It is true that the authority to set conditions for parole rests with the parole board, not the trial court. Long v. State, 807 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd); Buehler v. State, 709 S.W.2d 49, 51-52 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). However, the court has the authority to establish an appropriate sum for restitution in the judgment, leaving it to the parole board to determine if such payment should be a condition of parole.

Gallegos v. State, 754 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.). When a trial court errs by purporting to impose a condition of parole in its judgment, the proper remedy is to reform the judgment to delete the unauthorized order. See id.; see also Long v. State, 807 S.W.2d 350, 353-54 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd); Garcia v. State, 773 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.); Swope v. State, 723 S.W.2d 216, 229-30 (Tex.App. — Austin 1986), aff'd, 805 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (all: reforming judgment and affirming conviction). In this instance, however, the reformation of the judgment appellant desires is neither necessary nor possible, because the trial court never incorporated the order it announced from the bench into the judgment and sentence in this case. The oral announcement made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment, beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2)