The Supreme Court correctly determined that the special ad valorem levies for garbage and refuse collection services imposed by the defendants against certain "mass" parcels of real property owned by the plaintiff were invalid because those properties did not and could not receive any direct benefit from those services ( see RPTL 102; New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of Oyster Bay, 4 NY3d 387, 393-395; New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of Hempstead, 80 AD3d 583; Long Is. Water Corp. v Supervisor of Town of Hempstead, 77 AD3d 795; New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of N Hempstead, 76 AD3d 517; Long Is. Light. Co. v Office of Supervisor of Town of N Hempstead, 233 AD2d 300; cf. Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment declaring that the defendants' imposition of the special ad valorem levies against the subject "mass" properties is illegal and void, enjoining the defendants from continuing to impose those special ad valorem levies, and directing refund of tax payments made in connection with those levies for the subject tax years.

Decided May 3, 2011. Appeal from the 2d Dept: 77 AD3d 795. Motions for Leave to Appeal denied.

Here, “ ‘there is a sufficient theoretical potential of the properties to be developed in a manner that will result in the generation of garbage [and sewage]’ ” ( Town of Watertown, 6 N.Y.3d at 748, 810 N.Y.S.2d 399, 843 N.E.2d 1138, quoting Town of Tonawanda Assessor, 17 A.D.3d at 1092, 796 N.Y.S.2d 202). Unlike the plaintiff in Long Is. Water Corp. v. Supervisor of Town of Hempstead, 77 A.D.3d 795, 910 N.Y.S.2d 95,lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 711, 2011 WL 1643278, plaintiff herein owns the land on which its “mass” properties sit, and we conclude that it is theoretically possible that such land, if put to a different use, could generate garbage and sewage. Supreme Court therefore properly denied plaintiff's motion and properly granted defendants' cross motion.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was properly granted. With respect to the defendants' cross motion, although the defendants correctly note that Nassau County Administrative Code § 6-26.0 (b) (3) (c), referred to as the "County Guaranty," remains viable ( see New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of N Hempstead, 77 AD3d 121), the County of Nassau, the Nassau County Board of Assessors, the Nassau County Board of Assessment Review, the Assessment Review Commission of the County of Nassau, and the Assessor of the County of Nassau are not necessary parties to these actions ( see CPLR 1001 [a]; Town Law § 194 [b]; Long Is. Water Corp. v Supervisor of Town of Hempstead, 77 AD3d 795). Since these are, in part, declaratory judgment actions, the matters must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of judgments, inter alia, declaring that the defendants' imposition of special ad valorem levies for garbage and refuse collection services against the subject "mass" properties is illegal and void ( see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334, appeal dismissed 371 US 74, cert denied 371 US 901).