. 925, Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477, 67 P. 508, Montgomery v. Offutt, 136 Ky. 157, 123 S.W. 676, Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 P. 267, 11 Ann. Cas. 520, Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 183 N.W. 965, and Franck v. Franck, 107 Ky. 362, 54 S.W. 195. Hence, to determine whether the court had the authority to [2] make the order, we must examine the statutes bearing upon the subject.