Opinion
10043-23
10-20-2023
CHIQUITA T. LOCKETT, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Kathleen Kerrigan Chief Judge.
On August 29, 2023, respondent filed in the above-docketed case a Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, on the ground that the petition herein was not filed within the time prescribed by section 6213(a) or 7502 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). Respondent attached to the motion copies of a notice of deficiency and corresponding certified mail list (U.S. Postal Service (USPS) Form 3877), as evidence of the fact that such notice of deficiency for the taxable year 2019, dated March 1, 2021, had been sent to petitioner by certified mail on February 25, 2021. Specifically, the notice had been sent to petitioner on Gravier Avenue in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (the Gravier Avenue address).
The petition was filed with the Court on June 13, 2023, which date is 834 days after the date of the notice of deficiency for 2019 mailed to petitioner. The petition had been received by the Court in an envelope that bears a USPS postmark dated June 3, 2023, which date is 824 days after the date of the notice. The petition listed an address on Indiana Street in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (the Indiana Street address) as petitioner's current address for this proceeding.
This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case seeking the redetermination of a deficiency, the jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Rule 13(c), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), aff'g 116 T.C. 356 (2001); Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126, 130, n.4 (2022) (collecting cases); Brown v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 215, 220 (1982). In this regard, section 6213(a), I.R.C., provides that the petition must be filed with the Court within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day). The Court has no authority to extend this 90-day (or 150-day) period. Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. at 166-67; Joannou v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 868, 869 (1960). However, a petition shall be treated as timely filed if it is filed on or before the last date specified in such notice for the filing of a Tax Court petition, a provision which becomes relevant where that date is later than the date computed with reference to the mailing date. Sec. 6213(a), I.R.C. Likewise, if the conditions of section 7502, I.R.C., are satisfied, a petition which is timely mailed may be treated as having been timely filed.
A petition is ordinarily "filed" when it is received by the Tax Court in Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Leventis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 353, 354 (1968). Although the Court may sit at any place within the United States, its principal office, its mailing address, and its Clerk's office are in the District of Columbia. Sec. 7445, I.R.C.; Rule 10, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. And a document that is electronically filed with the Court is filed when it is received by the Court as determined in reference to where the Court is located. Nutt v. Commissioner, No. 15959-22, 160 T.C. (May 2, 2023).
In the present case, the time for filing a petition with this Court expired on June 1, 2021. However, the petition was not filed within that period.
Petitioner was served with a copy of respondent's motion to dismiss, and on October 10, 2023, an objection. Therein, petitioner did not deny the jurisdictional allegations set forth in respondent's motion and in fact conceded that petitioner had not filed before the statutory deadline, with the brief submission stating in its entirety as follows: "I Chiquita T. Lockett object. I did not receive 510,000. I never knew of this situation to respond to it on time. The letter I mailed in to the United States Tax Court." The earlier petition had offered additional detail with respect to timeliness, explaining: "I over came this notice due to my dad passing away going through May 1 at my old address recently." The earlier petition had also suggested concerns on petitioner's part that claims had been made improperly on the 2019 return by a return preparer.
As a threshold matter, as to petitioner's comment with respect to 510,000 (and a similar reference to $510,300 in the petition), there would appear to be a misunderstanding on petitioner's part. The deficiency determined in the underlying notice for 2019 is $1,256, stemming in significant part from disallowance of earned income credit. The $510,300 figure is an amount used in the computation of alternative minimum tax, and no alternative minimum tax has been asserted here.
More relevantly, to the extent that petitioner's statements might raise the question of whether the notice of deficiency was properly mailed to petitioner's last known address, respondent had incorporated relevant information on that point in the motion to dismiss. To wit, respondent had explained, and provided attached copies of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records supporting, that the address used on the notice of deficiency was consistent with the most recent information in the IRS systems as of the March 1, 2021, mailing. The proffered records incorporated transcripts showing that the Gravier Avenue address was used on petitioner's 2019, 2020, and 2021 returns, with the Indiana Street address not being used until the 2022 return. As such, the IRS records did not show that petitioner had provided clear notice of a change of address to the IRS prior to March 1, 2021.
