St. 1941, §§ 510.01 to 510.09 [Mason St. 1927, §§ 8336 to 8344]) was first expressed in Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833. There, four separate tenements were enclosed under one roof but were otherwise separate and independent of each other. It was contended that only the tenement actually occupied by the owner was exempt. In denying this claim we stated ( 112 Minn. 515, 128 N.W. 834):

The bankrupt contends, first, that certain decisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota have determined that growing crops on the homestead are exempt as a part of the homestead; and, second, that, if there be no state decisions settling this point, this court should so construe the statute. The cases upon which reliance is thus placed are Lockey v. Lockey, 128 N.W. 833, 112 Minn. 512; Stauning v. Crookston Mercantile Co., 159 N.W. 788, 134 Minn. 478; Erickson v. Paterson, 50 N.W. 699, 47 Minn. 525; Sparrow v. Pond, 52 N.W. 36, 49 Minn. 412, 16 L.R.A. 103, 32 Am. St. Rep. 571; Kammrath v. Kidd, 95 N.W. 213, 89 Minn. 380, 99 Am. St. Rep. 603; and Kirkeby v. Erickson, 96 N.W. 705, 90 Minn. 299, 101 Am. St. Rep. 411. The Lockey Case is cited as holding directly that "the proceeds of the homestead are exempt."

See, 49 Minn. L.Rev. 93, 105, note 33. National Bank v. Banholzer, 69 Minn. 24, 71 N.W. 919; Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833; Gale v. Hopkins, 165 Minn. 177, 206 N.W. 164; Cysewski v. Steingraber, 222 Minn. 221, 24 N.W.2d 266. "The homestead exemption law does not relieve one from his moral and legal obligation to pay what he owes."

"The presumption is that no change in the existing law was intended by the revision and to give it effect as changing the former law, the intention to make such change must clearly appear from the language of the statute when taken in connection with the history of the act and the purpose sought to be accomplished by it." The following cases accord therewith: State v. Ledbeter, 111 Minn. 110, 126 N.W. 477; United States C. L. Co. v. Sullivan, 113 Minn. 27, 128 N.W. 1112, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 51; Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833; State ex rel. Sherping v. Schmahl, 118 Mnn. 319, 136 N.W. 870; Manson v. Village of Chisholm, 142 Minn. 94, 170 N.W. 924; Olson v. Oneida Mines Co. 153 Minn. 80, 189 N.W. 455. The power of the legislature to provide that a judge elected and serving in one district may be called upon to render service in a district not his own is based upon art. 6, § 5, of our constitution, which reads:

It is obvious that they intended to provide that it should not. In Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 515, 128 N.W. 833, this court said with reference to the revisers' report: "This report, though not conclusive, was before the legislature when considering the adoption of the new law, and inasmuch as no change was made by that body in the language of the commission as embodied in the proposed revision, it is fairly clear that the intention was to enact the statute in the light of the interpretation given it by the commission."

In the absence of a clear intention to the contrary, the presumption is that no change in the existing law was intended by the commission or the adoption of its report by the legislature. State v. Ledbeter, 111 Minn. 110, 126 N.W. 477; Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833; U.S. C. Land Co. v. Sullivan, 113 Minn. 27, 128 N.W. 1112, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 51; Wipperman Merc. Co. v. Jacobson, 133 Minn. 326, 158 N.W. 606; Salmon v. Central Tr. Sav. Bank, 157 Minn. 369, 196 N.W. 468. Indeed the report of the revision commission makes no specific reference to §§ 687 to 690, G. S. 1894, but on the contrary, on page 8, refers to G. S. 1894, c. 8, and says that it has been rewritten with a view to condensation, but without material change except as noted. It is clear therefore that the legislature has never expressed or manifested any intent, for the purposes of this law, of including school districts in the word "municipality." 2.

The argument predicated upon the supposed partnership also overlooks the fact that, in this state, so long as actual occupancy of a homestead continues, its use otherwise matters little. Bacon v. Mirau, 148 Minn. 268, 181 N.W. 579; Stauning v. Crookston Merc. Co. 134 Minn. 478, 159 N.W. 788; Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833. 2.

The only facts claimed as a basis for her contention are those above stated and the further fact that the permits, issued by the building inspector for the construction of the building, specified the rear 42 feet of the lots as the site upon which it was to be erected. There is no limitation upon the uses to which a homestead may be put except that it must be occupied as a home. If the owner occupies it as his home, constructing other buildings upon it for rent, or using parts of it for business purposes, does not impair or affect his homestead right. Jacoby v. Parkland Distilling Co. 41 Minn. 227, 43 N.W. 52; Phelps v. Northern Trust Co. 70 Minn. 546, 73 N.W. 842; Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833; Stauning v. Crookston Merc. Co. 134 Minn. 478, 159 N.W. 788; Benning v. Hessler, 144 Minn. 403, 175 N.W. 682; Bacon v. Mirau, 148 Minn. 268, 181 N.W. 579. In the Phelps case, the owner of an 80-acre homestead platted a row of lots along the shore of Lake Minnetonka and sold a part of them. It was held that the unsold lots remained a part of his homestead.