" So, likewise, in the situation before us. This case is not controlled by rules, if such there be, that a pedestrian "must" keep a traffic light under constant observation as he crosses the street, that he "must" notice its changes (if it changes), that he "must" see any car which is "plainly there to be seen" ( Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291, 299), or that he must conform to any other rigid or unbending rule or group of rules. Why? For the same reason that Mr. Justice Cardozo rejected the stop, look and listen rule in the Pokora Case, supra, and that we rejected the constant observation rule in the Krause Case, supra, namely, that our problem is not to apply a so-called rule of law but to determine whether or not a standard of care has been reached.

It is this third duty with which we are concerned in this case. This particular duty has been imposed in cases where a traffic light exists at the crossing involved as well as in cases where there is no light. Thus in Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291, where the plaintiff did not look to the right or left while she was in the street and did not observe that the light had changed, and as a consequence walked into the side of a car, the Court said (pp 301, 309): "An ordinance giving the pedestrian the right-of-way is not a `guarantee' that a pedestrian may cross a street intersection, even with the green light, without looking to the right or to the left, walk into the side of a passing automobile plainly to be seen if the pedestrian had looked, and then avoid the conclusion that he is guilty of contributory negligence. * * *

The principles involved in those cases are applicable and controlling here. The same may be said of Steele v. Hamilton, 218 Mich. 522; Sloan v. Ambrose, 300 Mich. 188; Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291; Boyd v. Maruski, 321 Mich. 71; and Ashley v. Kilborn, 333 Mich. 283, in which plaintiff pedestrians crossing intersections under protection of green traffic lights were, for failure to maintain a reasonable and proper lookout for approaching traffic, held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. As said by Mr. Justice CARR in Ortisi v. Oderfer, 341 Mich. 254, 277, in speaking of the Ashley Case:

* * * "Plaintiff's theory is equally exploded by the reasoning in our opinion in Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291, and its analysis of the cases cited therein, although in that case plaintiff's contributory negligence, as found by the Court, was not necessarily determined as a matter of law. In that case we said [p 309]: * * *

We find no fault with this instruction. Defendant urges that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and relies upon Huber v. Paquette, 293 Mich. 370; Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291; Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich. 315; and Levine v. Schonborn, 336 Mich. 312. The facts in the instant case show that when plaintiff reached the intersection of Main and Fourth streets she paused and waited until the traffic light turned green in her favor, but before stepping into the street she looked to her left and to the north and saw no cars entering the intersection. She stated, "I was watching the traffic light and my surroundings going across."

The attempt to walk across the south half of the pavement under the circumstances was negligence. Among other decisions of like import are: Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich. 315; Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291; Boyd v. Maruski, 321 Mich. 71. Under the proofs in the cases at bar the trial judge should have directed verdicts for the defendant at the close of plaintiff's proofs.

" Plaintiff's theory is equally exploded by the reasoning in our opinion in Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291, and its analysis of the cases cited therein, although in that case plaintiff's contributory negligence, as found by the Court, was not necessarily determined as a matter of law. In that case we said, pp 301, 309:

Her failure to exercise such care resulted in her walking into the path of defendant's approaching vehicle. In its essential aspects the instant case is much like Long v. Garneau, 319 Mich. 291, 299, where Justice BOYLES, speaking for the Court, said: "It is equally obvious that if plaintiff had looked to the right before taking her last few steps south of the center line of Kalamazoo street, she could have seen defendant's automobile before walking into its side. It was plainly there to be seen.