A notice of deficiency is sufficient if it is mailed to the taxpayer's last known address by certified mail. See sec. 6212(b)(1), I.R.C. In King v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988), aff=g 88 T.C. 1042 (1987), the Court of Appeals stated that by "establishing a presumption that the taxpayer's 'last known address' is the address on his/her most recent return, we provide a clear starting point for the IRS's determination. A notice of deficiency mailed to that address will be sufficient, unless the taxpayer subsequently communicates 'clear and concise' notice of a change of address." See also sec. 301.6212-2(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs. In such circumstances, the 90-day period prescribed in section 6213(a), I.R.C., is computed by reference to the date the notice of deficiency "is mailed" by certified mail, not the date of attempted delivery, availability, or actual receipt, except in the narrow circumstances where the notice itself sets forth a later, and thus controlling, last date to petition the Tax Court.
Respondent bears the burden of proving proper mailing of the notice of deficiency by competent and persuasive evidence. Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82, 90 (1990). Such burden requires respondent to introduce evidence showing that the notice was properly delivered to the USPS for mailing. Cataldo v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 522, 524 (1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1974). In particular, as this Court has stated: "A Form 3877 reflecting Postal Service receipt represents direct documentary evidence of the date and the fact of mailing." Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. at 90. If the existence of the notice of deficiency is undisputed, a properly completed Form 3877 is alone sufficient to establish proper mailing, but even a Form 3877 with defects is probative and may be combined with additional evidence to meet respondent's burden. See O'Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537, 540-542 (2d Cir. 2009); Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. at 91-92; Portwine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-29, aff'd, 668 Fed.Appx. 838 (10th Cir. 2016).
It is well established in the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction that once respondent has established the fact and date of the mailing of a notice of deficiency, the burden rests on the taxpayer to prove that the notice was not sent to his or her last known address. See, e.g., Yusko v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 806, 808 (1987); Clevenger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-37, aff'd without published opinion, 176 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1999). Stated otherwise, the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that clear and concise notice of a change of address was provided to the IRS. See, e.g., Mollett v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 618, 624-625 (1984), aff'd without published opinion, 757 F.2d 286 (11th Cir. 1985); Hammann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-361.
Here, the Court is satisfied that the combination of evidence proffered is sufficient to establish proper mailing. The existence of the notice has never been challenged, respondent has supplied a properly postmarked USPS Form 3877, and the record is devoid of any evidence or claim to suggest that petitioner at any relevant time prior to the March 2021 mailing gave the IRS "clear and concise" notice of any other address other than the Gravier Avenue address. In particular, respondent proffered IRS transcript records showing addresses used on petitioner's returns and reflecting that petitioner's last return prior to the preparing and mailing of the notice was consistent with the address used on the notice. Furthermore even problems with delivery by the USPS do not override or otherwise invalidate proper mailing by the IRS.
Hence, while the Court is sympathetic to petitioner's situation and understands the unintentional character of the inadvertence here, as well as the challenges imposed by petitioner's personal circumstances and the good faith of the efforts undertaken to address the matter, the fundamental nature of the filing deadline precludes the case from going forward. As a Court of limited jurisdiction, the Court is unable to offer any remedy or assistance when a petition is filed late. Rather, the Court is barred from considering in any way petitioner's case or the correctness of petitioner's claims. Unfortunately, governing law recognizes no reasonable cause or other applicable exception to the statutory deadline, and the allegation that the petition was sent more than two years late remains unrebutted.
The Court has no authority to extend that period provided by law for filing a petition "whatever the equities of a particular case may be and regardless of the cause for its not being filed within the required period." Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256, 259 (1972). Accordingly, since petitioners have failed to establish that the petition was mailed to or filed with this Court within the required 90-day period, this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court would, however, encourage petitioner to consider or continue working administratively through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which, being entirely separate from the Tax Court, may be able to offer alternative avenues for relief, not dependent on the existence of a Tax Court case, such as audit reconsideration or a refund action.
The premises considered, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.