Opinion
Gruber & Turkel, by Samuel Gruber, Stamford, Conn., for plaintiff.
Larkin & Pickett, by William J. Larkin, II, Waterbury, Conn., for defendant.
BLUMENFELD, District Judge.
The defendant Anaconda American Brass Company, Torrington Division, hereafter Anaconda, operates three plants in three different cities in Connecticut, in each of which a different union is the bargaining representative for the employees. Each one of the three separate collective bargaining agreements between the respective unions and Anaconda contains the following provision:
The plaintiff Local No. 423, International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, hereafter Mine Workers, alleges that Anaconda breached its collective bargaining agreement by denying full plant seniority to those whom it re-employed at its Anaconda plant in Waterbury, after transferring machinery and equipment from its Torrington plant to its Waterbury plant, where the same work was continued thereafter, and by refusing to call back the other employees whom it had laid off in Torrington.
After answering the complaint, Anaconda now moves under Rule 14(a) for permission to implead the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO and Local Union No. 6445, United Steelworkers of America, of Ansonia, hereafter Steelworkers, and Local 1078, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, of Waterbury, hereafter U.A.W., by serving a summons and third party complaint upon them. This complaint, in brief, alleges that during the effective term of the several bargaining agreements,
the two proposed third party unions threatened it with strike action unless Anaconda agreed to modifications of their respective bargaining agreements, which would deprive former Torrington employees, whom it might transfer to the Waterbury or Ansonia plants, of full plantwide seniority, and that, as a result of those threats, it was compelled to and did enter into letter agreements with each of them, acceding to their demands. Since both letter agreements are essentially the same, only the earliest one is noted in the margin. The discussion which follows can be related to both third party defendants.
'For the purpose of certain transfers of employees which the Company desires to make from the Torrington Division to Waterbury, the effect of Sec. 19 of Art. VIII of the existing contract between the Company and Local 1078, UAW is mutually understood to be as follows:
Although Anaconda's answer denies that it has breached the collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiff, it alleges in its third party complaint that if it did breach that contract it was induced to do so by the necessity of complying with the letter agreements which are the product of the third party unions' strike threats. It pleads that it will be unable to carry out any decree requiring compliance with the Mine Workers' contract without violating the tainted letter agreements.
This claim is not considered with respect to whether or not it contains any thing of merit as a defense to the plaintiff's cause of action. Compliance with that contract would not appear to be legally impossible, and union coercion to induce Anaconda to violate it is probably not relevant. N.L.R.B. v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 6 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 528; N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 2 Cir., 1953, 206 F.2d 235.
Whether a claim by defendant against the proposed third parties which will fit within the scope of Rule 14, F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., may be found among these allegations is the question which must be determined. Rule 14(a) is explicit in its direction that the party impleaded must be one who is or may be liable to the defendant:
The defendant contends that the facts set forth in the third party complaint state a cause of action for malicious interference with the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, citing Ran W. Hat Shop, Inc. v. Sculley, 1922, 98 Conn. 1, 118 A. 55, 29 A.L.R. 551. The cause of action for malicious interference as recognized in Connecticut and in other jurisdictions, Cf. Restatement of Torts, §§ 766 et seq., gives to the promisee injured by a breach of contract the right to recover damages from the one who induced the breach.
No case or authority has been cited by Anaconda in support of its contention
that the one induced has a right to reimbursement or contribution against the inducer. As will be seen later, the merit of this contention must, for this case, be tested by federal substantive law.
Although independent jurisdictional grounds are not regarded as necessary in order to entertain a third party action, Dery v. Wyer, 2 Cir., 1959, 265 F.2d 804, the advantages of ancillary proceedings do not operate to enlarge jurisdiction over subject matter which, as governed by statute, lies only within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 4 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 183. While ordinarily the existence of a substantive right against the third party would be tested under state law, San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, at p. 247, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), forbids it in cases touching interests regulated by national policy in the field of labor management relations.
The first step in the development of Anaconda's claim against the third parties is its contention that the letter agreement is invalid. One ground relied upon is that the defendant resorted to threat of strike action prohibited under 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) in order to procure a modification of the existing collective bargaining agreement to the extent set forth in the letter agreement.
The purpose of § 158(d) has been explained in N.L.R.B. v. Jacobs mfg., 2 Cir., 1952, 196 F.2d 680 by Judge Chase at p. 684:
What may be regarded as any 'modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract' prohibited under 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) has been shown in Local Union No. 9735 etc. v. N.L.R.B., 1958, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 258 F.2d 146, where the court pointed out at p. 149:
To resolve the question of whether there was an unlawful modification requires something other than mere legal interpretation of the language of the letter agreement when read as an insertion into the context of the original agreement. Insofar as its claim is based on an unfair labor practice, the necessity of determining circumstances surrounding the inception of the original agreement arises, and these are matters peculiarly within the expertise of the National Labor Relations Board. See N.L.R.B. v. Jacobs, supra. To the extent that the conduct upon which Anaconda relies to seek relief is arguably within the compass of § 8, this court would have no power to act. 359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.
There remains, however, Anaconda's additional contention that the letter agreement with U.A.W. must be invalidated because it was obtained as a consequence of U.A.W.'s violation of the collective bargaining agreement. A suit for violation of that agreement would fall within the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. 185, and would be cognizable by this court. Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483.
While San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, precludes this court from granting a remedy for nonviolent tortious conduct under state law which might arguably also constitute an unfair labor practice this does not mean that the parties may not, by voluntary choice, make an enforceable bargain to refrain from this same conduct. In this latter instance, the court could undertake jurisdiction which otherwise would be prohibited under 8 without incurring jurisdictional conflict with the National Labor Relations Board.
'Since this was a suit for violation of a collection bargaining contract within the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the pre-emptive doctrine of cases such as San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, based upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board Is not relevant. * * *
It is, of course, true that conduct which is a violation of a contractual obligation may also be conduct constituting an unfair labor practice, and what has been said is not to imply that enforcement by a court of a contract obligation affects the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. to remedy unfair labor practices, as such. * * * ' Local 174, Teamsters, etc. v. Lucas Flour Co., 82 S.Ct. 571.
Reaffirmation in Local 174, Teamsters etc., supra, at pp. 8 & 9 of the mandate of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 923, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1956), compelling the courts to fashion a body of substantive federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements from the principles of federal labor law eliminates the risk of the development of state law
which would be incompatible with federal labor policy. Whether the threat of strike action was in fact 'violative of both the existing collective bargaining agreements between Anaconda and third party defendants * * *' as alleged in its proposed third party complaint, so as to substantiate the breach of contract aspect of Anaconda's claim, cannot be determined since neither the agreements nor the pertinent provisions have been filed. Decision of that question and the others which will be precipitated in the event of an affirmative answer must await an orderly procedure which cannot begin until the summons and complaint have been served upon the proposed third party defendants.
The motion for permission to serve the summons and complaint upon the proposed third party defendants is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.