The defendants contend the case herein is controlled by C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, 149 Ga. App. 354, 356-357 ( 254 S.E.2d 426), in that the proper venue of this action should be, as to the South Carolina foreign corporation, in Chatham County where its registered agent resides. However, the plaintiff contends that the case is controlled by Daniel Daniel v. Cosmopolitan Co., 137 Ga. App. 383 ( 224 S.E.2d 44), and Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Const. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 82-83 (2) ( 232 S.E.2d 575), in that the suit is also against the surety, seeking recovery on the bond and against the contractor (the principal) as joint obligors, and venue has been perfected as to the surety for the performance of its obligation in a particular county (Habersham); and under the law it is deemed to be transacting business in such county and deemed to be a legal resident of such county. See Code Ann. § 56-1201 (Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 500; 1969, p. 740).

Id., p. 425. Again, in Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Const. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 83 ( 232 S.E.2d 575), this court has, as its last expression of opinion on the subject, again cited Southern R. Co. v. Crawford Slaten Co., 178 Ga. 450, supra, and stated, after quoting Code § 67-2002 (3): "This language relates to an action against the person creating the debt and not to a subsequent suit to foreclose the lien against the property improved." To the contrary, however, we have two intermediate suits, Whitley Const. Co. v. Carlyle c. Ltd., 137 Ga. App. 113, supra, and Associated Dist. v. De La Torre, 138 Ga. App. 71 ( 225 S.E.2d 462).

In arriving at that decision the Court of Appeals relied upon two decisions of this court, Lombard v. Trustees, Young Men's Library Assn. Fund, 73 Ga. 322, 324 (1885), and Southern R. Co. v. Crawford Slaten Co., 178 Ga. 450 ( 173 S.E. 91) (1934), plus several cited decisions of the Court of Appeals. Numerous other decisions could also have been cited: see, for example, Griffin Bros. v. Gainesville Iron Works, 144 Ga. 840, 842-843 ( 88 S.E. 201) (1916); Smith v. Walker, 194 Ga. 586 (1) ( 22 S.E.2d 160) (1942); Bryant v. Jones, 90 Ga. App. 314 (1) ( 83 S.E.2d 46) (1954); Jordan Co. v. Adkins, 105 Ga. App. 157 (1) ( 123 S.E.2d 731) (1961); Allied Asphalt Co. v. Cumbie, 134 Ga. App. 960 (1) ( 216 S.E.2d 659) (1975); Old Stone Mtg. c. v. New Ga. Plumbing, 140 Ga. App. 686, 690 ( 231 S.E.2d 785) (1976), as well as the more recent Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Const. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 83 ( 232 S.E.2d 575) (1977). The owner in the case before us cites Chamblee Lumber Co. v. Crichton, 136 Ga. 391 ( 71 S.E. 673) (1911), which was distinguished in Southern R. Co. v. Crawford Slaten Co., 46 Ga. App. 424 ( 167 S.E. 756) (1933), with the approval of this court in Southern R. Co. v. Crawford Slaten Co., supra, 178 Ga. at 451.

In Daniel Daniel v. Cosmopolitan Co., 137 Ga. App. 383,384 (1) ( 224 SE2d 44) (1976), we held that "venue may be perfected by the proper addition of a party defendant" so as to cure an existing problem with venue. We applied the same rule in Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Constr. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 82 (2) (a) ( 232 SE2d 575) (1977), where we held that the addition of the new defendant "relate[d] back to the date of the original suit so as to perfect venue." But neither of those two cases involved an added defendant that had changed its residence since the time the original suit had been filed.

[Cits.]" Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Constr. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 83 (3) ( 232 S.E.2d 575) (1977). Thus, FHHCI was not required to file notice of its counterclaim for foreclosure of its lien against Beall's property. FHHCI was, however, required to file notice of its counterclaim against Beall on the underlying indebtedness. It is undisputed that FHHCI did not file the requisite notice.

Accord Old Stone Mortgage Realty Trust v. New Georgia Plumbing, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 686, 231 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1976). Similarly, in Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Construction Co., Inc., 141 Ga. App. 81, 232 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1977), a Georgia court of appeals stated "[Section 67-2002(3)] has consistently been held by the courts of this state not to be a statute of limitations as to the foreclosure or assertion of the lien, but a condition precedent to the establishment of the lien . . .." Therefore, Georgia courts construe their state's provisions for lien perfection as merely the means to preserve a lien and not as a means to enforce a lien.

In sum, the following observations are noted: first, there is no statutory requirement that a claimant file notice of its foreclosure action against a property owner; second, notice is required with respect to an action to recover on the underlying indebtedness against the contractually responsible party; and third, said notice requirement is mandated whether the suit is brought against the contractor or the owner. See Beall v. F.H.H. Construction, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 544, 545, 388 S.E.2d 342 (1989), citing, among others, Hancor, supra, 155 Ga. App. 579, 271 S.E.2d 712; and quoting Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Construction Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 83, 232 S.E.2d 575 (1977); see also Jordan Co. v. Adkins, 105 Ga. App. 157, 123 S.E.2d 731 (1961). Simply stated, the 12 month time limitation and 14 day notice requirement, as provided in Section 44-14-361.1(a)(3), are applicable to the suit against the party creating the debt and not the action to foreclose the lien.