Opinion
05 Civ. 639 (GEL) (KNF).
February 16, 2007
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On January 8, 2007, the plaintiffs conducted a deposition of defendant Joe Van Dorn ("Van Dorn"), in connection with the instant action. During that deposition, Van Dorn testified that he has never purchased a computer, cannot operate a computer and has never used a computer to purchase anything through eBay. On January 10, 2007, the plaintiffs served a subpoena on a non-party, American Express Company, seeking "[a]ll credit card statements for accounts in the name of Joe Van Dorn . . . from January 2001 through December 2002." On or about January 24, 2007, the plaintiffs prepared a draft letter to be sent to the American Express Company. In that letter, with Van Dorn's consent, the plaintiffs explained that they were limiting the scope of the subpoena to those credit card statements, from January 2001 through December 2002, that reflect: "(a) purchases of computers, portable and/or handheld computers, computer accessories of any kind (including but not limited to disks, keyboards, monitors, computer speakers, printers, scanners, usb or other connectors, flash drives, portable hard drives, and other, hard drives, and other, similar electronic products)." However, the draft letter also included a request for information to which Van Dorn had not consented: "internet purchases of any kind whether via paid subscription to a web site or retail internet purchases (such as from Amazon)."
Van Dorn has asked the Court to quash the subpoena, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45, because it seeks documents and information which: (i) are not relevant to the plaintiffs' claims; (ii) are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and (iii) invade his privacy. The plaintiffs oppose the defendant's request, contending that the subpoena seeks relevant information and that it is "narrowly tailored to protect any privacy interests" of the defendant.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. . . . For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Relevancy, as it relates to the subject matter of an action, is broadly constructed "to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 2389 (1978). Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(A), governing protection of persons subject to subpoenas, provides, in pertinent part, that "the court by which a subpoena was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it . . . (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies."
Van Dorn asserts that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant to the plaintiff's claims and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. According to the defendant, data sought by the plaintiffs, concerning "an internet purchase [,] fails to establish that Mr. Van Dorn, in fact, knows how to use a computer" — a matter explored at his deposition — because "[a]nyone with Mr. Van Dorn's credit card information could have made the purchase." For their part, the plaintiffs assert that the subpoena seeks information that is relevant and needed to rebut Van Dorn's claims that he did not purchase a laptop or use a computer to draft the severance agreements that are at issue in this case, and that he does not know how to operate a computer.
Having considered the parties' respective positions, the Court finds that the information sought by the plaintiffs is relevant to the subject matter of the action. Furthermore, the reach of the plaintiffs' subpoena is reasonably limited in time and scope. This militates in favor of enforcing the subpoena, notwithstanding the defendant's assertion of his privacy interest. See Reserve Solutions, Inc. v. Vernaglia, 442 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Carey v. Berisford, No. 90 Civ. 1045, 1991 WL 44843, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991); Sierra Rutile Ltd. v. Katz, No. 90 Civ. 4913, 1994 WL 185751, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1994). However, section (b) of the January 24, 2007 draft letter the plaintiffs prepared for transmission to the American Express Company, seeking "internet purchases of any kind" is an overly broad request. Complying with that request would permit the plaintiffs to access private financial information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this action. For that reason, in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), the request made at section (b) of the plaintiffs' January 24, 2007 draft letter shall be limited to internet purchases of computers and computer-related equipment, as described 2007.
In summary, the defendant's motion to quash the plaintiffs' subpoena to the American Express Company, seeking credit card data regarding Van Dorn, is denied. However, the universe of information the plaintiffs may acquire from the American Express Company pertaining to Van Dorn shall be limited, as noted above.
SO ORDERED: