Plaintiffs' argument is therefore insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on any element of their negligent hiring claim. See Long v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) (finding that although nursing home failed to check with all of employee's former employers before hiring her, nursing home was not liable for negligent hiring because there was no evidence in record that a more thorough investigation would have informed nursing home that employee might or would abuse patients). Plaintiffs next claim that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Home Instead conducted personal and professional reference checks on Davis because Doane did not personally discuss the results of such checks with the Home Instead employee who conducted them and because Home Instead "has produced no documentary evidence, either from Davis' personnel file or firm records, to substantiate that Davis had no complaints in Tennessee and Mississippi. . . ."
"Finally, the injured party must show that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury."Harden, 985 S.W.2d at 452 (citing Long v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). Plaintiff alleges that regulations promulgated under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 ("ACAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 41705, provide a basis for her negligence per se claim against Air Serv. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)
"Liability cannot be predicated upon mere violations of a statute, ordinance, or regulation unless it affirmatively appears that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury." Long by Cotten v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70, 73-74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Biggert v. Memphis Power Light Co., 80 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tenn. 1935)).
However, even if we assume, arguendo, that Andy Roten violated the foregoing statute in failing to sound his horn, it is well settled that "[l]iability cannot be predicated upon mere violations of a statute, ordinance, or regulation unless it affirmatively appears that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury." Long by Cotten v.Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70, 73-74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Biggert v. Memphis Power and Light Co., 80 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tenn. 1935)).
Traylor v. Coburn, 597 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App. 1980). Finally, the injured party must show that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Long v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn.App. 1994).Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998).
Traylor v. Coburn, 597 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App. 1980). Finally, the injured party must show that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Long v.Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn.App. 1994).Id. at 452.
Traylor v. Coburn, 597 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. App. 1980). Finally, the injured party must show that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Long v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. App. 1994). The FDCA was designed to protect the public as a whole.
Traylor v. Coburn, 597 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App. 1980). Finally, the injured party must show that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Long v. Brookside Manor, 885 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn.App. 1994). The FDCA was designed to protect the public as a whole.