Opinion
02 C 6430.
February 5, 2003
OPINION
This is a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, alleges the following: in November of 1977, she was promoted to the position of Area Manager, but was continually treated less favorably than other area managers in her region, all of whom are non-white. In August 2001, she was removed from the position of Area Manager without warning, replaced by a Hispanic woman, and demoted to the position of Park Supervisor.
Defendant first argues that plaintiff has not alleged a prima facie case under § 1983. After defendant filed its motion to dismiss, plaintiff amended her complaint to include the allegation that "[i]t has been a long-standing custom and policy of the Chicago Park District that exempt, professional personnel are not considered career service and therefore, are not provided a hearing before discharge or termination." In adding this allegation, plaintiff argues that her complaint now alleges that her procedural due process rights were violated pursuant to a custom of defendant. However, in order for a municipality to be liable under § 1983, the acts in question must be such that the municipality itself can be held responsible. Plaintiff, even in her amended complaint, does not allege that a person or entity with final policymaking authority was involved in the decision to demote her. According to 70 ILCS 1505/16a, the Board of Commissioners dictates the policy for the defendant. The testimony that it is defendant's custom to not provide a hearing to exempt, professional personnel by categorizing them as non-career service was given by Francine Bailey, who is not on the Board of Commissioners. Plaintiff does not allege that the Board of Commissioners or anyone on the Board of Commissioners was involved in the decision to demote her. Thus, her claim under § 1983 is dismissed.
Defendant next argues that plaintiff cannot sustain her claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because she has not shown that she has a property interest in her job. Plaintiff argues that her amended complaint clearly establishes that she has career service status and therefore, she had a property interest in her job. However, both 70 ILCS 1505/16a and Ms. Bailey's statement about defendant's custom speak to discharge or suspension, not demotion. Even if it were established beyond doubt that plaintiff was a career service employee, there is no support in the law that she is entitled to a hearing before demotion, and the legal authority on which plaintiff relies only speaks to entitlement to a hearing before discharge.
For the reasons stated above, defendant's partial motion to dismiss is granted.