Longhurst v. Clark

8 Citing cases

  1. McCrary v. Rios

    No. 05-18-01395-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 13, 2019)

    A claim that the judgment is not supported by the pleadings may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01-07-00226-CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *29 n. 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.) (finding appellant waived this claim because he failed to raise it at trial).

  2. Harpst v. Fleming

    566 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App. 2018)   Cited 14 times
    Holding documents were not sufficiently authenticated when witness did not testify that each document "is what it is claimed to be," how he obtained the documents, or that the documents were accurate and unaltered

    Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence relating to the referring law firms' alleged statements or conduct. Accord, e.g. , Jones v. Blume , 196 S.W.3d 440, 447-48 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (lone mention of joint venture in amended motion for summary judgment "does not amount to an assertion of joint venture as a basis for liability"); Longhurst v. Clark , No. 01-07-00226-CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (because plaintiff did not plead payment, trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of payments). We overrule appellants' second issue.

  3. Harper v. Spencer & Assocs., P.C.

    446 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App. 2014)

    Section 31.006 has the effect of creating a twelve-year residual limitations period for final judgments. Burnett–Dunham v. Spurgin, 245 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01–07–00226–CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In determining whether to revive a dormant judgment, a trial court considers the date of the judgment, evidence of any writs of execution issued on the judgment, and the date of the motion to revive.

  4. Wells v. Poindexter

    NO. 14-13-00982-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 26, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Without addressing the merits of their request for appointment of receivership, we conclude that in their individual capacities, Applicants had standing to seek appointment of a receiver under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 31.002(b)(3) regarding the 2008 Judgment. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Soniavou Books, LLC, 403 S.W.3d 900, 906 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01-07-00226-CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). The record reflects that the Unincorporated Society was not a defendant in the 2005 lawsuit or a party to the 2008 Judgment.

  5. Harper v. Spencer & Assocs., P.C.

    446 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App. 2014)

    Section 31.006 has the effect of creating a twelve-year residual limitations period for final judgments. Burnett–Dunham v. Spurgin, 245 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) ; Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01–07–00226–CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).In determining whether to revive a dormant judgment, a trial court considers the date of the judgment, evidence of any writs of execution issued on the judgment, and the date of the motion to revive.

  6. Kendall v. Kendall

    340 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App. 2011)   Cited 31 times
    Finding failure to comply with registration requirements did not deprive Texas court of subject matter jurisdiction where parties previously obtained orders from Texas court modifying New York divorce judgment, which expressly stipulated that subsequent proceedings would take place in Texas

    While no Texas case has squarely addressed this issue under the UIFSA, our conclusion is consistent with this Court's interpretation of similar foreign child support registration procedures under the UIFSA's predecessor, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("RURESA"). See Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01-07-00226-CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *3-4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Longhurst a child-support obligor challenged the validity of a Texas child-support order by collaterally attacking the earlier Texas order in which the court first assumed jurisdiction to enforce and modify a Colorado support order on the grounds that the Colorado order was never properly registered under RURESA.

  7. The Cadle Co. v. Rollins

    No. 01-09-00165-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 25, 2010)   Cited 18 times
    In Cadle, the appellant challenged the trial court's order denying its motion for scire facias to revive a dormant judgment assigned to it by American Express.

    The effect of section 31.006 is to provide a twelve year residual limitations period for final judgments. Burnett-Dunham v. Spurgin, 245 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01-07-00226-CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In determining whether to issue a writ of scire facias to revive a dormant judgment, a trial court considers the date of the judgment, evidence of any writs of execution issued on the judgment, and the date of the motion to revive the judgment scire facias.

  8. Packard v. Davis

    No. 02-08-022-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 13, 2008)   Cited 4 times

    46 inclusive of interest and costs. See id. (deferring to trial court's implied factual resolution and the resulting determination that wife failed to meet her burden of proof when she moved the trial court to confirm the arrearage that she claimed was due and owing by her ex-husband under their 1997 decree); see also Longhurst v. Clark, No. 01-07-00226-CV, 2008 WL 3876175, at *9 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that there was some evidence to support trial court's finding that ex-husband owed $298,835 on arrearages from 1992 when trial court took judicial notice of its 1992 Texas order). We overrule Patricia's first issue.