Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-62-KS-MTP
2021-05-12
Joshua LOFTIN, Plaintiff v. CITY OF PRENTISS, MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants
Sidney R. Hill, III, Clayton O'Donnell, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff. Gregory Todd Butler, Mallory K. Bland, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.
Sidney R. Hill, III, Clayton O'Donnell, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff.
Gregory Todd Butler, Mallory K. Bland, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KEITH STARRETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
For the reasons below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [72]. The Court will enter a separate final judgment in accordance with Rule 58. The Court also denies as moot Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony [74].
I. BACKGROUND
This is a § 1983 case arising from an arrest after a shooting in Prentiss, Mississippi. Plaintiff was aggrieved because he heard loud music emanating from a car that went past his house. So, Plaintiff decided to follow the car and confront its driver. Plaintiff took a gun with him because he had recently been threatened during a similar confrontation.
Plaintiff pulled his own vehicle up next to the one emitting loud music. The other driver, Dontarious Walker, apparently did not want to lower the volume of his music. Plaintiff claims that Walker brandished a firearm and threatened to shoot him. Plaintiff pulled his own weapon and fired into Walker's vehicle. Walker drove off. Plaintiff went back home and called the police, reporting that he had shot at someone and needed to make a statement.
A few minutes before Plaintiff called the police, someone else called to report that Walker had been shot. Walker drove a short distance away from the scene of the shooting before stopping his vehicle, and a third party transported him to the hospital. When the police arrived to Walker's vehicle, bystanders identified Plaintiff as the shooter. The officers initially believed the two calls were about different shootings, but soon realized differently. They went to Plaintiff's house and arrested him for aggravated assault, despite his claim that he acted in self-defense.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the City of Prentiss, Chief of Police Joseph Bullock, and Officer Stephen Jones. Bullock and Jones were the two officers who made the arrest. Plaintiff asserted claims under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a state-law claim of malicious prosecution. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [72], which the Court now addresses.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) ; see also Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P. , 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). "Where the burden of production at trial ultimately rests on the nonmovant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case." Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. , 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). The nonmovant "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Sierra Club , 627 F.3d at 138. "An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Cuadra , 626 F.3d at 812.
The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009). When deciding whether a genuine fact issue exists, "the court must view the facts and the inference to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Sierra Club , 627 F.3d at 138. However, "[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Oliver v. Scott , 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Heck Bar
Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). Heck provides that "a § 1983 claim for monetary damages is not cognizable when judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal ... or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Smith v. Hood , 900 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 2018). "Determining whether a particular claim is barred by Heck is analytical and fact-intensive and requires the court to consider the specifics of the individual claim." Id. A § 1983 claim may be " Heck -barred despite its theoretical compatibility with [an] underlying conviction if specific factual allegations in the complaint are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the conviction." Bush v. Strain , 513 F.3d 492, 498 n. 14 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, it is undisputed that the state court set aside the verdict finding Plaintiff guilty of aggravated assault. See Exhibit Q to Motion for Protective Order, Loftin v. City of Prentiss , No. 2:20-CV-62-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2021), ECF No. 56-17. Then, the state court dismissed the charges against Defendant upon the State's motion "to nolle prosequi the pending charges ..., as within the State's trial preparation new facts were developed that weaken[ed] its proof in the elements of the criminal statutes under which [Plaintiff was] charged ...." Exhibit R to Motion for Protective Order, Loftin v. City of Prentiss , No. 2:20-CV-62-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2021), ECF No. 56-18.
The Court finds that Heck does not bar Plaintiff's claims in this case. First, Heck provides that a claim for money damages is not cognizable where it would "imply the invalidity of [an underlying] conviction or sentence." Heck , 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Here, there is no underlying conviction or sentence in that the state trial court set aside Plaintiff's conviction. Exhibit Q [56-17].
Second, the subsequent order dismissing the charges found that "new facts were developed" that weakened the State's case. Exhibit R [56-18]. As Judge Lee has observed, the dismissal of criminal charges via nolle prosequi may be considered a "favorable termination," depending on the circumstances. Polacek v. Kemper County, Miss. , 2011 WL 9024, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 3, 2011). Where a prosecutor agrees to dismiss charges because he determines that there is insufficient evidence to support them, that is a favorable termination for the defendant. Id. at *2 ; see also Geness v. Cox , 902 F.3d 344, 356 (3rd Cir. 2018) (a nolle prosequi termination for insufficient evidence unquestionably provides an indication that the accused is actually innocent of the crimes charged); Wilkins v. DeReyes , 528 F.3d 790, 803 (10th Cir. 2008).
