Opinion
No. CV 01 0096256
May 29, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, William Logozzo, appeals from the decision of the defendant, the Haddam Zoning Board of Appeals, denying his application for a variance.
Procedural History
On May 14, 2001, the plaintiff, William Logozzo, filed an application with the Haddam Zoning Board of Appeals requesting a variance from two provisions of the Haddam Zoning Regulations. (ROR, Item 1.) Following the close of the July 30, 2001 public hearing, the board denied Logozzo's request for a variance. (ROR, Item 27.) On August 2, 2001, the board published its decision in the Middletown Press. (ROR, Item 29.) Logozzo appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court, and this court heard oral argument on April 10, 2003. The court has reviewed the record and considered the arguments of counsel.
Facts
The subject property consists of approximately 5.67 acres and is located in a R-2A (1F) (two acres, residential use, single family dwelling) zone. (ROR, Item 1.) A parcel of land owned by the State of Connecticut and leased to the Valley Railroad Line (railroad line) bisects the subject property. Logozzo seeks a variance of § 4.1.b.3.f and § 4.1.b.4. of the Haddam Zoning Regulations (zoning regulations) for the purpose of dividing the subject property into two interior lots. Section 4.1.b.3.f. provides, inter alia, that an interior lot must be at least 150 feet wide at a point no more than 500 feet back from a public street, and § 4.1.b.4. provides, inter alia, that such lot shall be at least one acre larger than the minimum required for the zone in which the lot is located. (ROR, Zoning Regulations, p. 17.) As proposed, both lots fail to comply with § 4.1.b.3.f. of the zoning regulations, and lot two, consisting of approximately 2.59 acres, fails to comply with the minimum acreage requirements of § 4.1.b.4 (three acres). (ROR, Property Survey Plan, Item 5.)
JURISDICTION
General Statutes § 8-8 governs an appeal from a decision of a zoning board of appeals denying a petition for a variance. "A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardoza v. Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 78, 82, 557 A.2d 545 (1989).
Aggrievement
"[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal . . . It is [therefore] fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402, 409, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002). The court's role is to find facts and weigh credibility, and if there is "sufficient evidence before the court as to the plaintiff's status as owner of the property," then the court may conclude that the plaintiff is aggrieved. Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 308, 592 A.2d 953 (1991).
Logozzo alleges that he is the owner of the real property which is the subject of the appeal. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) At hearing, the parties stipulated that Logozzo is the record owner of the subject parcel. The court finds that he has a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision for purposes of aggrievement. Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 219 Conn. 308.
The record contains a certified copy of quit-claim deed recorded in Volume 186 at Page 608 of the Haddam land records showing title is in the names of Eunice A. Logozzo and William A. Logozzo. (ROR, Item 10.)
Timeliness and Service of Process
"The procedure for the service of legal process in an appeal from the decision of the [board] to the Superior Court is delineated in General Statutes § 8-8 . . . An appeal shall be commenced by service of process . . . within fifteen days from the date the notice of the decision was published." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gadbois v. Planning Commission, 257 Conn. 604, 606, 778 A.2d 896 (2001).
In the present appeal, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether the appeal was timely commenced. On January 22, 2003, the court ordered the parties to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (b). On January 29, 2003, Logozzo filed a notice of a supplemental return of service endorsed by Marshal Joseph Passanesi stating that delivery of the original process was timely received and served in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 52-593 (a). See Russell v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 00 0553810 (October 5, 2000, Hurley, J.T.R.) (the savings provision of § 52-593a applies to a zoning appeal when process to be served is delivered to the marshal within the time limited by law and is then served within fifteen days of delivery).
The board denied Logozzo's application for a variance on July 31, 2001, and published its decision in the Middletown Press on August 2, 2001. In calculating the relevant time periods, the time for taking an appeal began to run on August 3, 2001, one day after the date of publication of the board's decision, and expired fifteen days later, on August 17, 2001. Service of process was made on the town clerk, the clerk of the board and the chairman of the board on August 23, 2001. (Marshal's Return.)
Based on the supplemental return of service filed by Logozzo's counsel, the court finds that the appeal was served in a timely manner on the proper parties. The court has previously found that Logozzo is aggrieved. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction.
