The goal of the clause is notice, not restriction of legislation. The "object" of a law is defined as its general purpose or aim. Local No 1644 v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962). The "one object" provision must be construed reasonably, not in so narrow or technical a manner that the legislative intent is frustrated.
"Legislation, if it has a primary object, is not invalid because it embraces more than 1 means of attaining its primary object." Local No 1644, AFSC ME, AFL-CIO v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962). Moreover, "[a]n act may contain all matters germane to its object" and any provisions which " `directly relate to, carry out and implement the principal object.'"
Kuhn v Treasury Dep't, 384 Mich. 378, 387-388; 183 N.W.2d 796 (1971). See also Local No 644 v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962): Numerous cases have held that the "object" of a statute is the general purpose or aim of the enactment.
[ 123 Mich. App. 771.] The "object" of a law is its general purpose or aim. Local No 1644, AFSCME v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962). The object of the CVZA is to enable cities and villages to regulate in a reasonable manner the use of land and structures within their boundaries.
The Act accomplishes its one primary object by regulating the pre-campaign political activity of candidates and electors, by imposing limitations on the post-election political activity of elected and appointed public officials and those who would influence their decisions, and, through the Political Ethics Commission, by providing a means of implementing and enforcing such regulations. Local No 1644, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962). Spending money in a political campaign is political activity.
As indicated above, the goal is notice, not restriction of legislation. This Court, in Local No 1644, AFSC ME, AFL-CIO, v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91 (1962), said: "Numerous cases have held that the `object' of a statute is the general purpose or aim of the enactment.
Legislation, if it has a primary object, is not invalid because it embraces more than one means of attaining its primary object. Local No 1644, AFSC ME, AFL-CIO v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 367 Mich. 79, 91; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962). The one-object provision is to be construed reasonably and not in so narrow or technical a manner as to frustrate the legislative intent.
Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra, p 467. The object of a law is its general purpose or aim. Local No 1644, AFSCME v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich. 79; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962); City of Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich. 466; 378 N.W.2d 402 (1985). A statute may authorize the doing of all things which further its general purpose.
Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra, p 467. The object of a law is its general purpose or aim. Local No 1644, AFSCME v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich. 79; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962); City of Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich. 466; 378 N.W.2d 402 (1985). A statute may authorize the doing of all things which further its general purpose.
Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra, p 467. The object of a law is its general purpose or aim. Local No 1644, AFSCME v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich. 79; 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962); City of Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich. 466; 378 N.W.2d 402 (1985). A statute may authorize the doing of all things which further its general purpose.