In Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) this Court said: Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922); Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389 (1936); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157 (1935); O'Hearne v. United States, 62 App.D.C. 285, 66 F.2d 933 (1933); Schwartz v. United States, 217 F. 866 (1914); Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 F. 857 (1913); Blake v. Nesbet, 144 F. 279 (1905); see Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (1930). "An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case.

The United States may punish wilful disobedience of it. We have sustained a similar temporary order as a basis for punitive contempt proceedings, though the law under which the suit was alleged to arise proved to be unconstitutional, in Locke v. United States, 5 Cir., 75 F.2d 157. See also Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S.Ct. 277, 66 L.Ed. 550.

The rule of state law accepted and approved in Howat v. Kansas is consistent with the rule of law followed by the federal courts.Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 F. 857; Trickett v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 25 F.2d 851, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 624; O'Hearne v. United States, 62 App.D.C. 285, 66 F.2d 933, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 683; Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, cert. denied, 295 U.S. 733; McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211, cert. denied sub nom. McCann v. Leibell, 299 U.S. 603: McLeod v. Majors, 102 F.2d 128; Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, Page 315 cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834.

This method lacks precedential support for the simple reason that the great weight of authority holds it to be inappropriate. See cases cited, supra; also, McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 2 Cir. 1935, 80 F.2d 211, 214, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603, 57 S.Ct. 233, 81 L.Ed. 444 (1936); Locke v. United States, 5 Cir. 1935, 75 F.2d 157, cert. denied, 295 U.S. 733, 55 S.Ct. 644, 79 L.Ed. 1681 (1935). This latter point aside, we hold that the temporary restraining order as to the return of the seized drugs was validly entered.

Once the consent decree was entered, the district court had the power ("jurisdiction") to punish disobedience, even if it erred in issuing the injunction originally. Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967); United States v. United Mine Workers of America, supra; McLeod v. Majors, 102 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1939); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 733, 55 S.Ct. 644, 79 L.Ed. 1681 (1935). III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The majority conclusion in this aspect of the case, I think, countenances disobedience of a court process. See Locke v. United States (C.C.A.) 75 F.2d 157, certiorari denied 295 U.S. 733, 55 S.Ct. 644, 79 L.Ed. 1681, and cases therein cited. "But if a court have jurisdiction to make an order it must be obeyed however wrong it may be. `The principle is of universal force, that the order or judgment of a court having jurisdiction is to be obeyed, no matter how clearly it may be erroneous.' People v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263, 266, 59 Am.Dec. 536. Errors must be corrected by appeal and not by disobedience."

Although, as we have indicated, that order was erroneous, the plaintiff was nevertheless bound to obey it, provided the judge had jurisdiction. Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 205 F. 857 (C.C.A. 2); Trickett v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 25 F.2d 851, 858 (C.C.A. 8); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (C.C.A. 5). We think that he did have jurisdiction and that the plaintiff was bound to obey, until the order was vacated or reversed.

Therefore, the Court finds Clyde Armory in contempt of the Court's Bench Trial Order and will now consider the appropriate sanction. See Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) ("An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers ... must be obeyed by [the parties], however erroneous the action of the court may be .... It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished."); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1935) ("Willful disobedience of an injunction, however erroneous, issued by a court having jurisdiction while such injunction is in force unreversed constitutes contempt of court.") (Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981, constitute circuit precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, see Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)); but see Gannett Outdoor Co. v. Feist, No. 1:89-CV-472, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 948, at *14 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 1991) (refusing to find defendants in contempt for failing to follow the court's order while an appeal and motion to stay the injunction were both pending). "A court has broad discretion in fashioning a contempt sanction.

so Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) ("An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers . . . must be obeyed by them, however erroneous the action of the court may be. . . . It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.") (citations omitted); Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 965 (5th Cir. 1979) ("A second threshold question is whether Braddick's notice of appeal deprived the district court of any further power to take action to enforce its order. Since Braddick failed to ask the district court for a stay pending appeal and to post supersedeas bond as required by [Rule] 62(d), the district court retained power to enforce its order by civil contempt proceedings."); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1935) ("Willful disobedience of an injunction, however erroneous, issued by a court having jurisdiction while such injunction is in force unreversed constitutes contempt of court.") (citation omitted); Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153 n. 2 (W.D. Wash. 2000) ("A contempt finding may be made, and sanctions imposed, while an appeal from an injunction is pending."); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Civil No. 93-0215, 1995 WL 422792, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1995) ("Although the filing of an appeal generally divests a district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal, courts still maintain jurisdiction for the . . . purpose of enforcing its injunctions."); Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr Sons, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 580, 580 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (concluding that, notwithstanding a pending appeal from an injunctive order, district court retained jurisdiction to inquire whether injunction had been violated and whether any party was, as a result, in contempt of court).

Those cases together with McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 2 Cir., 80 F.2d 211, fortify the government's contention against this motion to dismiss the criminal contempt. And see Locke v. United States, 5 Cir., 75 F.2d 157; Trickett v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 8 Cir., 25 F.2d 851; Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 1 Cir., 190 F. 565; Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 2 Cir., 205 F. 857; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 48 S.Ct. 486, 72 L.Ed. 862; Bough v. Lee, D.C., 29 F. Supp. 498, 501. Motion for dismissal of the criminal contempt is denied.