Opinion
2d Civil No. B227887 Super. Ct. No. 1317049 (Santa Barbara County)
08-29-2011
LOMPOC VALLEY COMMUNITY YOUTH CENTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GLORIA WILLIS, Defendant and Appellant.
Gloria Willis, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. The Law Offices of Robert D. Reed, Robert D. Reed for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Defendant Gloria Willis appeals a judgment cancelling certain title instruments and quieting title to real estate in favor of plaintiff Lompoc Valley Community Youth Center (Center). The trial court denied Willis's motion to set aside an order that the Center's requests for admissions were admitted by Willis's failure to timely respond. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.010, 2033.280, subds. (b) & (c).) We conclude, among other things, that Willis has not shown that the court abused its discretion. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
FACTS
The Center is a non-profit corporation that provides "recreational, educational and training programs" to assist the youth in the Lompoc Valley area. In 1996, it purchased real property in Lompoc, California to conduct its activities.
In 2009, the Center filed an action against Willis for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, quiet title and cancellation of instruments. It alleged that in 2007 and 2008, Willis, the director of the Center, fraudulently induced the Center's board members: 1) to transfer title to its Lompoc real property to herself and her husband, and 2) to execute a deed of trust and a lease which obligated the Center to pay rent to Willis and her husband. The Center requested the trial court to cancel the deed, the deed of trust and the lease.
Willis answered the complaint in propria persona and represented herself in this action. She briefly retained counsel after the trial.
On February 11, 2010, the Center served Willis with a set of requests for admissions. (§ 2033.010.) It requested that she admit, among other things, that the deed, the deed of trust and the lease were void and procured by Willis's fraudulent representations.
As of March 30, 2010, Willis had not responded. The Center's counsel sent her a letter asking for a response by April 5th. Willis did not respond.
On April 19, the Center filed a "motion to have requests for admissions deemed admitted." (§ 2033.280, subds. (b) & (c).) The notice of motion set a hearing date of May 21, 2010.
Willis did not respond to the motion, did not answer the requests for admissions, and did not appear at the May 21st hearing. The trial court ruled that the Center's requests for admissions were "deemed admitted." (§ 2033.280, subd. (c).)
On July 20, 2010, Willis appeared at trial and handed the trial court a "notice of motion and motion to set aside discovery order." The court did not consider it, because it was not properly noticed. It was concerned that the Center had no advance warning of this motion and no time to respond.
At the beginning of trial, the trial court advised Willis that "even with the request for admissions, it doesn't mean that you can't present evidence."
Nas Imran, the Center's current president, testified the lease and title documents were signed at Willis's request because she represented that: 1) she and her husband owned the real estate; and 2) Jim Hall, an attorney who had assisted the Center, had prepared the documents. Imran later discovered that her representations were false. Hall told Imran that he had refused to prepare such documents for Willis because he told her what she intended to do was "not proper." Hall was "surprised" that Willis had proceeded ahead against his advice.
Willis testified that at a board meeting the rental agreement was "approved by Mr. Nas Imran." She said, "When the quitclaim deed was initiated, it was done as a mere formality. Everything was being done to keep the doors open and operate the youth center for the community." The Center owed money to her and her husband, and she "could have foreclosed and seized the property." Her husband later "deeded his 50 percent of the property" back to the Center. Willis said, "I had no fiduciary duty to the [Center]."
After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered judgment for the Center. It ruled: 1) the Center was "the owner in fee simple" of the Lompoc real estate, and 2) the documents the Center executed at Willis's request in 2007 and 2008, including the deed, the deed of trust and the lease, were void and cancelled.
On August 20, 2010, Willis filed a "notice of motion and motion to set aside and vacate judgment." In her declaration, Willis said she relied on a paralegal to "draft the discovery responses," but she first learned that they had not been served when she appeared at a settlement conference on June 28, 2010. She claimed she never received notice of the May 21st hearing. She said, "If I had, I would have provided a response and appeared at the hearing."
