O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal.App.2d 774, 783, 42 Cal.Rptr. 283; Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 583, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793), nevertheless are administrative and not subject to local referendum where state regulation of the subject is pervasive and the local body has been delegated authority by the state to implement the legislative policies declared by the state on a matter of statewide concern. (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 596, fn. 14, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473; Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 125, 129-131, 222 P.2d 225; Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 550, 558, 559, 219 P.2d 457; Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley, 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 168, 143 Cal.Rptr. 633; Walker v. City of Salinas, 56 Cal.App.3d 711, 716-718, 128 Cal.Rptr. 832; Andrews v. City of San Bernardino, 175 Cal.App.2d 459, 462, 346 P.2d [189 Cal.Rptr. 554] 457; Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield, 123 Cal.App.2d 728, 733, 267 P.2d 871.) This is one aspect of the more general rule distinguishing legislative versus administrative action.
. . .'" (35 Cal.2d at p. 559. See also Hughes v. City of Lincoln, supra, 232 Cal.App.2d 741, 745; Andrews v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 459, 462; and Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 728, 731 [ 267 P.2d 871].) This principle was recognized in Hughes v. City of Lincoln, supra, as follows: "A second test is superimposed upon the first when the local proposal deals with a subject affected by state policy and state law.
Several cases have cited Housing Authority of Los Angeles for the proposition that a housing authority is a state agency, but none of these cases makes that conclusion any more pertinent to our analysis. The first such case is Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 728 [ 267 P.2d 871] ( Lockhart). The issue before that court "involved . . . whether the city may by resolution rezone a portion of the city while its ordinance rezoning the same portion of the city was suspended by referendum."
There is no doubt that the city council, while functioning pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, is an agency of the state functioning under the law to fulfill state purposes. ( Housing Authority v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 853 [ 243 P.2d 515]; Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield, 123 Cal.App.2d 728 [ 267 P.2d 871].) In People v. Olds, 3 Cal. 167 [58 Am.Dec. 398], a writ of mandamus was requested by the plaintiff who claimed to be duly elected to the office of clerk of San Francisco and set forth the proceedings he had taken to qualify and obtain possession of the records of the defendant who was then acting as clerk of said city and county.
[2b] We see no valid distinction between the resolution of the Council (whether it be called Ordinance or some other name) pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Plan and the Housing Authority Law in respect to whether there is a right to referendum. ( Housing Authority v. Superior Court, p. 559 [9-10]; Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield, 123 Cal.App.2d 728 [ 267 P.2d 871].) The two California cases upon which petitioner most strongly relies are Burdick v. City of San Diego, 29 Cal.App.2d 565 [ 84 P.2d 1064] and Collins v. City County of San Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d 719 [ 247 P.2d 362].
The city and the housing authority function as administrative arms of the state in pursuing the state concern and effecting the legislative objective. To this same general effect see also, Drake v. Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 872, 243 P.2d 525 (1952); Lockhart v. Bakersfield, 123 Cal.App.2d 728, 267 P.2d 871 (1954); and State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. Great Falls, 110 Mont. 318, 100 P.2d 915 (1940). [2] Against this statutory and conceptual background, we come to the pivotal question posed in this case: Does the city council have the power, under the pertinent provisions of the Housing Cooperation Law (Laws of 1939, ch. 24, §§ 4 and 7, RCW 35.83.030 and 35.83.060, above quoted), to directly except or exempt, by appropriate resolution or ordinance, the housing authority from off-street parking requirements of the Seattle Zoning Code, notwithstanding the provisions of Laws of 1939, ch. 23, § 13 (RCW 35.82.120) rendering the housing authority amenable to local zoning laws, which, in turn, procedurally require prefatory action upon exceptions, variances, conditional uses, or zoning changes by the city planning commission or board of adjustment?