Opinion
File No. 1:00-CV-419
November 2, 2001
OPINION
Before this Court are Defendants National Industrial Group Pension Plan ("NIGPP") and National Industrial Group Pension Plan Administrative Agency's ("Administrator") motions for summary judgment. Defendants seek summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiff's complaint. Count I of Plaintiff's complaint is an equitable estoppel claim against both Defendants. Count II alleges negligence by Defendant Administrator only. As explained below, the Court GRANTS both motions.
I.
Plaintiff represents the employees of Checker Motor Corporation ("Checker") in bargaining. Checker and Plaintiff were set to negotiate a new contract in 1999. Aware of the imminent expiration of the old contract, NIGPP, a pension plan which has contracted with Checker to provide benefits to Checker employees, sent both Plaintiff and Checker a supplemental quotation. (Pl.'s Compl. Ex. A). The supplemental quotation states that a 10 cent increase in contributions will increase the benefit level by $3.55. (Pl.'s Compl. Ex. A at 2). Furthermore, the quotation indicates that it "is consistent with the applicability of your last certified increase." (Pl.'s Compl. Ex. A at 2). Finally, the quotation directs Checker and Plaintiff that "[i]f an increase in your Contribution Rate or Benefit Level is agreed upon during your negotiations, please complete the form and return it to us as soon as possible." (Pl.'s Comp' Ex. A at 1). Although Plaintiff initially sought a 25 cent increase, Checker and Plaintiff agreed to a 10 cent increase.
Checker and Plaintiff prepared and returned the necessary paperwork to Defendants to establish the 10 cent contribution increases. Checker and Plaintiff applied the increase to all service and not merely future service. Defendants processed the form, and the resulting increase in benefits was significantly less than the quotation. Although Checker and Plaintiff had historically negotiated all service increases, the quotation assumed that the increase would only apply to future service and not all service. This change in assumptions is the sole cause of the difference in benefit levels.
Apparently unrelated to this litigation, Defendants decided to increase benefit levels without requiring a corresponding increase in contributions in both November 1999 and November 2000. These increases were applied retroactively to January 1998 and January 1999 respectively. As a result of these increases, the benefit levels in January 1999 exceeded the benefit levels described in the quotation.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). An issue concerning a material fact is genuine if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment is proper if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III.
As in any case, the Court has an independent obligation to review the basis of its jurisdiction. Here, Plaintiff asserts both federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001), and diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2001). There is a federal question because in Plaintiff's words, this litigation seeks "to enforce rights and obtain relief under ERISA." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 5). ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461(2001). ERISA will only constitute a federal question for purposes of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction if ERISA preempts either or both of Plaintiff's claims.
The Court finds ERISA preemption on these facts. As noted in an earlier opinion in this case, ERISA preemption is expansive. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). "[C]laims for benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by ERISA are preempted as long as the lawsuit relates to an employee benefit plan." Wright v. General Motors Corp., 262 F.3d 610, 613 (6th Cir. 2001). Additionally, "when the action is to recover benefits, enforce rights or clarify future benefits under an ERISA plan," the claims are completely preempted by ERISA. Id. Here, there is no question that Plaintiff is seeking increased pension benefit levels. (Pl.'s Compl. Count I, II). Moreover, while Plaintiff argues that it is not seeking increased benefits, nothing in Plaintiff's response persuades this Court that Plaintiff is seeking anything other than increased benefits. Consequently, the Court finds that ERISA preempts Plaintiff's claims.