B. Fourth Amendment
1. Unreasonable Seizure
Next, Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and, therefore, his Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim fails. Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff argues that Defendants had no probable cause to arrest him for aggravated assault because they knew that Plaintiff claimed the shooting was in self-defense.
"The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures ... and that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Arizmendi v. Gabbert , 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI ). Therefore, "[t]o remain within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause." Sam v. Richard , 887 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2018). To prevail on a § 1983 claim for false arrest or imprisonment, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant did not have probable cause to arrest him. Parm v. Shumate , 513 F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007) ; Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ. , 391 F.3d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 2004).
"Probable cause is established by facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Arizmendi , 919 F.3d at 897. "When considering what a reasonable person would have concluded, we take into account the expertise and experience of the law enforcement officials." United States v. Nunez-Sanchez , 478 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court judges probable cause by the facts that the officer knew at the moment of the arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford , 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004) ; Haggerty , 391 F.3d at 655.
It doesn't matter whether the offense was committed in the officer's presence. Sam , 887 F.3d at 715 n. 6. Likewise, it doesn't matter if the arrestee was ever convicted of the crime for which the officer arrested him. Cole v. Carson , 802 F.3d 752, 764 (5th Cir. 2015). Rather, "to make out a Fourth Amendment claim under either a ‘false arrest’ or ‘illegal detention’ theory, the relevant actors must not be aware of facts constituting probable cause to arrest or detain the person for any crime." Id.
In summary, probable cause "does not demand any showing that [the officer's belief that a crime has been committed] be correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown , 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983). "A practical, nontechnical probability that [the arrestee committed a crime] is all that is required." Id. It is "not a high bar," and it is based on "only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act." Kaley v. United States , 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 188 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2014). It's a "flexible, common-sense standard." Brown , 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535.
It is undisputed that the Prentiss Police Department responded to a call about a shooting near "Greasy Line" at approximately 3:06 p.m. The victim, Dontarious Walker, had already been taken to the hospital, but bystanders identified Plaintiff as the shooter. At 3:09 p.m., Plaintiff called the Prentiss Police Department, admitted that he had shot at someone, and said that he needed to provide a statement. Officers went to Plaintiff's house after leaving "Greasy Line." Plaintiff admitted that he had shot at Walker, but he claimed that Walker had brandished a gun. Plaintiff admitted that he then pulled his weapon, fired, and drove back home.
Defendants unquestionably had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault based on what they knew at the time of the arrest. Bystanders identified Plaintiff as the shooter, and Plaintiff admitted that he shot Walker. Based on these undisputed facts, a "reasonable and prudent" person could conclude that there is a "fair probability" that Plaintiff committed the crime of aggravated assault. Kaley , 571 U.S. at 338, 134 S.Ct. 1090.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants had no probable cause to arrest him because he claimed to have shot Walker in self-defense. Plaintiff argues that Defendants should have conducted more investigation, such as confiscating and testing a gun possessed by Javarious McInnis, a bystander who fled from where Walker stopped his car. Plaintiff apparently theorizes that Walker passed off a gun to someone else before police arrived, but he presented no evidence in support of this theory. He also admitted during his deposition that he did not know if McInnis's gun was the same one that Walker allegedly brandished.
When Defendant Jones arrived at Walker's car, he saw Javarious McInnis run away. Jones chased McInnis and observed him throw down a gun as he ran. When Jones caught McInnis, he admitted that he had thrown the gun down. He said that he ran because he believed that he had open warrants. Defendants retrieved the gun, and they recognized it as one that McInnis typically carried. Bystanders told the officers that McInnis had nothing to do with the shooting. Therefore, the officers concluded that McInnis was not involved, returned the gun to him, and released him.
