Long Island University v. Tappan

11 Citing cases

  1. Incorporated Vil. of Lloyd Harbor v. Huntington

    4 N.Y.2d 182 (N.Y. 1958)   Cited 29 times
    In Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntington, 4 N.Y.2d 182, 173 N.Y.S.2d 553, 149 N.E.2d 851, it was held that the defendant town had a right to establish a public bathing beach in a village regardless of the fact that the village ordinance prevented any except residential uses.

    Ordinances which have been found to bear no "substantial relation" to such purposes have frequently been stricken as "void and ineffectual". ( Long Is. Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, 960, affd. 281 App. Div. 771, affd. 305 N.Y. 893; Matter of Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 195-196; Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188.) Idyllic and charming though the particular areas here involved may be, it cannot be gainsaid that in these days of congested cities and burgeoning suburbs, with their traffic-packed streets, their hustle and bustle and their fume-laden air, parks and beaches have come to be regarded as essential to the health and welfare of the community.

  2. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi

    107 A.D.2d 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    Historically, schools in New York have enjoyed a limited immunity from municipal zoning ordinances that would otherwise exclude or circumscribe the educational uses to which they could put their property ( see, 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice §§ 11.07-11.19, at 539-56 [3d ed 1984]). Colleges and universities have received the same treatment as is generally enjoyed by other educational uses ( see, Matter of Concordia Coll. Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189; Long Is. Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, affd 281 App. Div. 771, affd 305 N.Y. 893). The basis for this preferred status rests in the recognition that, while zoning ordinances must find their justification in the police power exercised in the interest of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare ( Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 225; see also, Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Vil. of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 343), it is well established in New York that "educational uses are, by their very nature, 'clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare'" ( Matter of Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 493, quoting Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526).

  3. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi

    68 N.Y.2d 583 (N.Y. 1986)   Cited 74 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing that schools, both public and private, "serve the public's welfare and morals"

    On a broader level, the courts held that schools, public, parochial and private, by their very nature, singularly serve the public's welfare and morals (Matter of New York Inst. of Technology v Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d 125, 130; Matter of Concordia Coll. Inst. v Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 195; Matter of Summit School v Neugent, 82 A.D.2d 463). Colleges and universities were also recognized as serving the public's welfare in the same important ways (see, e.g., Matter of Concordia Coll. Inst. v Miller, supra; Long Is. Univ. v Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, affd 281 App. Div. 771, affd 305 N.Y. 893; compare, Yanow v Seven Oaks Park, 11 N.J. 341, 94 A.2d 482). Because of the inherently beneficial nature of churches and schools to the public, we held that the total exclusion of such institutions from a residential district serves no end that is reasonably related to the morals, health, welfare and safety of the community (Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., supra, at p 522; 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 12.10, at 422 [2d ed]; 2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 20.01 [4], at 20-9).

  4. New York Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Le Boutillier

    33 N.Y.2d 125 (N.Y. 1973)   Cited 15 times

    ( Matter of Hofstra Coll. v. Wilmerding, supra, at p. 258; Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Morris Plains, 72 N.J. Super. 425, 430; cf. Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 223 [HALL, J., concurring]; but see Matter of Dowling Coll. v. Schermerhorn, 28 N.Y.2d 908.) And the cases apparently draw no distinction between public and private educational uses (e.g., Long Is. Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, affd. 281 App. Div. 771, affd. 305 N.Y. 893; 1 Rathkopf, op. cit., supra, at p. 18-27), a distinction which might offend constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. (See Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 18 Misc.2d 550.)

  5. Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Plan. Bd.

    1 N.Y.2d 508 (N.Y. 1956)   Cited 248 times
    In Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. (1 N.Y.2d 508, 524-525), the Court of Appeals, citing both N.Y. Constitution, article XVI, § 1 and Tax Law former § 4 (6) (which is the predecessor to RPTL 420-a), held that a municipal corporation cannot deny a building permit to a tax exempt religious institution on the basis of the municipality's loss of potential tax revenue (see, Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v Incorporated Vil. of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 287, cert denied 426 U.S. 950; Walz v. Tax Commn., 24 N.Y.2d 30, affd 397 U.S. 664).