The trial court denied her motion. It found that representations she made in her declaration were contradictory and not credible.
DISCUSSION
Abuse of Discretion
Willis contends the trial court abused its discretion: 1) by denying her motion to set aside the order that the requests for admissions were deemed admitted, and 2) by not granting her a new trial. We disagree.
A party may request its opponent to admit or deny facts and the "genuineness of specified documents." (§ 2033.010.) Where the party served with requests for admissions fails to timely respond, the proponent may seek "an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted . . . ." (§ 2033.280, subd. (b).)
Here, after Willis did not timely respond to the requests, and failed to attend the discovery hearing, the trial court issued an order that the Center's requests for admissions were "deemed admitted."
Willis filed a motion under section 473, subdivision (b), seeking relief from her discovery omission and a new trial. She claimed her failure to timely respond to the requests for admissions "was based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect." She said, "The discovery order made it impossible for [her] to offer a defense and therefore led to the unfavorable August 9, 2010 judgment."
Willis claims the trial court erred by denying her request for relief from her discovery default. But in deciding Willis's motion, the court was "vested with broad discretion." (Solv-All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007.) "[I]ts factual findings are entitled to deference." (Ibid.) The court's decision may not be overturned unless Willis demonstrates that the decision "'exceed[s] the bounds of reason.'" (Ibid.)She has not met that burden.
In her declaration, Willis claimed that she did not receive notice of the May 21st hearing date for the motion to deem her nonresponse to the requests to be admissions. She said, "I never received anything that was labeled as a notice of motion or a hearing date. If I had, I would have provided a response and appeared at the hearing." Willis claimed these facts established surprise and grounds for relief.
But the trial court did not find the facts she stated in her declaration to be credible. It said her statement that she was not served with notice of the May 21st hearing was not believable. The court said, "It's a troubling declaration she filed, because she also says in her declaration, 'I knew that I had to have discovery responses served by May 21st.' How would she know that? How would she know that they had to be served by May 21st? There's only one way that you know they have to be served by May 21st. You received the notice . . . ." (Italics added.) The court concluded that her conduct was not excusable. It said, "She simply didn't come to court. There's no other explanation."
We may not ignore the trial court's credibility findings and we must give deference to them. (Solv-All v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) We cannot overturn the court's findings that Willis made false statements in her declaration. The trial court "'is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses.'" (Church of Merciful Saviour v. Volunteers of America, Inc. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 851, 856.)
Moreover, the trial court noted that there were additional reasons why Willis's motion had to be denied. It said she did not exercise due diligence. "She doesn't explain why she didn't file the motion before the trial date." The court also said, "[S]he failed to address prejudice in her moving papers . . . . What would have been different? Not just, 'Gee, we could have had a further hearing or more of the trial,' but prejudice."
A party seeking a new trial must make an adequate showing to demonstrate the likelihood of a different result. (Trovato v. Beckman Coulter, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 319, 327.) At the end of her declaration, Willis stated, "I believe that had the discovery order not been in place and I had been able to provide a defense that there would have been a very different result at trial." But such a conclusory statement is not sufficient to make an adequate factual showing. (Fuller v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 690, 693.) Moreover, the trial court allowed Willis to extensively testify at trial. Even excluding the admissions, Willis has not shown why the court would not have reached the same result relying on Imran's trial testimony. In addition, Willis's testimony that she had no "fiduciary duty" to the Center as director was wrong. (Mueller v. MacBan (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 258, 274.) It was also a compelling admission that impeached her defense and supported the Center's position about her intent. Willis has not shown any abuse of discretion or prejudicial error.
We have reviewed Willis's remaining contentions and we conclude she has not shown error.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded in favor of the respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P.J.
We concur:
COFFEE, J.
PERREN, J.
Arthur A. Garcia, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Gloria Willis, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
The Law Offices of Robert D. Reed, Robert D. Reed for Plaintiff and Respondent.