The Fifth Circuit has expressly declined to address whether "facts supporting the existence of an affirmative defense are relevant to the determination of probable cause." Piazza v. Mayne , 217 F.3d 239, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2000) ; see also Johnson v. Norcross , 565 F. App'x 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2014). "District courts within the Fifth Circuit, as well as other Circuits that have considered this issue have held that an affirmative defense is relevant to the probable cause inquiry, but that an official is under no duty to investigate a plaintiff's claimed defense." Mabry v. Lee County , 100 F. Supp. 3d 568, 573-74 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (citing cases). Moreover, "[a] mere assertion of an affirmative defense does not negate probable cause." Lewis v. Locicero , 2017 WL 3928117, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 7, 2017). The arresting officer is entitled to credit some evidence, while disbelieving the arrestee's version of events. Cooper v. City of La Porte Police Dep't , 608 F. App'x 195, 200 (5th Cir. 2015).
Here, Officer Jones provided undisputed testimony that he had arrested McInnis on multiple occasions, and that he recognized the gun that McInnis threw down as one he typically carried. At Plaintiff's criminal trial, Chief Bullock testified that McInnis had been involved in other shooting incidents. In light of this information, the absence of any evidence connecting McInnis to the incident between Walker and Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's admission that he had shot Walker, a reasonable and prudent person could conclude that there was a fair probability that McInnis had nothing to do with the shooting. Likewise, a reasonable and prudent person could disbelieve Plaintiff's claim that he shot Walker in self defense. Indeed, "[a] police officer faced with conflicting facts and eyewitness testimony does not necessarily lack probable cause for arrest simply because one party insists that her version of the facts is correct – even if that party claims at the time that she acted in self-defense." McCoy v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans , 2016 WL 2992528, at *17 (E.D. La. May 24, 2016), aff'd 714 F. App'x 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2017).
See also Mabry , 100 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (where witness statements conflicted on question of self-defense, officer's failure to consider witness statements did not demonstrate that probable cause was lacking); Turner v. Criswell , 2020 WL 1901086, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2020) (where there were facts within the officer's knowledge supporting conclusion that plaintiff had committed aggravated assault, plaintiff's version of events was not sufficient to conclusively establish self-defense and remove probable cause); Abbott v. Town of Livingston , 2018 WL 3430690, at *5 (M.D. La. July 16, 2018) (where officer received conflicting accounts of domestic incident, it was not objectively unreasonable for him to conclude that plaintiff was the predominant aggressor and arrest him, in spite of plaintiff's conflicting version of events); Lewis , 2017 WL 3928117 at *3 (officer had probable cause to arrest even if he had considered plaintiff's claim that he had a prescription for contraband); Townsend v. Tregre , 2016 WL 6403224, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2016) (in spite of conflicting evidence, there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for aggravated assault).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault arising from the shooting of Dontarious Walker.
Even if there were a genuine dispute of material fact on this issue, Plaintiff would still have to clear the hurdle of qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). "Although nominally a defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense once properly raised." Poole v. Shreveport , 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012).
There are two steps in the Court's analysis. First, the Court determines whether the defendant's "conduct violates an actual constitutional right." Brumfield v. Hollins , 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). Second, the Court must "consider whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively unreasonable in the light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question." Id. The Court may address either step first. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808. "The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Brumfield , 551 F.3d at 326. The Court "applies an objective standard based on the viewpoint of a reasonable official in light of the information then available to the defendant and the law that was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions." Freeman v. Gore , 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007).
For the same reasons provided above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants’ arrest of him for the shooting of Dontarious Walker was objectively unreasonable in light of the facts available to them.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants cannot take advantage of the independent intermediary defense based on the arrest warrant issued two days after the warrantless arrest, citing Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986). The Court need not address this issue because it finds that there was probable cause for the arrest.
2. Arrest Warrant
Plaintiff also contends that Chief Bullock violated his constitutional rights by failing to include certain information in the application for an arrest warrant, citing Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Bullock failed to include Plaintiff's claim of self-defense.
An officer can be "liable if the officer deliberately or recklessly provides false, material information for use in an affidavit or makes knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable cause." Anokwuru v. City of Houston , 990 F.3d 956, 964 (5th Cir. 2021) (punctuation omitted). To determine whether the omitted information is material, the Court must "insert any omitted facts into the affidavit and ask whether the reconstructed affidavit would still support a finding of probable cause." Lucky Tunes #3, LLC v. Smith , 812 F. App'x 176, 181-82 (5th Cir. 2020).