    pp. 70-72, 200; 1 Rathkopf on Law of Zoning and Planning [3d ed., 1956], p. 259; Yokely on Zoning Law and Practice [1st ed., 1948], § 183, p. 367). It is well established in this country that a zoning ordinance may not wholly exclude a church or synagogue from any residential district. Such a provision is stricken on the ground that it bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, peace or general welfare of the community ( North Shore Unitarian Soc. v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524; Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198; O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45; Board of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, supra; Bishop of Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, supra; Young Israel Organization of Cleveland v. Dworkin, 133 N.E.2d 174, 179, supra [Ohio]; City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115). An ordinance will also be stricken if it attempts to exclude private or parochial schools from any residential area where public schools are permitted ( Long Island Univ. v. Tappan, 305 N.Y. 893, affg. 281 App. Div. 771, which unanimously affd. 202 Misc. 956; Matter of Property Owners Assn. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 2 Misc.2d 309; see Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal.2d 325; City of Miami Beach v. State, 128 Fla. 750; City of Chicago v. Sachs, 1 Ill.2d 342, supra; Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257; Lumpkin v. Township Committee of Bernards, 134 N.J.L. 428; State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn. 363, supra). Section 2 of the ordinance states that it was enacted "For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals or the general welfare". If the planning board's refusal to grant a permit to petitioners in the instant case results in the exclusion of this proposed church and school from the Class A residential district of the Town of Brighton and, if such refusal bears no substantial relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community, such action is illegal ( Board of Zoning Appeals of D

  6. Matter of Wiltwyck School v. Hill

    14 A.D.2d 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    ed: (1) that every zoning ordinance is unconstitutional if, by its terms or by its interpretation, it has the effect of prohibiting, within a residence zone in a municipality or within the entire municipality, the use of land for such a purpose; and (2) that, in any event, such a zoning ordinance is invalid because an ordinance which has the effect of excluding a church, a synagogue or a school from a residence zone or from a town or village is obviously not one which bears "any substantial relation to the promotion of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community," as required by the statutes delegating the zoning power to local municipalities ( Matter of Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 452-453, 458, supra; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 521-526, supra; Matter of Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 192-197; Long Is. Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, 960, affd. 281 App. Div. 771, affd. 305 N.Y. 893).

  7. New York Inst. of Tech. v. Ruckgaber

    65 Misc. 2d 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970)   Cited 2 times

    Educational uses have a proper place in residential districts. Such a use is clearly "in furtherance of the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community" ( Matter of Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 195-196) and, since the "power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use * * * cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare" ( Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188), it follows that a zoning authority may not exclude a school from residentially zoned property ( Long Is. Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, 960, affd. 281 App. Div. 771, affd. 305 N.Y. 893). While the building zone ordinance in issue does not expressly purport to exclude schools and other educational institutions, the restrictions on accessory uses would, in the court's opinion, have that practical effect.

  8. Incorporated Vil., Muttontown v. Friscia

    60 Misc. 2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)   Cited 1 times

    An occupancy permit properly issued prior to annexation of the property to which it applies is not rendered invalid by annexation to a municipality which proscribes the use for which the permit was granted ( LongIs. Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, affd. 281 App. Div. 771, affd. 305 N.Y. 893, rearg. den. 306 N.Y. 570), but issuance of an occupancy permit cannot be compelled if the use has not commenced prior to annexation.

  9. Matter of Hofstra Coll. v. Wilmerding

    24 Misc. 2d 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)   Cited 4 times

    In any event, the board does not have "the unfettered power to say that the `precise spot' selected is not the right one," ( Matter of Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 458). A zoning ordinance may not wholly exclude a church or school from a particular district ( Long Is. Univ. v. Tappan, 305 N.Y. 893; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., supra, p. 522; see Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntington, 4 N.Y.2d 182, 191; Crolly, Regulation of the Location of Churches By Municipal Zoning Ordinances, 23 Brooklyn L. Rev. 185, 186, 197). Such power of exclusion as remains within the constitutional limit of its reach (see Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd, supra, p. 526; cf. Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 18 Misc.2d 550, 559; and Crolly, op. cit., supra) arises only from circumstances affecting or emanating from the site applied for.

  10. Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp.

    24 Misc. 2d 790 (N.Y. Misc. 1960)   Cited 21 times
    In Incorporated Vil. of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp. (24 Misc.2d 790, affd. 14 A.D.2d 575, affd. 11 N.Y.2d 672), involving the operation of a day school by a private school corporation, the court said (p. 792): "In short, the defendant has the three prime requisites which all the experts who testified agree are essential to make up a school: a curriculum, a plant consisting of adequate physical facilities, and a qualified staff to carry into effect its educational objectives."

    The original Zoning Ordinance of the Village of Brookville of 1935 was repealed by a new one enacted in 1952, coincident with the plaintiff's efforts to prevent Long Island University from locating a college branch in that village. In Long Is. Univ. v. Tappen ( 202 Misc. 956, affd. 281 App. Div. 771, affd. 305 N.Y. 893), this ordinance was held to be an unconstitutional encroachment on the rights of an educational institution and that would seem to dispose of this ordinance for the purposes of this case as well. I do not subscribe to plaintiff's contention that there is a distinction to be drawn unfavorable to the defendant because its school is run for profit.