Scope of Review
"Our law governing variances is well settled. Section 8-6 (a) (3) provides in relevant part that a zoning board of appeals may `determine and vary the application of the zoning bylaws, ordinances or regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent with due consideration for conserving the public health, safety, convenience, welfare and property values solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such bylaws, ordinances or regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship . . .'" (Emphasis in original.) Reid v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 235 Conn. 850, 856-57, 670 A.2d 1271 (1996). This section authorizes "a zoning board of appeals to grant a variance only when two basic requirements are satisfied: `(1) the variance must be shown not to affect substantially the comprehensive zoning plan, and (2) adherence to the strict letter of the zoning ordinance must be shown to cause unusual hardship unnecessary to the carrying out of the general purpose of the zoning plan.'" Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 207, 658 A.2d 559 (1995).
"A variance is authority granted to the owner to use his property in a manner forbidden by the zoning regulations . . . The power of the board to grant a variance should be used only where a situation falls fully within the specified requirements . . . Thus, the power to grant a variance should be sparingly exercised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reid v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 235 Conn. 857. "Variances cannot be personal in nature, and may be based only upon property conditions." Id. "Proof of exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship is absolutely necessary as a condition precedent to the granting of a zoning variance . . . A mere economic hardship or a hardship that was self-created . . . is insufficient to justify a variance . . . and neither financial loss nor the potential for financial gain is the proper basis for granting a variance." (Citations omitted.) Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 207-08.
"Where the hardship involved arises as the result of a voluntary act by one other than the one whom the variance will benefit, the board may, in the sound exercise of its liberal discretion, grant the variance . . . Where the claimed hardship arises from the applicant's voluntary act, however, a zoning board lacks the power to grant a variance . . . The hardship which justifies a board of zoning appeals in granting a variance must be one that originates in the zoning ordinance . . . and arises directly out of the application of the ordinance to circumstances or conditions beyond the control of the party involved." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 186 Conn. 32, 39-40, 438 A.2d 1186 (1982).
"A hardship resulting from the peculiar topography or condition of the land or a particular location which makes the property unsuitable for the use permitted in the zone in which it lies may well be such a hardship as is contemplated by the ordinance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 275, 280, 129 A.2d 619 (1957). "[T]he hardship must differ from the conditions that generally affect property owners in the same area, and it must arise from circumstances beyond the control of the property owner seeking the variance." Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 209. "Limitations imposed by the shape of the lot do not in themselves create a hardship . . . They must, in conjunction with the regulations, prevent the owner from doing something the owner otherwise has a right to do. An owner has a right to beneficially use [his] land, for example, but [he] does not have a right to undertake the most beneficial use of [his] land." T. Tondro, Connecticut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed. 2000 Sup., p. 76.). "The burden is on the applicant to prove hardship." Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn. App. 594, 599, 575 A.2d 249 (1990).
DISCUSSION A. Whether the Board's Failure to State on the Record Its Reasons for Denying Logozzo's Application Renders Its Decision Void
In his brief, Logozzo argues that the board's failure to state on the record its reasons for denying his application, as required by General Statutes § 8-7, renders the decision arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of its discretion. The board counters that "[w]here a zoning board of appeals does not formally state the reasons for its decision, the court must search the record for a basis for the board's decision." (Zoning Board of Appeals [ZBA] Brief, p. 3.)
General Statutes § 8-7 provides, in relevant part, that: "Whenever a zoning board of appeals grants or denies any special exception or variance in the zoning regulations applicable to any property . . . it shall state upon its records the reason for its decision . . ." This requirement is not mandatory and failure to comply with its provisions will not render the board's decision void. See West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 515, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994).
Consequently, "[w]here a zoning board of appeals does not formally state the reasons for its decision . . . the trial court must search the record for a basis for the board's decision." Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 208. "The Superior Court's scope of review is limited to determining only whether the board's actions were unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal. R R Pool Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456, 469-70, 778 A.2d 61 (2001). "It is well settled that a court, in reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency or to make factual determinations on its own." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Moreover, the [plaintiff bears] the burden of establishing that the board acted improperly." Wood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 258 Conn. 691, 698, 784 A.2d 354 (2001). "The [board's] decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Irwin v. Planning Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 629, 711 A.2d 675 (1998).
Because the board in this case did not formally state the reasons for its decision, the trial court must search the record to determine whether the board acted arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. R R Pool Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 257 Conn. 470.
B. Whether the Subject Property Suffers From an Exceptional Difficulty or Unusual Hardship
In his brief, Logozzo argues that the subject property suffers from an exceptional difficulty and unusual hardship because the placement of the railroad line in 1871 consumed a portion of the preexisting property (approximately 38,191 square feet) rendering it impossible for the subject property to conform to the subsequently enacted zoning regulations. (Logozzo's Brief, pp. 3-6.) As noted above, Logozzo's land is bisected by land now owned by the State of Connecticut on which the railroad line is situated. Logozzo contends that his property satisfies the area requirements for the proposed division if the land owned by the State is counted in computing the dimensions of his property.