The Court finds that the omitted information – that Plaintiff claimed to have acted in self-defense – is not material because even if it were included, the affidavit would still establish probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault. The affidavit provides, in relevant part: "Joshua Evans Loftin on April 17, 2017, did purposely, knowingly and feloniously attempt to cause serious bodily injury to Dontarious Walker by ... shooting [him] in the upper portion of the left arm with a .357 Smith & Wesson handgun ...." Exhibit M to Response [80-13], at 2.
As the Court noted above, "[p]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity." Lucky Tunes , 812 F. App'x at 182 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) ). While officers may not ignore "conclusively established evidence of an affirmative defense," they have no "duty to investigate the validity of any defense." Mabry , 100 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (quoting Thomas v. City of Galveston , 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 835 (S.D. Tex. 2011) ). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff admitted that he shot Walker, and that bystanders identified Plaintiff as the shooter. That is enough to provide probable cause for issuance of an arrest warrant for aggravated assault. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided evidence that Defendants recklessly or deliberately omitted material information from the warrant application.
Regardless, the officers had probable cause for the initial warrantless arrest which, in the absence of contrary evidence, continued forward in time. See United States v. Clark , 647 F. App'x 419, 422 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2016) (unless contrary facts come to light, probable cause to arrest continues for indefinite period). Their case only got stronger between the initial arrest and the warrant application. After they arrested Plaintiff, they interviewed Walker, the victim, and he denied that he brandished a firearm or threatened Plaintiff. They also learned that Plaintiff had initiated the confrontation with Walker by following him.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing that Defendant Bullock violated his constitutional rights by intentionally or recklessly omitting material information from the arrest warrant application.
3. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff argue that the City is liable for the individual Defendants’ actions described above. Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence to support a claim of municipal liability under § 1983.
The Fifth Circuit provided the following summary of the law concerning municipal liability under § 1983 :
A municipality is not liable under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior, but only for acts that are directly attributable to it through some official action or imprimatur. To hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for the misconduct of an employee, a plaintiff must show, in addition to a constitutional violation, that an official policy promulgated by the municipality's policymaker was the moving force behind, or actual cause of the constitutional injury. The official policy itself must be unconstitutional or, if not, must have been adopted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact that such constitutional violations would result.
Official policy can arise in various forms. It usually exists in the form of written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. A policy is official only when it results from the decision or acquiescence of the municipal officer or body with final policymaking authority over the subject matter of the offending policy.
Although an official policy can render a municipality culpable, there can be no municipal liability unless it is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. In other words, a plaintiff must show direct causation, i.e., that there was a direct causal link between the policy and the violation.
A plaintiff must show that, where the official policy itself is not facially unconstitutional, it was adopted with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences. Deliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond mere negligence; it must amount
to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.
James v. Harris County , 577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (punctuation and citations omitted).
However, "every Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation." Hicks-Fields v. Harris County, Tex. , 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the City fail because he has not provided any evidence of a constitutional violation by the individual Defendants, as explained above. Hill v. Carroll County, Miss. , 587 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 2009).
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Defendants also argue that summary judgment is appropriate as to any Fourteenth Amendment claims that Plaintiff may have asserted. Plaintiff did not address this argument in briefing. Therefore, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has abandoned any Fourteenth Amendment claims that he may have asserted, and the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in that respect.
D. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff also asserted a state-law claim of malicious prosecution. To prove a claim of malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must demonstrate the following:
(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; (2) by, or at the insistence of the defendants; (3) the termination of such proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting the proceedings; (5) want of probable cause for the proceedings; and (6) the suffering of damages as a result of the action or prosecution complained of.
Bearden v. Bellsouth Telcoms., Inc. , 29 So. 3d 761, 764 (Miss. 2010).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails because, among other things, he can not establish the absence of probable cause. The Court agrees, for the same reasons provided above.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [72]. The Court will enter a separate final judgment in accordance with Rule 58. The Court also denies as moot Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony [74].
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 12th day of May, 2021.