On May 27, 1992, this court reversed Longstreth's conviction, holding that no evidence was offered to prove the unlawful entry element to the burglary conviction. Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 561 (Wyo. 1992) ( Longstreth I). Upon his release from prison, Longstreth was again arrested and charged with two counts of felony property destruction stemming from the same March 1990 fires. After filing various unsuccessful motions to dismiss, including some based on double jeopardy grounds, Longstreth entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of felony property destruction involving the Sage Street fire.
He contends that our decision, therefore, amounts to a judgment of acquittal, foreclosing a second trial on the same count. Mr. Sarr relies on Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992) and Longstreth, 890 P.2d at 553 to support his position. [¶ 10] It is true that we stated in the original opinion that evidence such as medical reports and physician testimony would have been more probative on the "serious bodily injury" element of the charge than the victim's hearsay testimony about her injuries. Sarr, ¶ 16.
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we determine whether the evidence is adequate to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992) ( quoting Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992)). IV. DISCUSSION
The rationale may not be used to inform the jury of the details of a victim's allegation of the criminal conduct or a witness's statement when those details are not necessary to explain what happened next.Griggs , ¶ 86, 367 P.3d at 1134 (citing United States v. Cass , 127 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 1997) ; Kerns v. State , 920 P.2d 632, 640–41 (Wyo. 1996) ; and Longstreth v. State , 832 P.2d 560, 563 (Wyo. 1992) ).[¶34] Another statement of this principle is set forth in 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249, at 193-95 (7th ed. 2013) (footnotes omitted):
The rationale may not be used to inform the jury of the details of a victim's allegation of the criminal conduct or a witness's statement when those details are not necessary to explain what happened next. Id.; Kerns, 920 P.2d at 640–41; Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 563 (Wyo.1992). [¶ 87] In United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir.2000), the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether it was proper for the trial court to admit a police officer's recitation of the out-of-court statement of a non-testifying informant that the defendant was selling drugs.
The testimony at trial is clear, and Holzheuser does not disagree, that all of these precursors were found collected together in a box that Wenger and Holzheuser had access to, inasmuch as it was found in the apartment in which they resided. [¶ 15] In Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 562-566 (Wyo. 1992), the crime at issue was burglary, and we held that hearsay evidence admitted for a purpose other than to prove the matter stated therein could not be bootstrapped to suffice as evidence to prove an element of the crime of burglary (the unlawful entry element). Holzheuser contends that the only evidence that tied him to the precursors was hearsay evidence from police officers as to what Wenger told them.
(iv) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a woman whom he knows is pregnant. [¶ 9] Glenn asserts that this Court has previously ruled, in Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992), that an element of a charged offense cannot be proved with hearsay testimony and it is reversible error to do so. Quoting the prosecutor's closing argument, Glenn claims that the State relied upon one witness' inadmissible, unreliable hearsay statement that Brown had told Glenn "stop it, you're hurting me" as proof of bodily injury. The State contends that Longstreth is distinguishable because the hearsay involved here is admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule found at W.R.E. 803(1) and is reliable.
(Citation omitted.) We agree this argument has some merit especially following examination of Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 564 (Wyo. 1992), where this court wrote: In order to review appellant's sufficiency of evidence claim, we first examine what the phrase `without authority' means in Wyoming's burglary statute.
We agree with the augmentation of that standard of review found in the State's brief, in which it is suggested that Pool's claim does not raise a question of sufficiency of the evidence, but injects a question of law as to whether lack of a valid prescription or order of a practitioner is an element of the charged offense. If the lack of the prescription or order is an element of the offense, it is clear that no evidence about the absence of a prescription or order was offered by the State, and any reasonable juror must have had a reasonable doubt as to the existence of that element. Smith, 959 P.2d at 1197 (quoting Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 1981)); Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 563 (Wyo. 1992); Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166, 172 (Wyo. 1979). We perceive the contention as raising a question of law which we review de novo.
The basis for that mandate was appellant's drinking and the resultant friction it caused in their friendship. Appellant relies on Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 564 (Wyo. 1992) to counter that the entry was not clearly without authority, i.e., unlawful or unprivileged. In support of his position, appellant argues the evidence revealed that the victim told him to stay out of her home during an argument at which time he was intoxicated; that the victim left her mobile home unlocked; and that on one other occasion when he went to her home asking for a ride, he had just walked in, and the victim did not "run him off."