Because this case is governed by ERISA. "[s]tanding is thought of as a `jurisdictional' matter, and a plaintiff's lack of standing is said to deprive a court of jurisdiction." Ward v. Alternative Health Delivery Systems, Inc, 261 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the only plaintiffs with standing to bring civil actions under ERISA are participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2001). In a recent case, the Sixth Circuit found that a plaintiff did "not have standing to bring her ERISA claims because she [wa]s not a plan participant or beneficiary." Id. at 627. See also N.J. State AFL-CIO v. New Jersey. 747 F.2d 891, 893 (3d Cir. 19841(holding that "labor unions are neither participants nor beneficiaries" of ERISA plans). Defendants are correct that Plaintiff is neither a participant, a beneficiary, nor a fiduciary. Furthermore, Plaintiff's offer to amend the complaint to include every one of Plaintiff's members misses the point. Plaintiff must have ERISA standing for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction is not a mere formality. Because Plaintiff does not have standing to raise these ERISA claims, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
The Court notes that Plaintiff appears to argue that ERISA preemption is not applicable here. Specifically, Plaintiff compares its claims to a claim by a landlord against an ERISA plan tenant, which fails to pay its rent. (Pl.'s Br. Opp'n at 2). Assuming Plaintiff's analogy is correct, then there is no federal question and no subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In this scenario, Plaintiff must show diversity jurisdiction, but Plaintiff's complaint is not sufficient to invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiff may not rely on diversity jurisdiction because the complaint has not pleaded an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. "In diversity cases, the general rule is that the amount claimed by a plaintiff in his complaint determines the amount in controversy, unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount." Rosen v. Chrysler Corp., 205 F.3d 918, 920-21 (6th Cir. 2000). Both Plaintiff's complaint (Compl. ¶ 6) and Plaintiff's brief on this motion (Pl.'s Br. Opp'n at 3) assert that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. The diversity jurisdiction statute, however, specifies the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2001). See also Pub.L. No. 104-317 § 205 (1996) (increasing the amount in controversy from $50,000 to $75,000). Therefore, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction.
Assuming for argument that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's claim of equitable estoppel also fails on the merits. First, the Sixth Circuit strongly indicated in Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1991), that for public policy reasons, equitable estoppel is not applicable against a pension plan. Id. at 1300. Although Plaintiff claims that these policy reasons are inapplicable here, nothing in the Sixth Circuit's generalized analysis suggests that these reasons are not applicable to all pension plans. Id. at 1300.
Second, equitable estoppel is inappropriate "to vary the terms of unambiguous plan documents." Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, the plan documents describe the procedures for setting benefit levels but do not specify the exact benefit levels. Plaintiff contends that this description creates an ambiguity. Setting up procedures as opposed to stating exact figures does not, however, create an ambiguity. See Easa v. Florists' Transworld Deliverv Assn, 5 F. Supp.2d 522, 526 (E.D.Mich. 1998) (doubting the application of equitable estoppel to an error in computation when the plan documents specified the procedures for determining benefit levels). Because this plan is a pension plan and the plan documents are unambiguous, equitable estoppel is not applicable here. Consequently, Plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim has no merit.
Again, assuming that this Court had subject matter jurisdiction to address Plaintiff's negligence claim against NIGPP's Administrator, the Court would find the negligence claim like the equitable estoppel claim is without merit. In particular, damages are a necessary element of a negligence action. The Board of Trustees' action increasing benefits without a corresponding increase in premium levels gives Plaintiff's members the relief that they seek in this litigation.
IV.
In summary, ERISA preemption applies to Plaintiff's claims. Under ERISA, this Court only has jurisdiction over claims brought by participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries. Plaintiff is none of these, and contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, this requirement is not a mere formality. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not effectively invoked subject matter jurisdiction through an alternative federal question or diversity. Consequently, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear these claims. Even if the merits of Plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim are reached, it is inappropriate to apply equitable estoppel because this case involves a pension plan with unambiguous plan documents. Similarly, putting aside the difficulties caused by ERISA preemption and subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's negligence claim does not have any merit as Plaintiff has not suffered any damages. Consequently, Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion entered this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant National Industrial Group Pension Plan's motion for summary judgment (Docket # 34) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant National Industrial Group Pension Plan Administrative Agency's motion for summary judgment (Docket # 33) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants National Industrial Group Pension Plan and National Industrial Group Pension Plan Administrative Agency may file motions and supporting documentation seeking attorneys fees in this case by November 29, 2001.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Defendants and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.