Although not objected to by plaintiff, defendant's instruction No. 2 was withdrawn by the court after plaintiff's closing argument. It stated that if the condition alleged to be the cause of plaintiff's injury was not latent or concealed, appellant could expect her to discover and appreciate the risk of the condition. Appellant's definitions of the duties of landowner and invitee were based on its interpretation of Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 634, 381 N.E.2d 709, rather than pattern instructions. After approximately two hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict in favor of Piper and awarded her damages of $31,000.

See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Staggs (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 428, 434, 453 N.E.2d 145, 150. Having fully examined the record in light of the foregoing standards, we believe that the trial court properly refused to enter summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of Sauget. Citing, inter alia, the decision by our supreme court in Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465, and the decision by this court in Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 634, 381 N.E.2d 709, Sauget argues that its liability must be assessed in terms of the liability of possessors of land to their invitees as set forth in section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). That section provides:

The court determined that the existence of a duty to warn on the part of the landowner is a question of law and not of fact. In Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 634, 381 N.E.2d 709, appeal denied (1979), 72 Ill.2d 582, plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to warn of the condition of its poles on which plaintiff was working, and that defendant was negligent in maintaining the poles. The reviewing court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v., citing section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as stating the law in this State. The court said:

When a lineman was injured when he fell from a rotted utility pole, the appellate court found the rules promulgated by the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Act were not promulgated for the benefit of the injured lineman. Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 634, 641, 381 N.E.2d 709, 714-15 (1978). "Rather the regulations were designed for the protection of the public generally, and to insure the service of a continual supply of electrical energy without undue interruption.

A person is a business invitee on the premises of another if: (1) he enters by express or implied invitation; (2) his entry is connected with the possessor's business or with an activity the possessor conducts or permits to be conducted on his premises; and (3) there is a mutuality of benefit or an advantage to the possessor. ( Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 634, 381 N.E.2d 709.) Illinois has adopted the rules set forth in sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343, 343(A), at 215-16, 218 (1965)) regarding the duty of possessors of land to their invitees. ( Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill.2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223.)

• 2 It is equally well established that "the liability of a possessor of land [to invitees] cannot merely be predicated upon proof of a dangerous condition on the premises, there must also be proof that the condition was a latent or concealed one, or was existing under circumstances in which it would not be expected to be discovered by the invitee." ( Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 634, 639-40; see also Genqust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 456, 468; ( Hutter v. Badalamenti (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 561, 563; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).) Here, plaintiff charges that defendant's liability is predicated on the existence of a dangerous condition which defendant could not have expected her to discover or realize.

While moving a truss into place with the aid of another worker, plaintiff was looking upward and towards the person helping him. Suddenly, he stepped into the uncovered hole and fell to the basement, sustaining severe injuries. Both parties call our attention to the cases of Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465, Sepesy v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 868, 423 N.E.2d 942, and Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 634, 381 N.E.2d 709. In Genaust, the supreme court indicated that sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are followed in Illinois.

In Reddick v. General Chemical Co., 124 Ill. App. 31 (1905), a shipper of sulphuric acid was not liable because he had done nothing negligent — the unloader, who permitted an untrained employee to unload the product, was the only source of negligence; here, Johnson Controls has acted negligently. Longnecker v. Ill. Power Co., 381 N.E.2d 709, 714 (Ill.App. 1978) involved a patently dangerous condition — a power pole that was patently damaged and not safe to climb. Given the patent danger and the expertise of the plaintiff in climbing poles, the court found that his decision to climb the pole was an intervening event.

Sections 343 and 343A, which Illinois courts have adopted, set forth the standards regarding the duty that property owners owe to invitees such as the employees of independent contractors who are doing work on property in the interest of the property owner. Deibert, 566 N.E. 2d at 241;Longnecker v. Ill. Power Co., 381 N.E. 2d 709, 713 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) (business invitees include independent contractors and their employees). Under both § 343 and the common law, a property owner generally "owes its invitees a duty of reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition." Deibert, 566 N.E.2d at 242.

Ameren admits in its notice of removal that it in fact owns the power pole at issue, not Bagley and Dickerson. Doc. 1, p. 3. Further, Bagley and Dickerson do not own this power pole even though it may appear to be located on their lot as Ameren has an easement on their property so as to have their power pole there. See Duresav. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill.App.Ct. 2004) (stating that "actual, open and obvious possession is constructive notice to all the world of whatever right the occupant has in the land . . .). Cf. Longnecker v. IllinoisPower Co., 381 N.E.2d 709 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978). An easement is a right or privilege in the land of another.