At the outset of this analysis, we address the trial court's written order. In it, the trial court cited Logan v. State , 773 So.2d 338 (Miss. 2000), for the proposition that the information in the Affidavit for Search Warrant "described the things to be seized with sufficient particularity to satisfy [the] Fourth Amendment." ¶ 26.
Thus, it is the kind of question for which appellate courts routinely give deference to the trial courts. See Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 343 (Miss.2000) (“[The trial court] observes the witnesses first hand, hears the evidence and then determines whether the consent was, in fact, voluntary or not.”); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110, 114 (1965) (“The fact that the present case has to do with an ultimate finding of fact of constitutional dimension does not compel a different standard of appellate review.... [T]he determination whether consent was voluntarily given is a factual issue to be decided by the trial judge; and the appellate court should reverse only when it finds that determination to be clearly erroneous.”); McFadden v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1983) (“[V]oluntariness is a factual question.
Moreover, "`[a] trial judge's determination as to whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is given the widest possible discretion and that decision will only be disturbed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.'" Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 346-47 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Sheffield v. Goodwin, 740 So.2d 854, 856 (Miss. 1999)).
On issues of comments concerning a defendant's failure to testify, each case shall be considered on an individual basis. Logan v.State, 773 So.2d 338, 348 (Miss. 2000) (citing Conway v. State, 397 So.2d 1095, 1099 (Miss. 1980)).
See, e.g., Randall v. State, 806 So.2d 185, 213 (¶ 69) (Miss.2001); Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 349 (¶¶ 43–46) (Miss.2000); see also Collins v. State, 81 So.3d 1174, 1179 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (rehearing denied Nov. 29, 2011) (citing Parker v. State, 20 So.3d 702, 707–08 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2009)). Still we address the merits.
See, e.g., Randall v. State, 806 So. 2d 185, 213 (¶69) (Miss. 2001); Logan v. State, 773 So. 2d 338, 349 (¶¶43-46) (Miss. 2000); see also Collins v. State, 2011 WL 3925589, * 4 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011) (rehearing denied Nov. 29, 2011) (citing Parker v. State, 20 So. 3d 702, 707-08 (¶23) (Miss.
1982). While one of the factors to be considered in making that determination is whether the defendant was aware that he could refuse to give his consent, it is not the controlling factor, Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338 (¶¶ 12, 14) (Miss. 2000), since "consent may be established without a showing that the police warned the consenting party of his Fourth Amendment rights or that he was otherwise aware of those rights." Jones v. State ex rel. Miss. Dept. of Public Safety, 607 So.2d 23, 27 (Miss. 1991).
1991) ). "When the statement is not an outright violation, this Court will review the facts on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 166 (citing Logan v. State , 773 So. 2d 338, 348 (Miss. 2000) ). Further, "when considering whether an attorney's comment during opening or closing statements was improper, this Court must determine ‘whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.’ "
Smith v. State , 925 So.2d 825, 834 (¶ 23) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Logan v. State , 773 So.2d 338, 346–47 (¶ 31) (Miss. 2000) ). The trial judge's ruling on Dr. Neuschatz's testimony was not an abuse of discretion.
We afford “the widest possible discretion” to a trial judge's determination on the admissibility of expert testimony, and “that decision will only be disturbed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Smith v. State, 925 So.2d 825, 834 (¶ 23) (Miss.2006) (quoting Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 346–47 (¶ 31) (Miss.2000)). The trial judge's ruling on Dr. Neuschatz's testimony was not an abuse of discretion.