Furthermore, consideration of the affidavit was not error. Since the award of temporary alimony is subject to modification, "[t]he rules of evidence are not as strictly applied at an interlocutory hearing on an application for temporary alimony as in the final trial of the case." Gray v. Gray, 226 Ga. 767, 768 (2) ( 177 S.E.2d 575) (1970) and cits. The plaintiff is not required to develop her case as fully as would be necessary on the trial for divorce. Long v. Long, 191 Ga. 606, 607 ( 13 S.E.2d 349) (1941). The affidavit was filed pursuant to and in conformity with the local rules of the court, which are not challenged. The appellant has not shown that the facts alleged in the affidavit were untrue, that he requested and was denied an opportunity to either file a counter-affidavit or cross examine as to the affidavit, or even that the award of temporary child support, allegedly based solely on the affidavit, was excessive.

Similarly there was more than sufficient evidence on the third element, consummation of the marriage; i.e., cohabitation as man and wife. The parties themselves both testified that they lived together, slept together, ate together, took vacations together and went on business trips together while the defendant was married to his first wife, and that they continued to do so after March, 1972, when both parties had the capacity to contract to marry. The evidence was sufficient as to consummation (see Long v. Long, 191 Ga. 606, 607 ( 13 S.E.2d 349)), and its sufficiency is not seriously disputed here. Defendant's main contention is that there was no actual contract of marriage. Even though the parties were capable of contracting a marriage and they did, in law, consummate that marriage, the second element as set out in Code § 53-101 is still necessary in order to find that a marriage existed between the parties.

Though Code § 53-102 declares that a person laboring under the disability of impotency cannot contract a marriage, there is no statute which defines the word "impotency." This court, in Long v. Long, 191 Ga. 606, 607 ( 13 S.E.2d 349), taking the definition from 17 Am. Jur. 223, § 141, said: "Impotency denotes a state of permanent inability on the part of one of the parties to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse"; but we have found no legal authority that says what constitutes a "complete act of sexual intercourse." In Payne v. Payne, 46 Minn. 467 ( 49 N.W. 230, 24 Am. St. R. 240), impotency was defined as being substantially the "want of potentia copulandi, and not merely incapacity for procreation.

She testified in part that "My husband fussed continually all the time, and if for nothing else, he would start complaining about everything I did, what I cooked, how I cooked." While the other evidence concerning the alleged acts of cruelty and cause of separation was conflicting and self-contradictory, it did not demand a finding that the wife voluntarily abandoned her husband, which would prohibit an award to her ( Vinson v. Vinson, 94 Ga. 492, 19 S.E. 898; Tillman v. Tillman, 187 Ga. 567, 1 S.E.2d 676; Acree v. Acree, 201 Ga. 359, 40 S.E.2d 54); and, whether or not the evidence introduced at the interlocutory hearing was sufficient to establish the cruel treatment as alleged in the petition, we cannot say that there was a "manifest abuse of discretion" in the judgment allowing the temporary alimony and attorney's fees. Long v. Long, 191 Ga. 606 ( 13 S.E.2d 349); Hightower v. Hightower, 202 Ga. 643 ( 44 S.E.2d 116). Whether the wife condoned the alleged acts of cruelty is peculiarly a matter of defense in a trial of the case on its merits. Code, § 30-109.

5. The Code, § 30-205, declaring that on application for temporary alimony the merits of the cause are not in issue, does not authorize the judge to award the wife temporary alimony or attorney's fees where it appears without dispute that she abandoned her husband and refuses to live with him without just cause. Compare Barnett v. Barnett, 191 Ga. 501, 502 (4) ( 13 S.E.2d 19). Nothing to the contrary was held in either of the following cases cited by the defendant in error: Dillard v. Dillard, 182 Ga. 779 ( 187 S.E. 16); Long v. Long, 191 Ga. 606 ( 13 S.E.2d 349). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

While we are aware of the problem of proving impotence even by expert evidence, we think that the existence of such a ground for annulment against the defendant, susceptible as it may be, of more certain determination by expert examination, should not be decided against him unless such decision is supported by more evidence than was produced here. This additional evidence might be the evidence of a physician who has made an examination, or evidence of an existing malformation or organic defect, or evidence of the existence of a physical or psychological condition persisting over a period of time sufficient from which a court could infer impotence or exclude that there was a practical impossibility of marital relations between the two parties. It should, however, be the best evidence obtainable, as in other cases ( cf. Bunger v. Bunger (1911), 85 Kan. 564 [117 P. 1017, Ann. Cas. 1913A 126]; Long v. Long (1941), 191 Ga. 606 [ 13 S.E.2d 349]). We can only conclude that the evidence here presented was not sufficient to support the judgment of annulment on the grounds of subsection 6 of section 82 of the Civil Code because of the absence of evidence that the condition appears to be incurable.

Public policy would be in a constant state of frustration if the judiciary attributed to the Legislature in its use of the term impotence as a cause for divorce or nullity of marriage a meaning encompassing any temporary or occasional incapacity for sexual intercourse. We hold with virtually universal authoritative acceptance that impotence within the purview of our statute regulating divorce and annulment denotes a permanent inability on the part of one of the parties to the marriage contract to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. The incapacity must be incurable. 1 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, Vol. 1, Sec. 786, p. 338 and Vol. 2, Sec. 1321, p. 508; Kempf v. Kempf, 1863, 34 Mo. 211, 213; Long v. Long, 1941, 191 Ga. 606, 13 S.E.2d 349; Payne v. Payne, 1891, 46 Minn. 467, 49 N.W. 230, 24 Am.St.Rep. 240; Bascomb v. Bascomb, 1852, 25 N.H. 267; 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 81; 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 19; 35 Am.Jur., Marriage, § 124, p. 257; 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 13. The wife's incapacity for sexual intercourse in the instant case may have originated from psychological rather than physical causes.