Opinion
October 31, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Harry N. Sandler, J.
Peyton T. Jordan and Peyton T. Jordan, Jr., Tampa, for appellants.
Henry H. Cole and Doyle Campbell, Tampa, for appellees.
A bill of complaint was filed by appellants, the widow and the heirs at law of C.D. Logan, to partition property which had been purchased by their intestate and Addison Logan and held by the two grantees as joint tenants.
We turn now to the stipulated facts forming the basis for the question presented in this case: While the property was held by the joint tenants it was sold to the County of Hillsborough at the tax sale in 1941 for delinquent taxes for the preceding year, and on 27 December 1943 the county filed a bill, under the provisions of Chapter 22079, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1943, to have the title quieted and confirmed in the complainant. C.D. Logan died 2 January 1944. The county was awarded a final decree 28 August 1944.
Under the provisions of the statute we have cited the county, 18 July 1946, offered the property at public sale, after proper advertisement, and it was sold to the surviving tenant, Addison Logan, who received a deed in the form prescribed by the act, and subsequently the appellees purchased the property for value.
The appellants contend that they have an undivided interest in the land because the action of the surviving tenant amounted to payment of the tax, while the appellees maintain that the interest of the appellants' intestate was extinguished by the decree rendered in the litigation instituted by the county.
We are familiar with the general principle that "if a tenant purchases the joint property at a tax sale, his act benefits all the cotenants and discharges the lien," a principle we particularly applied to tenancy by the entirety where one spouse had undertaken to appropriate the title of the other by purchasing the whole property from the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund under the Murphy Act, Chapter 18296, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1937, while the relationship of husband and wife obtained. Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205. The gist of that opinion was that the man and wife were one, his default was hers, and her purchase of the property theretofore held in an estate by the entireties was his also.
To decide the present point we must go rather fully into the provisions of the law applied in the Andrews case, Chapter 18296, supra, and compare them with the law which governed the procedure in this case, Chapter 22079, supra.
In the former there was provision for the vestiture in the State of Florida of the fee simple title to all lands on which there were outstanding tax certificates of a certain age, and the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund were authorized to sell the property to the highest bidder for cash "at such time and after giving such notice and according to such rules" as might be adopted from time to time by the trustees. It was further stipulated that if at such sale more was received than the face value with interest and charges, the balance should be paid the owner of the fee simple title "at the date of making of such sale" or to any lien holder. We gather that the fee simple title holder there meant was the owner of the property, for if this were not true and the language of the act were taken literally to mean the State of Florida, which had become the fee simple title holder because of default and the passage of time, there would have been no occasion to specify what should be done with the surplus.
So in one section of the act the original owner was divested of his title, while in the following section it would appear that he still had a potential interest, at least to the extent of any surplus received from the sale of the property he had once owned after the taxes, charges and claims of any lien holder had been paid.
Turning to the newer law, under which the sale in the present case was conducted, we find a much more definite procedure, which we shall undertake to analyze at the risk of being tedious. The board of county commissioners is empowered to institute suit against all lands upon which the taxes have been delinquent for two years and upon which the taxes have not been redeemed or the certificates purchased; and when the cause has proceeded to its conclusion, after proper notice, the chancellor shall enter a final decree reciting the progress of the cause and adjudicating "the fee simple title in * * * the lands * * * to be absolutely vested in said county, and such title in such county shall be by such decree forever quieted and confirmed against all claims and interests formerly held by any of said defendants." It is specified that such a decree shall not be interpreted to give any person formerly holding an interest in the lands prior to the expiration of the period during which the taxes were delinquent any right to redeem after the return day of the clerk's notice, "except the right to purchase taxes * * *."
Again, it is provided in the act that upon the entry of the decree any right, title, or interest in the property, except of course county and municipal tax liens, shall be "extinguished, and forever declared null and void, and the title to such lands when conveyed by the county shall be construed in all respects as a new, original title * * *," subject only to the liens for general taxes of equal dignity to county liens for general taxes. So up to this point it would seem that the legislature intended that a decree entered in the suit which the county is authorized to institute would definitely terminate any right, claim or title of the person who owned the property at the time the taxes were delinquent for the requisite period.
Within ninety days after the decree, the board of county commissioners is enjoined to fix a "price" on the property affected by the suit, and then if any person desires to purchase any of the land involved, he must deposit with the clerk an amount representing the price as determined by the board plus the estimated cost of advertising the sale and incidental fees. The clerk is then required to publish a notice that the land will be offered at public sale. Although the money deposited with the clerk by the person precipitating the sale is considered the first bid, nevertheless this officer is required to sell the property to the highest bidder, whether it be the one making the deposit or someone else. The act contains provisions for the distribution of the proceeds of the sale in a manner rather complicated and not necessary here to detail, but the original owner is entitled to none of the proceeds, regardless of the sum the property fetches. The title holder seems not to be placed in any advantageous position even though he brings about the sale, for, as we have indicated, this may be done by anyone having a desire to have the property offered at public outcry, whether he has theretofore had any interest in it or not.
From this complex procedure we have the view that there is no such latent interest of the owner in his property as was true in the procedure under Chapter 18296, supra, where, to repeat, it was provided that the excess above taxes and liens be delivered to the owner of the fee simple title, despite the provision in the same act that his title had become "absolutely vested" in the state.
Returning now to the facts in the present litigation and comparing them with the circumstances of the case of Andrews v. Andrews, supra, and bearing in mind the rule announced at the outset that one cotenant may not take advantage of another by purchasing the joint property at a tax sale, we are unable to say that the principle applies, because the appellees in the present case were in no position at the time they purchased the property to take advantage of the other owner, or his successors in title, and were no better enabled to buy the land than a stranger. For all we know from the stipulated facts, the "first bid" may have been made by a stranger to the title and the property bought by the cotenant as a competitive bidder, but assuming that the latter made the so-called "first bid," he gained no advantage by doing so. Upon the entry of the decree the original title had become null and void, and the title conveyed by the county was, by the very language of the law, new and original.
We are unwilling to hold that when a decree such as we have described is entered, terminating the fee simple title and regenerating the fee simple title in the county upon the execution of its deed, a joint tenant may not cause the property to be offered at competitive sale without reviving some interest or other in behalf of his former cotenant. Our conviction is that the procedure outlined in the statute once culminating in a final decree ends the relationship of joint tenancy in the property and that either may thereafter become an owner anew, free from the charge that he has, after all, in practical effect only paid the taxes on behalf of his cotenant and himself.
Affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.