Under the wide sweep of Rule 54(c), supra, it was within the jurisdiction and power of the court to grant plaintiff equitable relief by way of specific performance of the contract relating to the possession and use of the residential premises on the Orchard Ranch as well as the furniture and furnishings reasonably necessary to that end, even though she sought rescission and cancellation. Cf. Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 2 Cir., 147 F.2d 54; Ring v. Spina, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 647, 160 A.L.R. 371. And it is well settled that in addition to decreeing specific performance of a contract relating to land, a court of equity may award legal damages for the injury proximately suffered from refusal or delay in the performance of the contract. West v. Washington C.R.R.R., 49 Or. 436, 90 P. 666; Abbott v. Seventy-Six Land Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 118 P. 425; Johnson v. Jones, Utah, 164 P.2d 893; Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 200 A. 1019; Bostwick v. Beach, 103 N.Y. 414, 9 N.E. 41; Hamilton v. Coster, 249 Mass. 391, 144 N.E. 226; Krawetski v. Nowak, 21 Ohio App. 429, 152 N.E. 323; Pillsbury v. J.B. Streeter, Jr., Co., 15 N.D. 174, 107 N.W. 40; Grossman v. Liedeker, Tex.Civ.App., 202 S.W.2d 267; Taylor v. Highland Park Corporation, 210 S.C. 254, 42 S.E.2d 335; McVay v. Castenara, 152 Miss. 106, 119 So. 155. Defendants present the further contention that, assuming for the moment power in the court in a case of this kind to render judgment for damages, the complaint did not support the provision in the judgment awarding damages measured by the reasonable rental value of the Orchard Ranch; and that in the absence of a pleading to support such part of the judgment, defendants are not protected under the doctrine of res judicata against a like claim subsequently asserted in another action.
Having demonstrated its right to specific performance of Lex' promise to convey title, the state had a right to be placed, as nearly as practicable, in the same position as if Lex had performed its contract obligations in timely fashion. Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 576, 200 A. 1019 (1938); Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn. 575, 581-82 (1846); 3 E. Farnsworth, Contracts (2d Ed. 1998) § 12.5, p. 165. But for Lex' unexcused refusal to convey title on October 15, 1990, Lex would have had no possible claim to further payments from the state.
" Kakalik v. Bernardo, 184 Conn. 386, 395, 439 A.2d 1016 (1981). Likewise, "[a] trial court's determination to award or to refuse damages as an incident to a decree of specific performance rests to a significant extent in the exercise of the court's discretion, `depending upon the equities of the case and based on reason and sound judgment.' Schneidau v. Manley, 131 Conn. 285, 289, 39 A.2d 885 (1944); Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 576, 200 A. 1019 (1938)." Heyman v. CBS, Inc., 178 Conn. 215, 229, 423 A.2d 887 (1979); see Cohen v. Meola, 184 Conn. 218, 221, 439 A.2d 966 (1981); Cohen v. Meola, 37 Conn. Sup. 27, 34, 429 A.2d 152 (1981).
A trial court's determination to award or to refuse damages as an incident to a decree of specific performance rests to a significant extent in the exercise of the court's discretion, "depending upon the equities of the case and based on reason and sound judgment." Schneidau v. Manley, 131 Conn. 285, 289, 39 A.2d 885 (1944); Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 576, 200 A. 1019 (1938). This discretion cannot appropriately be exercised, however, until the parties have had the opportunity to inform the court about the damages that have proximately ensued from the wrongful withholding of the property.
The denial of a motion for a directed verdict is not a ground of error. Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 575, 200 A. 1019. There were no requests to charge, and but two of the three objections by the defendant pursuant to 156 of the Practice Book are discussed in its brief.
On February 28 the defendants took the position that the plaintiff had no option to purchase. Under these circumstances the plaintiff was excused from going on with preparations for performance; Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 574, 200 A. 1019; and from making formal tender. Tracy v. O'Neill, 103 Conn. 693, 699, 131 A. 417; Federal Finance Co. v. Forman Properties, Inc., 135 Conn. 153, 158, 62 A.2d 516.
The rulings were correct. Morache v. Greenberg, 116 Conn. 549, 551, 165 A. 684. The denial of a motion for a directed verdict is never a ground of error. Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 575, 200 A. 1019. The interrogatory was in conformance with a request made by the plaintiff. No evidence is certified to support the claim that the verdict should have been set aside as against the evidence.
It was not assigned as error in the writ that the notice to quit was not given the required length of time before the day fixed in it for the lessee to vacate the premises, and this case certainly is not one where we are under any obligation to consider claims not definitely assigned. Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 575, 200 A. 1019. The lessee does contend that the notice was insufficient because it was signed by the lessors by an attorney. He cites the case of Molzon v. Carroll, 91 Conn. 642, 100 A. 1057, but that case has little weight upon the question before us because the issue as to the sufficiency of the notice arose there under the provisions of the lease permitting its termination upon sixty days written notice and the sufficiency of the notice as a basis of a summary process action was not considered. The statute merely provides that the notice shall be in writing "substantially" in accordance with the form therein recited and this form concludes with the letters "A. B." representing a signature.
The true measure of damages ancillary to relief for specific performance is to place the parties in the same position they would have been if the contract had been performed according to its terms. Tri State Mall Associates, supra; Hellkamp v. Boiman, 25 Ohio App.2d 117, 267 N.E.2d 323 (1970); Four-G Corporation v. Ruta, 56 N.J. Super. 52, 151 A.2d 546 (1959); Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 200 A. 1019 (1938). McCoy is entitled to $1,933.
Pearce v. Third Ave. Improvement Co., 221 Ala. 209, 128 So. 396 (1930); see also Annotation, 7 A.L.R.2d 1204. Rather, the Court in decreeing specific performance will adjust the equities of the parties in such a manner as to put them as nearly as possible in the same position as if the contract had been performed according to its terms. Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 200 A. 1019 (1938); Smith v. Owens, 397 P.2d 673 (Okl. 1964); Four-G Corporation v. Ruta, supra; Pearce v. Third Ave. Improvement Co., supra. Specific performance is what the term implies — enforcement of the contract as nearly as may be to accomplish its purpose. Pearce v. Third Ave. Improvement Co., supra. Plaintiff is now bound by the terms of that contract and is entitled to no more than it provides.