Section 1.02 of the zoning regulations provides, inter alia, that the "Zoning Regulations for the Town of Haddam were first effective on October 10, 1958." (ROR, Zoning Regulations, p. 3.)
Logozzo claims that the configuration of the subject property predates the zoning regulations and that the construction of the railroad line was not a condition within his control or that of his predecessors. Logozzo contends that the board's "failure to recognize this implicit hardship and to deny the variance on that basis renders [its] decision arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion . . ." (Logozzo's Brief, p. 7.) He maintains that the railroad line has been unused for many years and is overgrown and impassable. He also argues that this is not a self-created hardship because although he bought the subject property after the creation of these conditions, he is entitled to "the same right to a variance as any of his predecessors, whose ownership was afflicted by the layout of the rail line and the passage of the zoning regulations . . ." (Logozzo's Brief, pp. 7-8.)
The board counters that Logozzo's claims of hardship are identical to those contained in a previous application that was denied in 1995, that the enforcement of the zoning regulations does not create an exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship, and that the present "situation is self-created and, therefore, not a sufficient reason to depart from the zoning regulations." (ZBA's Brief, pp. 6-8.)
Here, the principal claim advanced by Logozzo is that but for the construction of the railroad line in 1871, his proposed division of the land would comply with the zoning regulations. Implicit in Logozzo's brief are three issues. First, whether the laying of the railroad line in 1871 constituted a taking of the subject property by eminent domain such that it created the exceptional difficulty and unusual hardship from which the subject property continues to suffer. Secondly, whether strict adherence to the zoning regulations amounts to a practical confiscation by the board such that it limits the use of the subject property so that it cannot be utilized for any permitted purpose without a variance. Third, whether Logozzo's request for a variance to subdivide the subject property was a voluntary act sufficient to constitute a self-created hardship.
Eminent Domain CT Page 7306
"We begin . . . by setting forth the general, well established principles that govern the taking of real property by eminent domain. The fifth amendment to the United States constitution, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . provides that `private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.' [T]he Connecticut constitution similarly provides that `[t]he property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefore.'" (Citations omitted.) Northeast Ct. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, 256 Conn. 813, 827-28, 776 A.2d 1068 (2001)."Where [however] land has been acquired for the public use in fee simple absolute by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the former owners retain no rights in the land; and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use without any impairment of the estate acquired or reversion to the former owner." 27 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 940, p. 443; see also Mainer v. Canal Authority of the State of Florida, 467 So.2d 989 (1985) (a former property owner retains no interest in land taken by eminent domain, nor entitled to further compensation when plans to construct a canal for public use is later abandoned); see also Carlo Co., Inc. v. City of Miami, 62 So.2d 897, 900, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821, 98 L.Ed. 347, 74 S.Ct. 37 (1953) (no reversion in fee simple title where condemnor took private property in good faith but later abandoned plans to construct airport for public use).
In the present appeal, the State of Connecticut holds title in fee simple to the railroad property that bisects the subject property. (ROR, Item 16, p. 4.) During the application process and this appeal, the state's interest in the railway land has been at times alternatively referred to as a "right of way" and a "fee simple interest." However, the definitions of "fee simple interest" and "right-of-way" are not interchangeable, and clearly represent different ownership interests in land. A "`[r]ight-of-way' is generally defined as a legal right of passage over another person's ground . . . The term `fee interest' normally connotes a fee simple interest, or absolute ownership, of real property." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Double I Ltd. Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 218 Conn. 65, 74-75, 588 A.2d 624 (1991). It is clear that the State of Connecticut owns the land that cuts through Logozzo's property. The record reveals that Logozzo was subsequently granted a right-of-way interest in 1984 to pass over the state's railroad line. (ROR, Easement Agreement, Item 18.)
A fee simple interest was apparently transferred to the State of Connecticut by deed recorded in Volume 105, Page 445 of the Haddam Land Records. (ROR, Property Survey Plan, Item 5.) This deed is not contained in the record. At the May 31, 2001 public hearing, Town Planner Colegrove stated that the railroad property is held in fee simple by the State Department of Environmental Protection and that the property is leased to the Valley Railroad Line. (ROR, Item 9, Transcript, pp. 3-4.)
At the May 31, 2001 hearing, Logozzo's counsel stated that the property on which the railroad was situated was a "fee." (ROR, Transcript 5/31/01, p. 3.) At the July 30, 2001 hearing, Logozzo's counsel stated ". . . well, the railroad owns the strip." (ROR, Transcript 7/30/01, p. 5.)
At hearing, there was no conclusive evidence presented to indicate whether Samuel Ventres, Logozzo's predecessor in title, agreed in 1871 to sell the property for the railroad line, or was paid for it after a condemnation proceeding. Nonetheless, the state's fee simple interest in the railroad property reasonably infers that the state compensated Ventres for the acquisition of the property. Northeast Ct. Economic Alliance v. ATC Partnership, supra, 256 Conn. 827-28. Any apparent abandonment by the state of the railroad line does not create a reversion in title to Logozzo, nor does it reserve any rights to him or his predecessors. Carlo Co., Inc. v. City of Miami, supra, 62 So.2d 900.
At the June 25, 2001 public hearing, Commissioner Berchulski and Mr. Colegrove, the town planner, speculated that the state acquired title by eminent domain:
Commissioner: How did the railroad come to own that property?
Commissioner: It's mind boggling. They bought it?
Commissioner: or eminent domain.
Colegrove: Eminent domain . . . (Garbled sentence)
Commissioner: A long time ago.
Colegrove: 1871.
(ROR, Transcript 6/25/01, p. 4.)
II Confiscation
"Two tests have been used in Connecticut cases to determine whether land use regulations go so far as to amount to an unconstitutional restriction on the use of property, namely the practical confiscation test and the balancing test." R. Fuller, 9A Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed. 1999) § 54.4, p. 589. "A practical confiscation occurs when a landowner is prevented from making any beneficial use of its land as if the government had, in fact, confiscated it. A practical confiscation does not occur when the landowner cannot take advantage of a myriad of uses acceptable under the applicable regulations because of choices the landowner itself has made that limit its land use options." Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 256, 662 A.2d 1179 (1995). In this case, a practical confiscation did not occur because Logozzo is using the subject property as his personal residence and is making a beneficial use of the property without the issuance of a variance.
Thus, because the court finds that the denial of Logozzo's application does not amount to practical confiscation, the court next applies the balancing test. "Short of regulation which finally restricts the use of property for any reasonable purpose resulting in a practical confiscation, the determination of whether a taking has occurred must be made on the facts of each case with consideration being given not only to the degree of diminution in the value of the land but also to the nature and degree of public harm to be prevented and to the alternatives available to the landowner . . . The financial effect on a particular owner must be balanced against the health, safety and welfare of the community." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chevron Oil Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 170 Conn. 146, 151, 365 A.2d 387 (1976). The potential for financial loss to an owner is not a proper basis for the granting a variance. Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 207-08.
"Disadvantage in property value or income, or both, to a single owner of property, resulting from application of zoning restrictions, does not, ordinarily, warrant relaxation in his favor on the ground of . . . unnecessary hardship . . . Financial considerations are relevant only in those exceptional situations where a board could reasonably find that the application of the regulations to the property greatly decreases or practically destroys its value for any of the uses to which it could reasonably be put and where the regulations, as applied, bear so little relationship to the purposes of zoning that, as to particular premises, the regulations have a confiscatory or arbitrary effect . . . Zoning regulations have such an effect in the extreme situation where the application of the regulations renders the property in question practically worthless." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoffer v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 64 Conn. App. 39, 44, 779 A.2d 214 (2001).
In the present case, the court finds that an unconstitutional taking has not occurred. Logozzo is currently utilizing the subject property for residential purposes in accordance with the applicable zoning regulations as he has done since he first purchased the land. The record reveals that the applicant built his house on the property more than fifteen years ago. (ROR, Item 28, Transcript, p. 4.) This is a valuable use of the property. That the present permitted use of the property as a single family residence may not have the value or income-generating potential that Logozzo's proposed subdivision plan would have, is of no legal significance. The board's adherence to its regulations is not confiscatory in this case. Logozzo has not been deprived of the intended use of the subject property, nor has the property been rendered practically worthless by the denial of a variance. His personal desire to divide the subject property into two interior lots, and thereby increase the value of his land, while understandable, does not mandate the issuance of a variance.
III Self-Created Hardship
In Johnny Cake, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 180 Conn. 296, 429 A.2d 883 (1980), our Supreme Court addressed the self-created hardship exception for variances. "Where the applicant or his predecessor creates a nonconformity, the board lacks power to grant a variance." Id., 300. However, "if the hardship is created by the enactment of a zoning ordinance and the owner of the parcel could have sought a variance, then the purchaser has the same right to seek a variance and, if his request is supported in law, to obtain the variance . . . Otherwise the zoning ordinance could be unjust and confiscatory." (Citation omitted.) Id., 300-01. "[S]elf-inflicted or self-created hardship . . . is never considered proper grounds for a variance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 186 Conn. 40, quoting 2 Yokley, Zoning Law Practice (3d Ed.) § 15-8, p. 159.
"One specific type of voluntarily assumed hardship is embodied in what has been termed `the purchase with knowledge rule.' . . . Under that rule, if a purchaser acquires property with knowledge of the applicable zoning regulations . . . and later attempts to use that property in a manner that is proscribed by the regulations, the purchaser is barred from obtaining a variance." Kalimian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 65 Conn. App. 628, 632, 783 A.2d 506, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936, 785 A.2d 231 (2001); see also Abel v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 172 Conn. 286, 289, 374 A.2d 227 (1977) (applicant's hardship was self-created because he knew when he purchased the property that the applicable zoning regulations prohibited him from using the property for residential purposes).
Logozzo argues that the self-created hardship rule does not apply here because he has a vested right to seek a variance as did his predecessors in title whose ownership was also affected by the construction of the railroad line in 1871 and by the passage of the zoning regulations. (Logozzo's Brief, p. 8.) Logozzo relies, in part, on the proposition advanced in Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483, 408 A.2d 243 (1979), where the Supreme Court found that a preexisting nonconformity "is a vested right which adheres to the land itself."
In Petruzzi, the plaintiffs sought a building permit to convert the use of the existing building as a church into a single-family residence, both permitted uses in the zoning district. The lot and the building predated the enactment of the zoning regulations in 1948. The regulations and amendments thereto established minimum setback and lot frontage requirements that effectively rendered the lot and building nonconforming. The zoning board of appeals denied the plaintiffs' application on the ground that there was no evidence of any hardship because the plaintiffs knew when they purchased the lot in 1976 that the lot and building failed to comply with the town's zoning regulations. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that "the trial court erred in sustaining the denial of the plaintiffs' application for a building permit." Id., 485. "A vested right, unless abandoned, to continue the nonconforming use is in the land . . . [T]he right to a nonconforming use is a property right and . . . any provision of a statute or ordinance which takes away that right in an unreasonable manner . . . is invalid. A lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection." Id., 483-84, quoting 2 Yokley, Zoning Law Practice, § 16-3, p. 219.
The facts in the present case are not analogous to those set forth in Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 179 Conn. 479. The plaintiffs in Petruzzi did not seek to create the nonconformity after purchasing the property, but rather, were being denied a permitted use previously allowed before the regulations were enacted. In the present appeal, Logozzo is not being denied the permitted use of the subject property before or after the regulations were enacted. It is Logozzo's voluntary act in seeking a variance for the purpose of dividing the subject property into two interior lots that would create the nonconforming use. Logozzo purchased the subject property some fifteen years ago. He had actual knowledge of the state-owned railroad line that bisected the subject property, and he is presumed to have known about the applicable Haddam Zoning Regulations, which were enacted in 1958.
Again, "[w]here the claimed hardship arises from the applicant's voluntary act . . . a zoning board lacks the power to grant a variance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 186 Conn. 39. A land owner cannot complain after purchasing the land knowing of the zoning conditions "that the zoning regulations are unjust." Abel v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 172 Conn. 286, 291, 374 A.2d 227 (1977). "Personal hardships, regardless of how compelling or how far beyond the control of the individual applicant, do not provide sufficient grounds for the granting of a variance . . . It is not the function or responsibility of the board of appeals to seek ways to extricate [the applicant] from his self-created difficulties." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 44, quoting 3 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (4th Ed.) § 21-5.
Logozzo's land does not satisfy the zoning regulations' area requirements for division into two separate lots. The board denied his variance for this reason. He is able to use the subject property as a single residence lot, and has done so for approximately fifteen years. His land has not been rendered useless by the zoning regulations, and there is no unusual hardship.
Furthermore, because the court finds that any hardship here was self-created by Logozzo's voluntary act, in purchasing the subject property with the actual knowledge of the state-owned railroad line bisecting the subject property and with knowledge of the applicable Haddam Zoning Regulations, it holds that the board was without power to grant a variance. Pollard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 186 Conn. 44.
FINDINGS
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the record reasonably supports the board's denial of Logozzo's variance application. The plaintiff/appellant did not establish that the board's adherence to its zoning regulations created an unusual hardship, caused an unconstitutional taking of his property, or deprived him of a vested property right. The board did not act arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.
Because the court has dismissed Logozzo's appeal for the reasons stated, it has not considered herein the board's claim that the instant application is identical to the variance request that was denied in 1995, and must therefore be denied by the board unless the applicant could demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.
Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED:
BY THE COURT
DYER, J.