In addition, we observed that legislative bodies are not required by equal protection to attack all aspects of a problem at the same time; rather, the legislative body "may select one phase of a problem and apply a remedy there, neglecting for the moment other phases of the problem." Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 241, 335 A.2d at 686; see also Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dep't of Env't, 410 Md. 326, 346, 978 A.2d 702, 713 (2009). Neither party contends that the Ordinance implicates a suspect classification or a fundamental right.
" Frey v. Comptroller of Treasury , 422 Md. 111, 177, 29 A.3d 475 (2011) (quoting Neifert v. Dep't of Env't , 395 Md. 486, 506, 910 A.2d 1100 (2006) ). Legislative bodies are permitted to make commercial classifications that distinguish between entities; provided a "classification is not purely arbitrary and has a rational basis, the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause." Frey , 422 Md. at 163, 29 A.3d 475 (quoting Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp. , 279 Md. 410, 439, 370 A.2d 1102(1977) ); seeLonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dep't of Env't , 410 Md. 326, 343, 978 A.2d 702 (2009) (A classification is presumptively constitutional and will not be voided "if there are any considerations relating to the public welfare by which it can be supported[.]") (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Md. Decl. RightsS art. 24. Although the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not contain an express equal protection provision, the Court of Appeals has recognized that principles of equal protection are embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24. Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 499, 3 A.3d 421 (2010). See also Lonaconing Trap Club Inc. v. Md. Dep't of the Env't, 410 Md. 326, 342 n. 16, 978 A.2d 702 (2009); Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 272 n. 33, 932 A.2d 571 (2007).The State disagrees. It asserts that appellee's argument “relies on classifications concerning jurisdiction of residence and jurisdiction of conviction,” and “[b]ecause these classifications do not involve a suspect class like race or gender, and do not infringe on any fundamental rights,” the proper standard of review is rational basis.
"We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with `forced or subtle interpretations' that limit or extend its application." Id. at 275, 987 A.2d at 29 (quoting Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Env't, 410 Md. 326, 339, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009)). Nor do we construe the language of the statute in a vacuum; rather, we examine the language "within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute."
"`The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.'" Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dept. of the Env't, 410 Md. 326, 338, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 21 [4], 973 A.2d 233, 241 (2009)). "`Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language.'"
"`The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.'" Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dept. of the Env't, 410 Md. 326, 338, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 212, 973 A.2d 233, 241 (2009)). "`Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language.'"
A statutory classification analyzed under the rational basis test, the most deferential standard of constitutional review, will "pass constitutional muster so long as it is 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.'" Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't of Env't, 410 Md. 326, 341 (2009) (quoting Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 274 (2007)). This Court "'will not overturn' the [legislative] classification 'unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [this Court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational.'"
We cannot, however, add that language to the statute by judicial fiat. SeeLonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't of Env't , 410 Md. 326, 339, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (stating that "[we] neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain language of the statute ...").
The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.” (internal citations omitted)); Ry. Express Agency v. New York , 336 U.S. 106, 110, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949) ( “It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.”); see also, e.g. , Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20, ¶ 32, 2016 WL 805519, as corrected (Mar. 4, 2016) (“A mere overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness in statutory classification will not necessarily show a failure to satisfy a rational-basis review.”); Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dep't of Env't , 410 Md. 326, 978 A.2d 702, 713 (2009) (“Underinclusiveness does not create an equal protection violation under the rational basis test.”). {95} To be sure, a tailoring analysis can be useful to discern whether the Legislature created a discriminatory classification with animus toward a particular, discrete group and disguised that animus with a socioeconomic rationale.
Under the rules of construction, “we neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain language of the statute; nor [do we] construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dept. of the Env't, 410 Md. 326, 339, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (internal quotation and citation marks omitted). We must “ ‘read a statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ”